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Abstract
In 2016, the icty Trial Chamber found one of the greatest hate and fear propagandists 
of the Yugoslav wars, Dr Vojislav Šešelj, not guilty on all counts of the indictment. A full 
comprehension of the role the propaganda played was lost and the partial reversal of 
the judgment at the Appeals Chamber provided little improvement in this regard. Yet 
the blame does not solely rest with the Chambers but also with the Prosecution and an 
utterly fragmented law applicable to hate and fear propaganda. This article looks in 
depth at the Šešelj case in order to highlight the many hurdles to effective prosecution, 
some specific to the case and others symptomatic generally of propaganda trials. It 
then takes a multi-disciplinary approach in presenting the nature of hate and fear 
 propaganda to suggest a broader way of looking at causality as well as to argue for re-
form of the current applicable law.
1 The authors are very grateful to Professor Predrag Dojčinović, Dr. Wibke K. Timmerman, Pro-
fessor Gregory S. Gordon, Professor Richard Ashby Wilson and Ms Clare Lawson for their me-
ticulous reading of the paper and their most valuable comments and inputs. Special thanks 
to Dr. Daley Birkett. Earlier versions of this work were presented at Salzburg Law School’s 
Twentieth Anniversary Symposium ‘The Sound of the icl’, Salzburg, Austria; The State Coun-
cil of Egypt, Cairo; Centre for European Law and Internationalisation, University of Leices-
ter, UK; The Egyptian Society of International Law, Egypt; the international conference on 
‘Hate Propaganda at International Criminal Tribunals’, organised by the authors, hosted by 
Northumbria University and funded by the Society of Legal Scholars (sls), online at www 
.northumbria.ac.uk/hpict2020. All online sources included were accessed on 2 January 2020.
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1 Introduction
Propaganda, in its various forms and manifestations, is as old as recorded his-
tory, and its philosophical origins can be traced back to ancient Greece.2 It is a 
deliberate and systematic attempt at shaping perceptions and manipulating 
the cognitions of the listener in order to direct their behaviour in a way that 
furthers the intent of the propagandist.3 The intended influence and manipu-
lation distinguish it from dissemination of mere factual information.4 As one 
commentator put nearly fifty years ago, propaganda is: ‘one of the most dan-
gerous sources of international friction and war … [and that] the presence of 
unrestrained propaganda can sometimes make the difference between peace 
and war’.5 Because of its omnipresence, propaganda has largely come to be ac-
cepted as a fact of political life and its most pernicious forms remain inade-
quately addressed in international criminal law (icl).
In terms of propaganda that specifically spreads fear and hatred towards a 
 particular out-group in order to foster crimes against its members6 there is 
a  wide spectrum of approaches to it offered by a number of international 
2 G.S. Jowett and V. O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (7th ed., sage Publishing, London, 
2019), pp. 48-49; see also J. Kiper, ‘How Dangerous Propaganda Works’, in P. Dojčinović (ed.), 
Propaganda and International Criminal Law: From Cognition to Criminality (Routledge, 
Abingdon, 2020), p. 219.
3 Jowett and O’Donnell, ibid., p. 7.
4 E. De Brabandere, ‘Propaganda’, Max Plank Encyclopedia of Public International Law, https://
opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e978?prd= 
OPIL&q=Propaganda, p. 2.
5 A. Larson, ‘The Present Status of Propaganda in International Law’, 31 Law and Contemporary 
Problems (1966) 439-451, p. 439.
6 See the ‘Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mis-
sion on Myanmar’, UN Human Rights Council, 39th session, A/HRC/39/64, 12 September 2018, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/A_HRC_39_64 
.pdf, para. 73, noting that ‘The Myanmar authorities, including the Government and the Tat-
madaw, have fostered a climate in which hate speech thrives, human rights violations are 
legitimized, and incitement to discrimination and violence facilitated’; see also W.K. Tim-
mermann, Incitement in International Law (Routledge, New York, 2015), p. 3.
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 conventions and existing jurisprudence, but it all fall short of determining its 
true nature, role and impact in international criminal trials and its position 
and status in icl.7
Kearney observes how successive judgments by the ad hoc Tribunals have 
 carried continuous analyses and references to the significance of propaganda, 
in terms of the role of hate speech, censorship and incitement in preparing 
 people for war and in establishing atmospheres of hatred and fear in which 
emotion, confusion and uncertainty can be exploited in order to further the 
commission of the most serious and appalling international crimes.8 Yet, this 
condemnation of propaganda rarely translates into a sustained and focused 
analysis of an individual criminal responsibility for the relevant speech.9
Instead of moving forward, the icty took a step back in the Šešelj Trial Judg-
ment. Noting that what it considered to be propaganda of a ‘nationalist’ ideol-
ogy was not in itself criminal,10 it proceeded to consider the entirety of the 
toxic hate and fear propaganda spread by the accused as falling outside the 
ambit of international criminal responsibility altogether. Thus, the Šešelj trial, 
which was considered one of the most significant ‘propaganda trials’ in the 
recent history of international law, ended ignominiously for the Prosecution 
with a complete acquittal.11 As noted by Timmermann, the case demonstrates 
the difficulties associated with charging instigation in relation to acts of public 
incitement and more generally with the way in which instigation and incite-
ment are currently treated in icl.12
Unsurprisingly, the judgment received an epilogue at the Appeals Chamber 
(AC) of the UN International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 
(imct), which substantially reversed the findings of the Trial Chamber (TC). 
However, this was hardly sufficient, as only a single speech given in Hrtkovci, 
out of all of Šešelj’s propaganda, was found to be criminal in the end.
7 P. Dojčinović ‘Introduction’, in Dojčinović (ed.), Propaganda and International Criminal 
Law, supra note 2, p. 5; see also M.E. Badar and P. Florijančič, ‘Assessing Incitement to 
Hatred as a Crime against Humanity of Persecution’, 24 International Journal of Human 
Rights (2020), DOI: 10.1080/13642987.2019.1671356, 1-30.
8 M. Kearney, ‘Propaganda in the Jurisprudence of the icty’, in P. Dojčinović (ed.), Propa-
ganda, War Crimes Trials and International Law: From Speakers’ Corner to War Crimes 
(Routledge, New York, 2012), p. 231.
9 Ibid.
10 Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Trial Judgment, Case No. (IT-03-67-T), 31 March 2016, para. 300.
11 R.A. Wilson, Incitement on Trial: Prosecuting International Speech Crimes (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, 2017) pp. 8-9.
12 W.K. Timmermann, ‘International Speech Crimes following the Šešelj Appeal Judgment’, 
in Dojčinović (ed.), supra note 2, pp. 108, 111.
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In Section 2, the article first examines how the concept of ‘hate speech’ 
has been defined by various international institutions, in the areas of interna-
tional human rights law as well as international criminal law (icl). This Sec-
tion  further demonstrates the fragmentation of the law and the lacuna that is 
still present in terms of international criminalisation of ‘hate and fear propa-
ganda’ as a particular phenomenon that includes a set of components, which 
cannot simply be equated with the basic notion of ‘hate speech’.
Section 3 analyses the case of Vojislav Šešelj as a case study of the current 
problems in dealing with hate and fear propaganda at international criminal 
tribunals. It will delineate the propagandistic activities of Šešelj and demon-
strates how the Trial Chamber (TC) failed in understanding the workings of his 
propaganda while simultaneously being derailed by the fragmentation of the 
applicable law. The Section will provide a critique of the prosecutorial method 
in selecting evidence as well as the overly restrictive interpretation of the law 
by both the TC and AC. The analysis of the Šešelj case is conducted with a view 
to avoiding mistakes in the future and understanding the underlying legal 
problems that require a reform of the existing law.
Section 4 takes a multi-disciplinary approach at identifying why the law and 
its current application at international criminal tribunals fails to approach 
hate and fear propaganda in an effective manner. It furthermore highlights the 
necessary shifts in legal perceptions of this phenomenon that would allow 
more meaningful conclusions in the jurisprudence in line with the findings of 
experts in the social sciences.
Section 5 assesses the work of the International Law Commission (ilc) on 
the new draft convention on crimes against humanity (cah) and the preventa-
tive function of international criminal law with the recommendation of add-
ing a new inchoate crime – incitement to cah. The article concludes with pro-
posing how hate and fear propaganda should be criminalised and adjudicated 
at the international level.
2 International Law Applicable to Hate and Fear Propaganda
This section will examine briefly the various domestic and international ap-
proaches to speech acts broadly termed ‘hate speech’ from the perspective of 
human rights and criminal law. It will further demonstrate the fragmentation 
of the law and the lacuna that is still present in terms of international crimi-
nalisation of ‘hate and fear propaganda’ as a particular phenomenon that in-
cludes a set of components, which cannot simply be equated with the basic 
notion of ‘hate speech’.
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2.1 Hate Speech and Hate and Fear Propaganda
Various speech acts13 can cause or strengthen antagonism against the mem-
bers of particular groups.14 ‘Hate speech’ is a term that most broadly captures 
these acts and virtually all states apart from the United States have accepted 
some sort of national, regional or international restrictions on it since the 
1960s.15 Yet the definitions vary and there is no consensus on what exactly con-
stitutes hate speech. The threshold factor of any hate speech is that it targets a 
group, or an individual as a member of a group (hereinafter: out-group); usu-
ally based on nationality, ethnicity, religion or race, less commonly on gender, 
gender identity or sexual orientation and sometimes on veteran status, physi-
cal ability or suffering from serious diseases.16 What is understood by the term 
hatred, and how to legally outline it, is less clear. An earlier draft of General 
Comment No. 34 by the Human Rights Committee (hrc) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr) defined hatred as ‘intense emo-
tions of opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards a target individual or 
group’ and considered that the expression in question had to convey such 
emotions.17 However this approach was ultimately dropped, perhaps because 
it would exclude extreme speech that is not explicitly accompanied by such 
emotions.18 During the travaux préparatoires of the iccpr Art. 20(2) an early 
13 On ‘speech acts’ see generally J. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1962), p. 108: Austin distinguishes between locutionary acts roughly 
equivalent to utterances of sentences with a certain sense and reference (i.e. meaning); 
illocutionary acts corresponding to utterances which inform, order, warn, undertake etc.; 
and perlocutionary acts which bring about or achieve by utterance, for example convinc-
ing, persuading, deterring or misleading. See also J. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the 
Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969). Dojčinović uses 
their work as the foundation for determining words/phrases/utterances as ‘speech acts’, a 
concept applicable in legal discourse. Wilson adopted the approach in his monograph 
Incitement on Trial, supra note 11. Most recently, see anthropologist and cognitive scientist 
Kiper, supra note 2, p. 219; and legal theorist and cognitive linguist P. Dojčinović, ‘In the 
Mind of the Crime’, in Dojčinović (ed.), supra note 2, p. 196, fn 38.
14 Timmermann, supra note 6, p. 17.
15 E. Heinze, ‘Wild-West Cowboys versus Cheese-Eating Surrender Monkeys: Some Prob-
lems in Comparative Approaches to Hate Speech’, in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.), Ex-
treme Speech and Democracy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009), p. 184.
16 A.F. Sellars, ‘Defining Hate Speech’, Berkman Klein Center Research Publication No. 2016-
20 papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2882244.
17 Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No. 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34/
CRP.2 (2010) hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/hrcom34.html, para. 53.
18 J. Temperman, Religious Hatred and International Law: The Prohibition of Incitement to 
Violence or Discrimination (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016), p. 173. 
 Temperman describes how this definition was influenced by the definition of hatred in 





international criminal law review (2020) 1-87
text proposed by France included advocacy of hostility that constituted an 
 incitement to violence or hatred.19 Some delegates however expressed that in-
citement to hatred was not easy to define as a penal offence20 nor was it easy 
to legally interpret the word ‘hatred’ in general and thus suggested its remov-
al.21 The final wording that qualifies advocacy of hatred with other necessary 
outcomes (see below) has allowed the hrc to identify hatred with the element 
of incitement in its case law.22 For example in the case of Faurisson v. France, 
Rajsoomer Lallah accepted the conclusion of the French courts that the state-
ments were ‘of such a nature as to raise or strengthen anti-Semitic tendencies’ 
and for that reason they amounted to hatred.23
Some definitions of hate speech describe speech that promotes inferiority 
of the target group or the denial of the personhood of target group members24 
or their stigmatisation with qualities widely regarded as undesirable in order 
Art. 12(i) of the ngo, Article xix, Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equal-
ity (April 2009), which in turn was influenced by a Canadian Supreme Court decision in 
R. v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 13 December 1990, at 697 (Can.), para. 1, where the Court 
held that the word ‘hatred’ under the Canadian criminal hate speech prohibition (s. 319(2) 
Criminal Code of Canada 1985) refers to ‘only the most severe and deeply felt form of op-
probrium’. The Court further speaks of ‘extreme feelings of opprobrium and enmity 
against a racial or religious group’ (R. v. Keegstra, section V). Note that the Special Rap-
porteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion employed a similar approach to the draft General Comment. In his Report on Hate 
Speech and Incitement to Hatred he defined hate as ‘a state of mind characterized as in-
tense and irrational emotions of opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards the target 
group’. He considered that a severe and deeply felt form of opprobrium should be present 
for the application of iccpr Art.20(2) and that it should be assessed based on the severity 
of what is said, the harm advocated, magnitude and intensity in terms of frequency, 
choice of media, reach and extent. UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rappor-
teur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
A/67/357, (2012), (unga, Report A/67/357, 2012), paras. 44(a), 45(a).
19 Text proposed by the representative of France [Any advocacy of national, racial or reli-
gious hostility that constitutes an incitement to violence or hatred shall be prohibited by 
the law of the State.] UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 
Sixth Session, Compilation of the Comments of Governments on the Draft International 
Covenant on Human Rights and on the Proposed Additional Articles, E/CN.4/365, (1950) 
(UN, E/CN.4/365) 57.
20 Ibid., para. 2 (United Kingdom).
21 UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sixth Session, E/CN.4/
SR.174, (1950) (UN, E/CN.4/SR.174) para. 38 (Lebanon).
22 Temperman, supra note 18, pp. 168-172.
23 Human Rights Committee, Faurisson v. France, No. 550/1993, Individual opinion, Lallah 
(concurring), para. 9.
24 M.J. Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story’, 87 Michi-
gan Law Review (1989) 2320-2381, p. 2358.
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to be seen as an undesirable presence and a legitimate object of hostility.25 
Other definitions more simply include speech that is abusive, humiliating, of-
fensive or intimidating.26 The Rabat Plan of Action (rpa), which considers the 
distinction between freedom of expression and incitement to hatred, looks to 
see if the speech is ‘provocative and direct’, and asks European Union (EU) 
member states to look to the ‘nature of the arguments employed’.27
The broader definitions of hate speech include speech that does not neces-
sarily incite or instigate a further harm apart from hatred itself. Thus the Coun-
cil of Europe and the EU have produced at various times by various bodies 
widely differing and broad definitions that mostly include the instruction to 
member States to criminalise either incitement, promotion, justification, the 
spreading of or subjection to ‘hatred’ in itself.28
On the contrary, qualified hate speech is meant to elicit some sort of action 
from the listener. Most notably Article 20(2) of the iccpr orders States parties 
to adopt incitement laws not to ban hate speech for the sake of banning hatred 
but only if such advocacy incites discrimination, hostility or violence, i.e. forms 
of harm that are ‘contingent’ and ‘measurable’.29 An earlier draft sought to 
 prohibit ‘incitement to hatred and violence’, i.e. incitement to violent acts only, 
25 B. Parekh, ‘Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?’, in M. Herz and P. Molnar (eds.), The 
Content and Context of Hate Speech (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) pp. 
40–41.
26 United Kingdom refers to speech that is ‘threatening, abusive, or insulting’ (Public Order 
Act 1986, para. 18(1)); Australia refers to speech that is likely to ‘offend, insult, humiliate, 
or intimidate others’ (Racial Discrimination Act 1975, para. 18(c)(1)).
27 Rabat Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial or Religious Hatred 
that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence (Rabat, 5 October 2012), 
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Articles19-20/Pages/Index.aspx, para. 22. 
The Rabat Plan of Action considers the distinction between freedom of expression and 
incitement to hatred. It was adopted by a group of experts and brings together the conclu-
sions and recommendations of a series of workshops organised by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (ohchr) in 2011. It is included in Appendix to an Ad-
dendum to an annual report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/22/17/
Add.4, 11 January 2013. For its significance see Sejal Parmer, ‘The Rabat Plan of Action: A 
Critical Turning Point in International Law on ‘Hate Speech”, in P. Molnár (ed.), Free 
Speech and Censorship around the Globe (Central European University Press, Budapest, 
2015) 211-231, p. 213: claiming that ‘states and non-state actors, particularly media and civil 
society organizations, should rally behind the rpa as a legitimate and credible framework 
for responding to diverse challenges of hate speech around the world’.
28 See ECtHR, Günduz v. Turkey, App no. 35071/97 (ECtHR, 4 December 2003), para. 40. Com-
mittee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (97) 20 on ‘Hate Speech’ (adopted on 30 Oc-
tober 1997). Other documents adopted by the Committee of Ministers emphasise specific 
contexts.
29 R. Post, ‘Hate Speech’, in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds.), Extreme Speech and De-
mocracy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) pp. 123-38, 127, 133-5.
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however the final wording also now includes incitement to discrimination or 
hostility without a need for violence.30 The definitions of the terms remain 
somewhat of an enigma, as the hrc General Comment 34 is exceedingly sum-
mary, more detailed provisions in early drafts having been dropped.31
Nevertheless, as Schabas notes, discrimination is a ‘familiar concept in in-
ternational human rights law’ thoroughly addressed in Articles 2 and 26 of the 
iccpr.32 It can be understood as any distinction, exclusion, restriction or pref-
erence of different categories of people, the list of which keeps expanding over 
time,33 with the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public 
life.34 In terms of the other two ‘harms’ referred to in Article 20(2), the Special 
Rapporteur described ‘violence’ as ‘the use of physical force or power against 
another person, or against a group or community, which either results in, or 
has a high likelihood of resulting in, injury, death psychological harm, malde-
velopment or deprivation’.35 On the other hand the term ‘hostility’ was de-
scribed by the Rapporteur as ‘a manifestation of hatred beyond a mere state of 
mind’36 in the form of actual harmful acts.37 The term is nevertheless vague 
and can blur the distinction between qualified and unqualified hate speech. 
For example, the Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality,38 
a set of principles developed by the non-governmental organisation Article 
xix,39 equate hostility with hatred.40
30 See Art. 26 of the Commission on Human Rights draft cited in W.A. Schabas, Nowak's Com-
mentary on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Engel, Kehl, 2019) 576-
591, p. 583.
31 Schabas, ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 587.
33 UN General Assembly, Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, (A/74/486) (2019), para. 8.
34 ngo Article xix, Prohibiting Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence, Policy 
Brief, (December 2012) www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/3548/ARTICLE-19-poli-
cy-on-prohibition-to-incitement.pdf, 19; UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expres-
sion, Report on Hate Speech and Incitement, para. 45(d) contains a similar definition.
35 UN General Assembly, Sixty-seventh session, Promotion and Protection (A/67/357), (2012), 
para. 43.
36 Ibid., para. 44.
37 UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, supra note 34, para. 45(e).
38 See the Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality, April 2009, www.ar-
ticle19.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/Camden-Principles-ENGLISH-web.pdf.
39 For more on the work of the international ngo Article xix see www.article19.org.
40 ngo Article xix, supra note 34, Principle 12(1)(i) ‘the terms ‘hatred’ and ‘hostility’ refer to 
intense and irrational emotions of opprobrium, enmity and detestation towards the tar-
get group’.
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Even narrower definitions of hate speech than that in Article 20(2) of the 
iccpr demand not solely incitement but instigation of the listener and thus a 
causal link with the discrimination, hostility, violence, or other harm subse-
quently committed, which is what is mainly the trend in icl, described in de-
tail below. Approaches in the middle, require the likelihood of subsequent 
harm occurring, in which case context is essential in defining such likelihood. 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has at times used a multi- 
faceted test that takes into account a variety of factors including the likelihood 
and seriousness of the consequences of a particular expression and the inten-
tion of the speaker, while at other times it has disregarded this for an open-
ended and context based so-called democratic necessity approach.41
From the travaux préparatoires of iccpr Article 20(2) one can observe that 
the term ‘hate propaganda’ was often used throughout the drafting debates 
and when the term ‘advocacy’ was introduced, some delegates maintained that 
it should be understood as ‘systematic and persistent propaganda’42 and others 
that it must mean ‘repeated and insistent expression’.43 Interestingly, para-
graph 20(1) still uses the term propaganda for war while there were no efforts 
to define it during the drafting.44 Delegates in the Third Committee indicated 
that the term had already been employed in national and international legal 
norms, in various General Assembly resolutions and in the judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal.45 The intent of the drafters of Art. 20(1) was to 
prohibit propagandistic incitement roughly comparable to that practised in 
the Third Reich.46 Schabas thus understands propaganda in this context to 
mean ‘intentional, well-aimed influencing of individuals by employing various 
channels of communication to disseminate, above all, incorrect or exaggerate 
allegations of fact… negative or simplistic value judgments whose intensity is 
at least comparable to that of provocation, instigation or incitement’.47
Similarly, in terms of advocacy of hatred, the reference to Nazi views and 
Nazi-like propaganda was obvious. A text proposed by the representative of 
the Soviet Union, explicitly referred to fascist-Nazi views and the propaganda 
41 S. Sottiaux, ‘Leroy v France: Apology of Terrorism and the Malaise of the European Court 
of Human Rights’ free speech jurisprudence’, 3 European Human Rights Law Review (2009) 
419-420, 425.
42 E/CN.4/SR.174, supra note 21, para. 37 (Lebanon).
43 UN A/C.3/SR.179, para. 2.
44 Schabas, Nowak's Commentary, supra note 30, p. 580.
45 A/C.3/SR. 1078, para 12 as cited in M.J. Bossuyt, Guide to the Travaux Préparatoires of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987) 
408.
46 Schabas, supra note 30, p. 581.
47 Ibid.
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of racial and national superiority.48 Mr. Jevremović representing Yugoslavia 
stated that Nazi ideas had been the cause of the death of two million of his 
countrymen and that the people of the region ‘knew what was meant by incite-
ment to hatred’.49 He further noted that there were already laws in Yugoslavia 
prohibiting such incitement and that it was necessary to introduce the idea 
into the covenant.50
Despite this, the highly dangerous phenomenon of what can best be charac-
terised as repetitive and systematic hate and fear propaganda cannot simply be 
equated with any subset of hate speech but rather includes a comprehensive 
set of specific components. As with all propaganda, it is designed to last longer 
than a single utterance or speech act.51 It is systematic and aimed at defining 
the very ‘level of reality on which people think, discuss, and act’.52 The most 
precarious methods of hate propaganda ‘are those that intersect with hate me-
dia, which stigmatizes and demonizes an out-group’.53 This is equally true of 
hate propaganda used by governments and other organised groups as part of a 
systematic process of persecution to prepare the public to commit atrocities 
against other members of the society.54 Crucially, it furthermore not only 
 characterises the out-group in highly negative stereotypical terms (hate propa-
ganda) but also as a threat to the survival or well-being of the in-group (fear 
propaganda), which in turn, is proposed to be managed with a ‘solution’ rang-
ing from discrimination to physical separation or even annihilation.55 Thus 
48 UN Secretary General, Compilation of the comments of Governments on the draft Interna-
tional Covenant on Human Rights and on the proposed additional articles; memorandum / 
by the Secretary-General (E/CN.4/365) (1950). Text proposed by the representative of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [The propaganda in whatever form of fascist-Nazi 
views and the propaganda of racial and national superiority, hatred and contempt shall 
be prohibited by law.] 57.
49 E/CN.4/SR.174, supra note 21, para. 41 (Yugoslavia).
50 Ibid.
51 Dojčinović, ‘Introduction’, supra note 7, p. 7.
52 H. Gerth, ‘Crisis Management of Social Structures: Planning, Propaganda and Societal 
Morale’, 5 International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society (1992) 337-359, p. 338.
53 Kiper, supra note 2, p. 219. For instance, the military establishment in Myanmar has used 
Facebook to incite widespread violence against the Rohingya Muslim minority a fact that 
was admitted by Facebook, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-46105934.
54 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Interna-
tional Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, (A/HRC/39/CRP.2) 17 September 2018, noting 
that ‘The Myanmar authorities, including the Government and the Tatmadaw, have fos-
tered a climate in which hate speech thrives, human rights violations are legitimized, and 
incitement to discrimination and violence facilitated’. See also Timmermann, supra note 
6, p. 3.
55 A. Oberschall, ‘Propaganda, hate speech and mass killings’, in Dojčinović (ed.), supra note 
8, pp. 171, 174; J. Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass 
Killing (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002); Timmermann, ibid., pp. 17-18, 29.
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‘hate speech’ and ‘fear speech’ are components of distinct but corresponding 
conduct geared towards achieving the same ends and goals.56
Oberschall explains how ‘the public makes sense of public affairs through a 
cognitive frame that establishes the truth value of perceptions, beliefs, opin-
ions, attitudes, and action norms’.57 Threat messages in the mass media are the 
most effective in switching the public’s cognitive frame of peaceful inter-group 
relations to a crisis frame justifying coercion and violence.58 This phenome-
non, also called ‘paranoia propaganda’, consists of fostering delusions of dan-
ger from external enemies and traitors at home and of complete dependency 
upon leadership, party and ideology.59 Its effects have been recognised in in-
ternational criminal jurisprudence, for example in Nahimana et al. where most 
references to fear ‘constitute inferences and links between the evidence of fear 
propaganda and the commission and perpetration of a wide range of physical 
crimes’.60 Referring to the newspaper Kangura, the TC stated that ‘[t]hrough 
fear-mongering and hate propaganda, [it] paved the way for genocide in Rwan-
da, whipping the Hutu population into a killing frenzy’.61 Furthermore, in 
Brđanin, the TC addressed the combination of spreading fear and hatred by 
stating the following:
By his public statement the Accused created fear and hatred between 
Bosnian Serbs on the one hand and Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats 
on the other hand, inciting the ethnic groups against each other. The Ac-
cused repeatedly used derogatory language to refer to non-Serbs, calling 
them ‘Balijas’ (Muslims), ‘Ustaša’ (Croats), ‘Šiptar’ (Albanians), ‘vermin’, 
‘scum’, ‘infidel’ and second rate people.62
As noted by Predrag Dojčinović, ‘through the distinct combination of fear, 
hate, derogatory and dehumanising, and indirect culture-specific references 
56 Dojčinović, ‘Introduction’, supra note 7, p. 7.
57 A. Oberschall, Vojislav Šešelj’s Nationalist Propaganda: Contents, Techniques, Aims and Im-
pacts, 1990-1994, An Expert Report for the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the 
 former Yugoslavia, exhibit no. P00005, (4 January 2005), p. 44, www.baginst.org/uploads/ 
1/0/4/8/10486668/vojislav_seseljs_nationalist_propaganda-_contents_techniques_aims 
_and_impacts.pdf.
58 Ibid., p. 45.
59 R. Cole (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Propaganda (Routledge, New York, 1998) 566.
60 Dojčinović, ‘Introduction’, supra note 7, pp. 8-12.
61 Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al, Trial Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-99-52-T), 3 De-
cember 2003, para. 950, emphasis added.
62 Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Trial Judgment, Case No. (IT-99-36-T), 1 September 2004, 
para. 325 (emphasis added).
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and types of linguistic communication, the concept of fear is placed at the 
centre of Brđanin’s and other jce members’ propagandistic conduct’.63
Hate and fear propaganda furthermore rest on a number of persuasion tech-
niques to speed up this process, such as relentless repetition of its never chang-
ing narrative; speaking in the voice of trusted authorities including God,64 the 
majority of the in-group, ancestors, history, national heroes, and experts;65 and 
employing falsehoods, from a selective omission of facts, deliberate mischar-
acterisation of events and adversaries to out and out fabrication and lies. Ac-
cording to Oberschall, it is the latter that is the essential element of hate pro-
paganda.66 An often-used example are accusations in a mirror, ‘a rhetorical 
practice in which one falsely accuses one’s enemies of conducting, plotting, or 
desiring to commit precisely the same transgressions that one plans to commit 
against them’.67
Despite the far broader and more complex nature of such propaganda, cur-
rent international criminalisation is limited mainly to incitement of violence, 
leaving out much of the hate and fear propaganda surrounding it. Judgments 
that have dared to include it into the criminalisation of hate speech outside 
strict incitement and instigation have been reversed in later jurisprudence.
2.2 International Criminalisation of Hate Speech and Hate and Fear 
Propaganda
Neither hate speech nor systematic hate and fear propaganda are internation-
ally criminalised as such, although they can in part constitute international 
crimes. The concept of propaganda is furthermore often used in the jurispru-
dence to describe ‘behavioural patterns and forms of intent in a variety of ideo-
logical, political and military, individual or collectively coordinated efforts’.68
63 Dojčinović, ‘Introduction’, supra note 7, p. 10.
64 A propaganda technique which has been successfully employed by a terrorist organisa-
tion that named itself the Islamic State (isis), see M.E. Badar, ‘The Road to Genocide: The 
Propaganda Machine of the Self-Declared Islamic State (IS)’, 16 International Criminal 
Law Review (2016) 361-411; M.E. Badar and P. Florijančič, ‘The Cognitive and Linguistic 
Implications of isis Propaganda: Proving the Crime of Direct and Public Incitement to 
Commit Genocide’, in Dojčinović (ed.), supra note 2, pp. 27-62.
65 Oberschall refers to this as ‘testimonial persuasion technique’ and the use of vox populi, 
vox dei, see Oberschall, supra note 57, pp. 172-173.
66 Ibid., p. 173.
67 K.L. Marcus, ‘Accusation in a Mirror’, 43 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal (2012) 357-
394, p. 359: noting that ‘the basic idea of [Accusation in a mirror] is deceptively simple: 
propagandists must ‘impute to enemies exactly what they and their own party are plan-
ning to do’.
68 Dojčinović, ‘Introduction’, supra note 7, p. 4.
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‘Incitement to hatred’ is the closest law-based concept that has been dealt 
with in international criminal jurisprudence since the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg (imt) considered the cases against Nazi propagandists, 
Julius Streicher and Hans Fritzsche. The former was found guilty of cah while 
Fritzsche, was acquitted. A third propagandist, Otto Dietrich, was prosecuted 
and also convicted under Control Council Law No. 10 in the Ministries case 
before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal (nmt).
Since then, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (1948) established the international crime of direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide.69 This was incorporated verbatim into the 
statutes of the icty (1993) and the ictr (1994), while the icc Statute (2002) 
established in its ‘General Part’, in respect of the crime of genocide, individual 
criminal responsibility for anyone who directly and publicly incites others to 
commit said crime.70
On the other hand, publicly uttered hate propaganda falling short of direct 
incitement to commit genocide was not criminalised in any of the statutes. In 
fact, during the drafting of the Rome Statute, Roger Clark and a few others sug-
gested including incitement to all four major crimes, however the proposal 
gained little traction.71 Strongly opposed to the idea, some delegations even 
felt that incitement as a specific form of complicity in genocide should not be 
included in the ‘General Part’ of the Statute but only in the specific provision 
on the crime of genocide (Article 6) in order to underline that incitement was 
not recognised for other crimes.72 Yet such incitement is covered by several 
forms of complicity.73 In terms of the Rome Statute, it is covered by soliciting74 
and inducing.75 Furthermore under the icty and ictr Statutes speech acts 
69 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (1951) 78 unts 
277, Art. 3(c).
70 icty Statute, Article 3(c); ictr Statute, Article 2(3)(c); icc Statute, Article 25(3)(e).
71 G.S. Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law: Foundation, Fragmentation, Fruition (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2017) p. 375, fn. 32 (e-mail from R. Clark, Board of Governors Professor of 
Law, Rutgers Law School, to G.S. Gordon (9 Aug. 2016).
72 K. Ambos, ‘Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (3rd ed., CH-
Beck/Hart/Nomos, Baden-Baden/Munich/Oxford, 2016) p. 1016.
73 icc Statute, Art. 25(3).
74 According to Section 5.02 (1) of the United States Model Penal Code, ‘soliciting’ entails 
‘urging, advising, commanding, or otherwise inciting another to commit a crime’. Induc-
ing entails the ‘enticement or urging of another person to commit a crime’ American Law 
Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries (The American Law Institute, Philadelphia 
1985).
75 According to R. Clark, soliciting, inducing and inciting seem to be synonyms in the Rome 
Statute. R. Clark, ‘Lexsitus Lecturer: icc Statute Article 25’, Centre for International Law 
Research and Policy, www.cilrap-lexsitus.org/lectures/25-3-d-i/25-clark.
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can fall under instigation while all three Statutes establish individual criminal 
responsibility for ordering and aiding and abetting.76 Under Article 25(3)(d) of 
the Rome Statute such acts can also lead to what has been described as a ‘re-
sidual form of accessory liability’ since it establishes ‘the lowest objective 
threshold for participation’ and thus constitutes a lower level of blameworthi-
ness than other liability theories.77 While this mode of liability is based on the 
‘common purpose theories’ from which the icty established the joint criminal 
enterprise ( jce) doctrine78 it nevertheless differs from the latter doctrine and 
is unprecedented in icl.79 It applies to a person who intentionally contributes 
to a group crime, either with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group or in the knowledge of the intention of the 
group to commit the crime. Yet membership of the person in the group or the 
existence of an agreement between the person and the group are irrelevant as 
it is rather the intentional contribution that is the basis of responsibility. The 
mens rea requirement reshapes part (d) into a version of the crime of joining a 
conspiracy, which is a crime based on individual responsibility, arguably for-
mulated this way to overcome the collective responsibility implicit in the vari-
ations of jce, particularly jce iii.80
Dojčinović notes that ‘any effective propagandistic campaign at the leader-
ship level in modern times must be an enterprise and not merely a personal 
76 icty Statute, Art. 7; ictr Statute, Art. 6(1).
77 Situation in the drc, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of 
the Statute, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Trial Chamber Judgment, 7March 2014, para. 1683; 
Situation in drc, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 
Case no. (ICC-01/04-01/06), 29 January 2007, para. 337; Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
Prosecutor v. William Ruto, Henry Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on the Confir-
mation of Charges, Case No. (ICC-01/09-01/11), 23 January 2012, para. 354. see contra: Mar-
jolein Cupido, ‘Common Purpose Liability Versus Joint Perpetration: A Practical View on 
the icc’s Hierarchy of Liability Theories’ 29 Leiden Journal of International Law (2016) 
897-915.
78 Brđanin Trial Judgment, supra note 62, paras. 80, 323-32; Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Trial Judg-
ment, Case No. (IT-95-5/18-T), 24 March 2016, para. 347; Prosecutor v. Popović et al, Trial 
Judgment, Case No. (IT-05-88-T), 10 June 2010, paras. 1912-21.
79 K. Ambos, ‘The icc and Common Purpose: What Contribution is Required under Article 
25(3)(d)?’, in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court: 
A Critical Account of Challenges and Achievements (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 
p. 592.
80 G. Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law – Volume ii International Criminal Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2019) p. 281; For a critique of jce iii in the icty jurisprudence, 
see M.E. Badar, ‘“Just Convict Everyone!” From Tadić to Stakić and Back Again’, 6 Interna-
tional Criminal Law Review (2006) 293-302.
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attempt at instigating groups and individuals to commit a crime’.81 He thus 
finds the concept of conspiracy to commit a crime or the corresponding doc-
trine of jce to best reflect this phenomenon that encompasses both a collective 
intent and a common objective and provides for the liability both of the inciter/
instigator and the liabilities of the incited/instigated.82
Importantly, for the establishment of liability in these instances, a causal 
link is necessary between the speech and subsequent crimes committed,83 
while such a link is not necessary in terms of incitement to genocide.84 jce li-
ability requires that the act or omission had a ‘significant’ contribution or ef-
fect on subsequent crimes, while aiding and abetting, instigating, soliciting 
and inducing, ordering and planning, all require a higher threshold, i.e. a ‘sub-
stantial’ effect or contribution.85 There are indications however, that the 
81 Dojčinović, ‘Introduction’, supra note 7, pp. 1, 7.
82 Ibid., p. 10. ‘Conspiracy’ is both an inchoate offence and a complicity doctrine (a basis for 
holding a person accountable for the consummated offences of another). A common law 
conspiracy is an agreement, express or implied, between two or more persons to commit 
a criminal act or series of criminal acts, or to accomplish a legal act by unlawful means. It 
has been frequently prosecuted particularly in the United States but more recently courts 
and scholars called for its reform or abolition, see Joshua Dressler, Understanding Crimi-
nal Law (6th ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender, 2012) pp. 421-422.
83 Apart from conspiracy to commit genocide, which is an inchoate crime, see Art. 4(3)(b) of 
the icty Statute; Art. iii(b) of the Genocide Convention.
84 Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-99-52-A), 28 
November 2007, para. 678 ‘the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide 
is an inchoate offence, punishable even if no act of genocide has resulted therefrom. This 
is confirmed by the travaux préparatoires to the Genocide Convention, from which it can 
be concluded that the drafters of the Convention intended to punish direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, even if no act of genocide was committed, the aim being 
to forestall the occurrence of such acts’.
85 For aiding and abetting see, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (IT-94-
1-A), 15 July 1999, para. 229 (iii); Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Appeal Judgment, Case No. 
(IT-95-14/1-A), 24 March 2000, para. 164; Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, Appeal Judgment, 
Case No. (IT-98-32-A), 25 February 2004, para. 102(i); Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana and Al-
lieu Kondewa (the cdf Accused), Appeal Judgment, Case No. (SCSL-04-14-A), 28 May 2008, 
paras. 52, 71, 75, 84; Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (IT-03-68-A), 3 
July 2008, para. 43; Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-
2000-55A), 29 August 2008, para. 79; Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 84, paras. 
482, 672, 934; Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić and Veselin Šljivančanin, Appeal Judgment, Case 
No. (IT-95-13/1-A), 5 May 2009, para. 81; Situation in the drc, Prosecutor v. Callixte 
Mbarushimana, Decision on the confirmation of charges, Case No. (ICC-01/04-01/10), 16 
December 2011, para. 279; Situation in the drc, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
 Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Case No. (ICC-01/04-01/06-2842), 14 March 
2012, para. 997.
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thresholds in the icc Statute may be interpreted lower than this. The aiding 
and abetting definition includes the language ‘or otherwise assists’ that may 
simply constitute an example of assistance, and perhaps a lower threshold 
than ‘substantial’ contribution.86 Furthermore, while certain decisions re-
quired a ‘substantial contribution’87 others did not.88 The Ongwen and Al Mah-
di confirmation of charges decisions specifically rejected the existence of any 
threshold as did the Trial Chamber in Bemba.89 The latter noted that the ilc 
Draft Code Article 2(3)(d) envisioned individual criminal responsibility for 
anyone who knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substan-
tially, in the commission of the crime.90 The fact that ‘substantially’ vanished 
from the final text, indicates that such a standard was likewise intentionally 
removed.91 Several scholars have expressed their disagreement with this ap-
proach, insisting on a substantial contribution or at least some sort of minimal 
threshold.92 However, the Bemba Appeal Judgment confirmed that the icc 
86 C.B. Mahony, ‘Make the icc Relevant: Aiding, Abetting, and Accessorizing as Aggravating 
Factors in Preliminary Examination’, in M. Bergsmo and C. Stahn (eds.), Quality Control in 
Preliminary Examination – Volume ii (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2018) 
200.
87 Mbarushimana Confirmation of Charges, supra note 85, para. 279; Lubanga Trial Judg-
ment, supra note 85, para. 997; Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, supra note 77, para. 354.
88 Situation in the Republic of Côte d’lvoire, Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, Case No. (ICC-02/11-02/11-186) 11 December 2014, para. 167; Situ-
ation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, et al., Deci-
sion on the Confirmation of Charges, Case No. (ICC-01/05-01/13-749), 11 November 2014, 
para. 35.
89 Situation in Uganda, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, Case No. (ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red), 23 March 2016, para 43; Situation in the Re-
public of Mali, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, Case No. (ICC-01/12-01/15-84-Red), 24 March 2016, para. 26. Situation in the Cen-
tral African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba et al., Trial Judgment, Case No. (ICC-
01/05-01/13-1989), 19 October 2016, paras. 93-95.
90 UN, International Law Commission, 48th session, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind with commentaries (1996) (Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1996, vol. ii, Part Two).
91 Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 89, para. 93; see also W.A. Schabas, An Introduction to 
the International Criminal Court (4th ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), 
228; G. Werle and F. Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (3rd ed., Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2014) pp. 216-217, fn. 298.
92 M.J. Ventura, ‘Aiding and Abetting’, in J. de Hemptinne et al. (eds.), Modes of Liability in 
International Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019) pp. 219-223; A. 
Eser, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary – Volume I (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009) p. 801; E. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility 
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was not bound by the ‘substantial contribution’ standard and that the actus 
reus of Article 25(3)(c) is fulfilled when the accused’s actions have ‘an effect’, 
i.e. they facilitate or further the commission of the crime.93 This was also re-
flected in one of the majority reasonings of the Decision acquitting Mr Laurent 
Gbagbo and Mr Charles Blé Goudé as well as in the dissenting opinion.94 In 
terms of Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, it likewise does not qualify the 
threshold and thus has been interpreted as excluding only contributions that 
are ‘inconsequential’, ‘immaterial’, or ‘neutral’ to the commission of the crime.95
The inclusion of incitement to genocide under Article 25(3)(e) in the icc 
Statute has caused some confusion regarding whether this strips the offence of 
its inchoate nature96 since it is listed as a ground for criminal responsibility 
in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 128; S. Finnin, Elements of Ac-
cessorial Modes of Liability: Article 25(3)(b) and (c) of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2012) p. 146; K. Ambos, Treatise on International 
Criminal Law – Volume I: Foundations and General Part (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2013) 164; Ambos, ‘Article 25’, supra note 72, p. 1008; M. Jackson, Complicity in International 
Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015); V. Lanovoy, Complicity and its Limits in the 
Law of International Responsibility (Hart, Oxford, 2016) p. 72; H. Olásolo and E. Carnero 
Rojo, ‘Forms of Liability under Article 25(3)(b) and (c)’, in Stahn (ed.), supra note 79, pp. 
587, 590; Ambos, supra note 79, pp. 599, 601, 607 (arguing that Article 25(3)(c) and (d) of 
the icc Statute ‘require a minimum threshold of assistance’).
93 Situation in the Central African Republic, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Appeal 
Judgment, Case No. (ICC-01/05-01/08-3636), 8 June 2018, paras. 18, 1326-1327.
94 Situation in Côte d’Ivoire, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, Reasons of 
Judge G. Henderson, Case No. (ICC-02/11-01/15-1263-AnxB), 16 July 2019, para. 2020: ‘At this 
level of abstraction and generality, almost every act in support of an institution or organ-
isation can be said to have made a contribution to the conduct of individual members of 
such institution or organisation. At some point, the causal link between the contribution 
and the specific criminal conduct, although theoretically present, becomes so tenuous 
that it becomes artificial to say that the physical perpetrator was genuinely assisted by the 
contribution’; Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, Case No. ICC-02/11-
01/15-1263-AnxC, Dissenting Opinion Judge H. Carbuccia, 16 July 2019, para. 559 indicating 
that merely facilitating ‘may suffice’ for aiding and abetting.
95 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé decision, Reasons of Henderson, supra note 94, para. 1960 referring 
to Prosecutor’s reasoning and allowing the possibility that this is the correct interpreta-
tion of the contribution threshold for Article 25(3)(d).
96 T.E. Davies, ‘How the Rome Statute Weakens the International Prohibition on Incitement 
to Genocide’, 22 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2009) 245-270; Wilson, supra note 11, 
p. 254. Apart from seeing the Rome Statute as weakening incitement to genocide, Wilson 
also reads the Nahimana and Bikindi judgments as putting on genocidal speech the con-
dition of contemporaneity with an actual genocide (Wilson, ibid., p. 253). This is however 
an overstatement of the significance placed on an actual genocide by the two ictr judg-
ments, which rather consider the existence of actual genocide as a contextual element 
that may help determine the mens rea of the speaker as well as how the intended audi-
ences understood the speech and not a sine qua non in establishing the incitement. Other 
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after paragraphs (b) to (d) dealing with accessorial liability.97 The present au-
thors, however, are of the view that the correct interpretation remains that in-
citement to genocide here also breaks with the dependence of the act of com-
plicity on the actual crime, abandoning the accessory principle that governs 
paragraphs (b) to (d).98 Prominently, the same utterance that will constitute 
incitement to genocide under paragraph (e) will amount to soliciting or induc-
ing under paragraph (b) when a causal link can be established between the 
speech and an actual genocide being attempted or committed.99 This further 
demonstrates the raison d’être of paragraph (e), which is to provide a tool for 
possible intervention before the speech has had its desired effect and a geno-
cide actually takes place.100 In the opposite cases, however, it will be up to the 
Prosecutor to decide which form of liability should be pursued, under para-
graph (e) or (b) in light of the available evidence. Most likely, all available 
forms would be argued in the indictment as is the standard practice.
Outside the context of incitement to genocide, modes of accessorial liability 
provide the basic tool for prosecuting hate propagandists and in practice they 
prove greatly challenging for a successful prosecution in several ways resulting 
in a high failure rate before the two ad hoc tribunals and the icc.101 Firstly, the 
law applicable to hate propaganda is too fragmented.102 The Prosecutorial ap-
proach in Šešelj reflected this problem as it employed the so-called ‘catch-all 
practice’ by firstly drawing a distinction between crimes physically committed 
by the Accused and other crimes committed by way of jce and then ‘obscur-
ing’ this framework by alleging Šešelj’s membership in a jce for all of the 
crimes.103 The Indictment furthermore claimed instigation, jce as well as aid-
ing and abetting based on what the TC characterised as the same factual 
contextual elements may provide sufficient indicators of the mens rea and the ‘directness’ 
of the incitement as an element of the actus reus. See Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra 
note 84, para. 709, fn. 1674.
97 Ambos, ‘Article 25’, supra note 72, p. 1017.
98 Ibid.; see also R. Cryer et al. (eds.), An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure (4th ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019) 362; A.A. Agbor, ‘The Sub-
stantial Contribution Requirement: The Unfortunate Outcome of an Illogical Construc-
tion and Incorrect Understanding of Article 6(1) of the Statute of the ictr’, 12 International 
Criminal Law Review (2012) 155-191, p. 158; Clark, supra note 75; Nahimana Appeal Judg-
ment, supra note 84, para. 678.
99 Clark, ibid.
100 In practice however, no such early intervention has ever taken place, rather prosecutions 
are initiated after a genocide has already occurred and even using the fact that it had oc-
curred as evidence of the actus reus and mens rea of incitement.
101 Kearney, supra note 8, p. 231.
102 Gordon, supra note 71, pp. 20, 253.
103 Šešelj, Trial Judgment, supra note 10, para. 15.
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 basis.104 While the Prosecution was criticised by the Chamber for this ‘circular 
approach in which practically each crime has multiple qualifications’, it is but 
a natural consequence of the unfortunate fragmentation of the law and quite 
common in practice.
It is also worth noting that, while the common law criminal theory does not 
distinguish between ‘principals’, ‘secondary participants’, ‘accessories and ac-
complices’ or ‘individuals in a group acting with a common purpose’ in terms 
of guilt or applicable penalty, many civil law systems perceive modes of par-
ticipation through a hierarchical lens that implies a lesser penalty for partici-
pation falling short of principal perpetration.105 Thus, if we are to consider 
hate propaganda merely under accessorial liability, victims might feel that the 
perpetrators of such propaganda, who are in fact more morally culpable, are 
found less culpable in law than those who, under its influence, physically car-
ried out the crimes. In German law, however, the instigator is punished in the 
same way as the principal, thus a hierarchy does not apply.106
Third, the causal link between the speech and subsequent crimes commit-
ted, which all modes of accessorial liability require, albeit to differing extents 
as mentioned above, poses the main challenge for the Prosecution. Many have 
thus questioned why incitement to international crimes such as war crimes 
and cah has not been criminalised in the same way as incitement to genocide, 
which would not only make prosecutions more straightforward but would also 
serve the preventative function of the law by providing a tool for intervention 
before subsequent crimes are committed.107
Fourth, as mentioned above, mostly left out of criminalisation is speech that 
does not strictly speaking amount to incitement to violence even if it consti-
tutes a necessary part of the propaganda leading to the success of such incite-
ment.108 Furthermore even direct incitement may not suffice and the added 
prerequisite of a causal link with subsequent crimes committed is necessary 
for the speech to be considered criminal.
The most encouraging development in terms of hate propaganda in recent 
jurisprudence has been in Ruggiu and Nahimana, where the ictr Appeal 
Chamber held that as part of a widespread and systematic attack against a ci-
vilian population, hate speech can also in and of itself constitute the physical 
104 Ibid., para. 17.
105 Clark, supra note 75.
106 Penal Code (StGB), Art 26.
107 W.A. Schabas, ‘Prevention of Crimes against Humanity’, 16 Journal of International Crimi-
nal Justice (2018) 705-728; see also Fletcher, supra note 80.
108 Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 84, para. 693.
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commission of persecution as a crime against humanity.109 The Appeal Judg-
ment in Šešelj has now brought the jurisprudence of the icty in line with that 
of the ictr on the matter by confirming this possibility.110 It has nevertheless 
unjustifiably left almost all of Šešelj’s hate propaganda outside of this charac-
terisation, save for one speech in Hrtkovci, and even here the finding of perse-
cution mainly rested on a finding of instigation showing a reluctance on the 
part of the Court to apply criminal responsibility sufficiently broadly with re-
gards to hate propaganda, i.e. beyond successful incitement to violence, i.e. 
instigation.
Importantly, within the context of the crime of aggression, the icc Statute 
in Article 8 bis criminalises also its planning and preparation. While not yet 
tested in the jurisprudence, Dojčinović notes that there are no major eviden-
tiary and jurisprudential obstacles inhibiting the investigation and prosecu-
tion of historical and political acts of propaganda and incitement, or instiga-
tion, already during the formative period of this act.111
3 The Almost Acquittal of Vojislav Šešelj as a Reflection of a 
Fragmented Law and a Poor Judicial Understanding of Hate and 
Fear propaganda
This section will analyse the case of Vojislav Šešelj as a case study of the current 
problems in dealing with hate and fear propaganda at international criminal 
tribunals. It will delineate the propagandistic activities of Šešelj, one of the 
greatest hate mongers of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, and demonstrate how 
the TC failed to understand the workings of his propaganda while simultane-
ously being derailed by the fragmentation of the applicable law that manifest-
ed itself in the Office of the Prosecutor (otp) bringing multiple potential qual-
ifications for each crime, none of which could be applied by a straightforward 
approach. The section will provide a critique of the prosecutorial method in 
selecting evidences as well as the overly restrictive interpretation of the law by 
both the TC and the AC in the present case. The analysis of the case will be 
109 Ibid., para. 993.
110 Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (MICT-16-99-A), 11 April 2008, 
para. 134.
111 P. Dojčinović, ‘The Shifting Status of Grand Narratives in War Crimes Trials and Interna-
tional Law: History and Politics in the Courtroom’, in D. Žarkov and M. Glasius (eds.), 
Narratives of Justice in and Out of the Courtroom: Former Yugoslavia and Beyond (Springer, 
Berlin, 2014) p. 26.
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conducted with a view to avoiding mistakes in the future and understanding 
the underlying legal problems that require a reformulation of the law.
3.1 Vojislav Šešelj’s Hate and Fear Propaganda
Vojislav Šešelj was the founder and president of the Serbian Radical Party from 
23 February 1991, and a member of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. In 
1989, Šešelj was declared Četnik duke by Momčilo Đujić, a Četnik leader from 
World War ii, with a mandate to make a unitary Serbian state where all Serbs 
would live, occupying all the Serb lands, the so-called Greater Serbia. Šešelj 
established a military wing of his party, created a War Staff, promoted the 
Četnik movement’s militaristic traditions, appeared in military attire at front-
lines and most importantly, relentlessly spread his fear and hate propaganda 
aimed mostly at Croats and Bosniaks. Šešelj studied the mass psychology of 
fascism and in his book, entitled Ideology of Serbian Nationalism, published in 
2002, he expressed the belief that propaganda is based on the fact that the 
majority of people are ready to believe indiscriminately in everything they 
read, hear or see on television.112 Anthony Oberschall conducted a content 
analysis of Šešelj’s 1990-1994 mass media propaganda that revealed that he 
massively used claims of past and on-going Serb victimhood coupled with 
claims of a threat being posed to Serbs by an endless list of victimisers, ranging 
from the West, the Vatican, Germany, the UN, to the communists, Slovenes, the 
Muslims, and, at the top of the list, the Croats in addition to numerous oth-
ers.113 Sometimes the threat was presented as coming from within and Šešelj 
even accused Serb media of ‘anti-Serbian propaganda’.114
Šešelj’s claims of Serb victimhood and threat messaging, coupled with a de-
nial of any Serb responsibility formed the moral justification of collective vio-
lence and the core of the crisis frame in ethnic relations.115 He rejected the 
possibility of compromise and non-violent conflict management116 and propa-
gated that the natural sentiment between ethnic groups was that of hatred, 
antipathy and rejection making co-habitation impossible.117 On top of this ba-
sis he outright advocated coercion and violence issuing numerous threats and 
warnings, particularly the phrase that ‘rivers of blood will flow’.118 His claim 
112 Šešelj, IT-03-67-T, Transcript of the Testimony of Anthony Oberschall, 11 December 2007, 
1201, 1337.
113 Oberschall, supra note 57, p. 19.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., p. 18.
116 Ibid., pp. 34, 36.
117 Ibid., p. 32.
118 Ibid., pp. 21, 27-28.
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was that self-defence, revenge and retribution justified the violence.119 A big 
part of Šešelj’s xenophobic and xenomisic narrative was a constant glorifica-
tion of Serbs and the dehumanising of other nations. While in his theory Serbs 
were a historic nation, everyone else, i.e. Croats, Macedonians and Muslims, 
were ‘artificial’ and as such did not have any right to their own states and were 
not even worthy of consideration.120 Thus Šešelj characterised the Croats as 
the ‘last trash of Europe’, a ‘genocidal nation’, who has ‘never been honest with 
anyone’, a ‘poisonous snake’ who bites Serbs on the heart and whose head 
Serbs need to smash.121 In numerous instances he called for the ‘amputation’ of 
Croatia. The snake analogy mirrors both Nazi propaganda against the Jews122 
as well as Hutu propaganda against the Tutsis.123
Misuse of history and fabrication of facts were tools Šešelj constantly em-
ployed, using partial, biased, misleading and sometimes outright fabricated 
information or history (for example claiming that Dubrovnik had always been 
a Serb town)124 as well as the crimes taking place during the war (presenting 
ethnic cleansing as a consensual, spontaneous and civilised exchange of 
populations).125
In other words, Šešelj carefully used the main persuasion techniques em-
ployed in fear and hate propaganda, whereby the out-group was negatively ste-
reotyped and, in its entirety, blamed for historical crimes while at the same 
time presented as a threat to the Serb nation and its historically legitimate 
aspirations.
Oberschall’s analysis, which scientifically analysed and clearly demonstrat-
ed the workings of Šešelj’s propaganda was however not given the weight it 
deserved at trial. Oberschall’s expertise was challenged by Šešelj and the Court 
upheld his objections on two grounds. Firstly, on the ground that Mr Ober-
schall did not speak Serbian and was not an expert on Serbian mass media or 
nationalist propaganda and secondly on the absurd ground that he referenced 
eighty-seven books by authors other than himself showing, according to the 
119 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
120 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
121 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
122 See for example E. Hiemer (trans.), Julius Streicher Der Stürmer, The Mongrel – Translated 
from the Third Reich Original, Der Pudelmopsdackelpinscher (2nd ed., rjg Enterprises, Lin-
coln, 2017) p. 48: ‘If we do not kill the Jewish poisonous snake, it will kill us’.
123 Prosecutor v. Simon Bikindi, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-01-72-A), 18 March 2010, 
para. 50.
124 Oberschall, Šešelj’s Nationalist Propaganda, supra note 57, pp. 25-26.
125 Ibid., p. 24.
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Court, insufficient expertise in the subject.126 Oddly the Court nevertheless al-
lowed the testimony, yet failed to grasp its usefulness for a conviction. As Ober-
schall himself explained the situation:
No matter how I explained my methods to them, I was never going to 
convince the judges that my social-science approach could help them. 
Judges are interested in a specific causal sequence that leads to a specific 
crime… The question is, can you connect the speech of one person to the 
crimes? That person alone and not the others? No. It’s the ensemble that 
does it. For propaganda to be effective, you don’t need to influence 100 
percent of the population…[yet] in the judges’ way of thinking, if it’s not 
100 percent, then it’s not a cause.127
At risk of oversimplification, it was indeed this narrow approach to causality 
that was at the crux of the TC’s failure in finding individual criminal responsi-
bility based on Šešelj’s fear and hate propaganda, as analysed below. Yet, the TC 
shares the responsibility for the failure both with the Prosecution, which de-
cided not to bring to the Court the most essential evidence relevant to the 
question of causation, as well as with the applicable law, which required the 
proof of a high level of causality, many times difficult or nearly impossible to 
demonstrate.
3.2 Šešelj’s Indictment and Trial at the icty
Šešelj was indicted in January 2003 and surrendered voluntarily to the icty a 
month later.128 Under the Third Amended Indictment, issued in December 
2007, the Prosecution charged Šešelj with persecution, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts (forcible transfer) as cah as well as five counts of war crimes. 
The Prosecution alleged that, acting individually, or as part of a jce with high-
ranking Serb politicians and military leaders, such as Slobodan Milošević, 
Šešelj ‘planned, ordered, instigated, committed or otherwise aided and abetted 
in planning, preparation or execution’ of cah and war crimes that included 
persecution, murder, sexual assaults, torture, deportation and forcible transfer 
126 R.A. Wilson, ‘Propaganda Experts in the International Criminal Courtroom’, in Dojčinović 
(ed.), supra note 2, p. 73.
127 A. Oberschall in interview with R. Wilson in ibid., p. 75.
128 For a critique of Šešelj Trial judgment see G. Gordon, ‘Vojislav Šešelj's Acquittal at the icty: 
Law in an Alternate Universe’, Jurist (11 April 2016), online at www.jurist.org/commen 
tary/2016/04/gregory-gordon-seselj-acquittal/, describing the judgment as ‘a resounding 
victory for the culture of impunity’. For a critique of Šešelj at the courtroom see Wilson, 
supra note 11, pp. 107-115 (Cirque Du Šešelj).
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of non-Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia.129 It alleged that Šešelj through his speech-
es in Vukovar (Croatia), Mali Zvornik and Hrtkovci (Serbia) in 1991 and 1992, 
‘physically committed’ persecution because of ‘direct and public ethnic deni-
gration and forcible transfer’.130
The Prosecution did not rely on the totality of Šešelj’s propaganda but fo-
cused on a particular set of speeches as described. In the speeches in Vukovar, 
Šešelj stated publicly that ‘this entire area will soon be cleared of Ustaša;’ and 
that ‘not one Ustaša must leave Vukovar alive’.131 At Zvornik, Šešelj spoke at a 
rally, stating: ‘Dear Chetnik brothers, especially you across the Drina river, you 
are the bravest ones. We are going to clean Bosnia of pagans and show them a 
road which will take them to the east, where they belong’.132 At Hrtkovci, Šešelj 
declared there was ‘no room for Croats in Hrtkovci’. He proclaimed that ‘we 
will drive them to the border of Serbian territory and they can walk on from 
there, if they do not leave before of their own accord’.133 He further stated that 
Serbs from Hrtkovci and the surrounding villages would ‘promptly get rid of 
the remaining Croats in your village and the surrounding villages’.134 The TC 
also considered two other speeches, delivered in the Serbian Parliament on 1 
and 7 April 1992, alleged by the Prosecution to have constituted clear appeals 
for the expulsion and forcible transfer of Croats.135
Thus, the Prosecution claimed, for what were essentially the same speech 
acts, several modes of liability in a bid to establish criminal responsibility un-
der any of them, albeit in vain. Even claims under jce, which in the past proved 
a valuable tool for prosecuting hate and fear propaganda (see discussion infra 
section 3.3), were this time thwarted from the beginning as described below.
The actual trial did not begin until late 2007 and finally ended with an 
 acquittal on 31 March 2016 making it the longest running trial in war crimes 
history. One of the judges sitting at the Šešelj trial, Judge Frederik Harhoff, was 
disqualified a few months before the Trial Chamber’s judgment was expected 
129 Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. (IT-03-67-T), Third Amended Indictment, 7 Decem-
ber 2007, para. 8(a).
130 Ibid., paras. 5, 15, 17(i), 31-33.
131 Ibid., para. 20.
132 Ibid.
133 Šešelj Trial Judgment, supra note 10, para. 331.
134 Ibid.
135 Even though, in the view of the majority, Judge Antonetti dissenting, these speeches were 
appeals for expulsion, a different majority, Judge Lattanzi dissenting, held that they 
formed an opposition to the official Serbian policy and were thus an expression of an al-
ternative political programme that would never be put into practice.
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and replaced with Judge Niang.136 This added to the delay of the case by an-
other eighteen months in order for Judge Niang to familiarise himself with the 
unwieldy case. In its Closing Brief the Prosecution alleged that Šešelj, through 
his speeches, pursued a persecutory propaganda campaign against non-
Serbs,137 and that such a campaign consisted of three stages as follows: firstly, 
propagating a climate of fear and hatred of non-Serbs;138 secondly, encourag-
ing retaliation against non-Serbs for crimes committed in the World War ii;139 
and thirdly, legitimising recourse to force and violence against them in order to 
gain and retain what Šešelj considered as Serbian lands outside of Serbia.140
While considered to be somewhat of a ‘lone wolf ’ in his propagandistic en-
deavours by both the TC and AC, Šešelj’s speeches in fact fit perfectly with the 
mainstream Serbian propaganda at the time, which almost entirely eliminated 
the marketplace of ideas.141 While previous judgments at the icty acknowl-
edged the effects of such a combination, the Šešelj judgments were a signifi-
cant step backward.
3.3 Trial Chamber’s Dismissal of jce − Setting Aside Previous 
Jurisprudence on Hate Speech in the Context of jce
The most evident examples in the icty trial records of propaganda forming an 
integral part of a jce are the concepts of ‘Greater Serbia’142 (also referred to as 
136 For a critical examination of the removal of Judge Harhoff from the Šešelj case, see M.E. 
Badar and P. Florijančič, ‘The Disqualification of Judge Frederik Harhoff: Implications for 
the Integrity of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’, in Morten 
Bergsmo and Viviane Dittrich (eds.), Integrity in International Justice (Torkel Opsahl Aca-
demic EPublishers, Brussels, 2020).
137 Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. (IT-03-67-T), Prosecution Closing Brief, 5 February 
2012, para. 50.
138 Ibid., paras. 51 and 53.
139 Ibid., para. 54.
140 Ibid., paras. 54-55.
141 As noted by Kiper, supra note 2, pp. 222-223: ‘From 1989 to 1990, Milošević undertook what 
he called an anti-bureaucratic revolution, encouraging a populist revolt with the goal of 
replacing non-Serbian officials in the Yugoslavian bureaucracy with Serbs. Consequen-
tially, when Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina sought independence, the Milošević re-
gime was able to propagate misinformation about neighbouring republics. The Serbian 
media thus became inundated on a daily basis with false news reports and alleged con-
spiracies about non-Serbs, ranging from fabricated atrocity stories to an alleged Vatican-
Tehran conspiracy to destroy the Serbian people…. In terms of linguistic context, 
Milošević’s controlled-media provided the right felicity conditions for Šešelj’s inflamma-
tory speeches’.
142 Dojčinović, ‘Introduction’, supra note 8, p. 10, fn 47.
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the ‘Strategic Plan’) and ‘Greater Croatia’.143 The implementation of these two 
political objectives, according to the icty trial records in the relevant cases, 
was carried out by criminal means, both military and political.144 Within the 
framework of the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the grand narratives 
of ‘Greater Serbia’ and ‘Greater Croatia’ were the geopolitical, ideological and 
military equivalents of the Nazi narrative of ‘Greater Germany’.145 Just as the 
latter employed the sub-narrative of Lebensraum, ‘Greater Croatia’ and ‘Great-
er Serbia’ meant that areas outside of Croatia and Serbia populated with Cro-
ats or Serbs should be used to create additional ‘living space’.146 Dojčinović 
thus concludes: ‘In as much as Hitler’s grand narrative of Lebensraum was di-
rectly linked to the Endlösung (Final Solution), the extermination of the Jewish 
population, the Serbian and Croatian projects were directly linked to the ‘eth-
nic cleansing’ of non-Serbs or non-Croats in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’.147
While at the imt, the status of the relevant grand narrative was merely con-
textual evidence it shifted at the icty to constitute the forensic evidence and/
or the reasons for the commission of crimes.148 Most of the so-called ‘Serb 
leadership cases’ at the icty had the Greater Serbia narrative incorporated 
into their indictments, pre-trial and final briefs, opening and closing argu-
ments, and judgments.149 Both in Šešelj and Milošević, the otp’s theory of the 
case was largely framed within and by this concept.150 Thousands of exhibits, 
from speeches to maps, were introduced as part of the cases to evidence and 
support the significance of this grand narrative for the commission of crimes.151 
Numerous witnesses, including combatants and principal perpetrators, con-
firmed and confessed that they had been inspired and prompted to join the 
struggle due to the narratives, implying that they had committed specific 
143 See Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al., Case No. (IT-04-74-T), Second Amended Indictment, 
11 June 2008, para. 15. Defining the scope of the jce, the Prosecution refers to the idea of 
‘Greater Croatia’ as an objective which was to be achieved by joining the so-called ‘Croa-
tian Community of Herzeg-Bosna’ as part of the Republic of Croatia ‘[…] by force, fear or 
threat of force, imprisonment and detention, forcible transfer and deportation, appro-
priation and destruction of property and other means […]’
144 Dojčinović, ‘Introduction’, supra note 8, p. 10.
145 Ibid., p. 9.
146 Ibid., p. 16.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid., pp. 2, 23.
149 Ibid., some of these cases include Momčilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, Slobodan Milošević, 
Vojislav Šešelj and Radovan Karadžić.
150 E-mail communication with P. Dojčinović, on file with authors.
151 Dojčinović, ‘Introduction’, supra note 8, p. 16.
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crimes precisely because of them.152 In their testimonies, they often made ref-
erences to the exact pro-Greater Serbian phrases they may have read or heard 
from the accused or the accused’s associates’.153 Dojčinović describes phrases 
such as the one invented by Šešelj, i.e. ‘Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Vitrovitica 
line’ as ‘unique mental fingerprints’, i.e. when other politicians or principal per-
petrators use such a phrase it can be concluded that a specific mind has been 
cognitively ‘fingerprinted’ by the originator.154 Such ‘mental fingerprints’ 
should fit into the evidentiary feedback loop as one of the links between the 
instigator and the instigated.155
In Šešelj, the Prosecution grounded its claim of participation in the jce 
amongst other things based on the fact that Šešelj ‘espoused and encouraged 
the creation of a homogeneous ‘Greater Serbia’, encompassing the territories 
specified in this indictment, by violence, and thereby participated in war pro-
paganda and incitement of hatred towards non-Serb people’.156 While present-
ing great hope for an even stronger recognition of the role played by this grand 
narrative, the Šešelj Trial Judgment instead shifted into the regrettable direc-
tion of considering Šešelj’s goal of creating a Greater Serbia to have been mere-
ly a political project and that the necessary common criminal purpose had not 
been proven.157 However, as the Prosecution noted, this finding was due to the 
fact that the Majority did not engage with the evidence about the substance of 
the Šešelj’s Četnik ideology and goals that were predicated on ethnic cleansing 
and the forced expulsion of non-Serb ethnicities making this criminal element 
an essential part of the political project.158 While the TC acknowledged that 
crimes had been committed by Serbian forces in the process, it claimed these 
were not inherently linked to the fulfilment of the purpose of Greater Serbia. 
Judge Antonetti’s individual opinion reveals the profound confusion of the 
Presiding Judge in terms of what are the motives of individual participants in 
a jce and what is the common criminal purpose of a jce.159 While the first 
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
155 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
156 Šešelj Indictment, supra note 129, para. 10 (c).
157 Šešelj Trial Judgment, supra note 10, para. 230.
158 Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. (MICT-16-99-A), Notice of Filing of Public Redacted 
Version of Prosecution Appeal Brief, 29 August 2016, paras. 71-73, referring to exhs. P00153, 1; 
P00164, 45-46; P01263, 1-3, 15; P01170; P00141, 2; Šešelj, Indictment, supra note 129, para. 6.
159 M. Milanović, ‘The Sorry Acquittal of Vojislav Šešelj’, ejil Talk!, 4 April 2016, www.ejiltalk 
.org/the-sorry-acquittal-of-vojislav-seselj/.
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may have been political, the latter was undoubtedly criminal, i.e. the forcible 
displacement of Croats and Bosniaks.160
By dismissing Šešelj’s liability based on a contribution to a jce the Trial 
Judgment departed drastically from previous case law involving hate propa-
ganda. Already in its first judgment, in Tadić, the TC clearly identified the im-
portance of hate propaganda in fomenting ethnic discord and noted Šešelj, 
alongside Milošević and Brđanin, as fuelling conflict and crimes by use of such 
propaganda.161 Subsequently in Brđanin, the TC considered the accused’s hate 
propaganda as his most substantial contribution to the so-called Strategic 
Plan.162 The defendant was found responsible for instigating forced transfers 
and deportations as well as aiding and abetting their execution through in-
flammatory and discriminatory public statements, such as advocating the dis-
missal of non-Serbs from employment, and stating that only a few non-Serbs 
would be permitted to stay on the territory of the Autonomous Region of Kra-
jina.163 The judgment however fell short of framing the criminal responsibility 
arising from Brđanin’s propaganda within the context of a jce. This was main-
ly due to the TC’s understanding of the theory of jce as encompassing only 
small-scale cases and not enterprises as large as the one claimed in Brđanin164 
as well as its view that, in order for the accused to be found responsible for 
committing a crime under the first category of jce, there should exist an agree-
ment between the accused and the principal perpetrator of that crime (i.e. 
they should both be members of the jce).165 These understandings of the 
 theory were however found to be erroneous by the AC, which confirmed that 
principal perpetrators need not be members of the jce166 and that jces can 
exist on a large scale.167 It was only for reasons of trial fairness that Brđanin’s 
160 See Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (MICT-13-55), 20 March 
2019, para. 395.
161 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Trial Opinion and Judgment, Case No. (IT-94-1), 7 May 1997, 
para. 87.
162 Brđanin Trial Judgment, supra note 62, para. 80.
163 Kearney, supra note 8, pp. 243-244; Brđanin Trial Judgment, supra note 62, para. 360; Pros-
ecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Appeals Judgment, Case No. (IT-99-36-A), 3 April 2007, paras. 
307-319.
164 Brđanin Trial Judgment, supra note 62, fn 890.
165 Ibid.
166 Brđanin Appeal Judgment, supra note 163, paras. 408-414 referring to, Prosecutor v. Ra-
doslav Krstić, Trial Chamber, Case No. (IT-98-33-T), Judgement, 2 August 2001, paras. 618 
and 645.
167 Brđanin Appeal Judgment, ibid., para. 422 referring to Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 
85, para. 204 envisioning a jce with the common purpose of ethnically cleansing an en-
tire region; Brđanin Appeal Judgment, ibid., para. 423 referring to Prosecutor v. André Rwa-
makuba, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-98-44C-A), 13 September 2007, para. 25.
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responsibility was not reconsidered under this framework at the appeal 
phase.168 Other judgments, such as Stakić, Krajišnik, Martić and Karadžić, all 
found the propaganda of the persons accused as their contribution to a jce 
even considering it many times as being at the very core of such enterprises 
shared by defendants to undertake war crimes and cah.169 The TC in Stakić 
found that his propaganda helped to polarise the Prijedor population along 
ethnic lines and created an atmosphere of fear,170 while the AC specified that 
his hate propaganda contributed to an atmosphere that was of such a coercive 
nature that the persons leaving the municipality cannot be considered as hav-
ing voluntarily decided to give up their homes.171 In Krajišnik the TC found that 
the accused contributed to the jce with Milošević and others through:
Supporting, encouraging, facilitating or participating in the dissemina-
tion of information to Bosnian Serbs that they were in jeopardy of op-
pression at the hands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, that ter-
ritories on which Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats resided were 
Bosnian-Serb land, or that was otherwise intended to engender in Bos-
nian Serbs fear and hatred of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats or to 
otherwise win support for and participation in achieving the objective of 
the joint criminal enterprise.172
Furthermore Krajišnik’s other speeches were found to have instigated, encour-
aged, and authorised the implementation of the common objective.173 In 
Martić the TC found the accused to have contributed to the jce by fuelling an 
atmosphere of insecurity and fear through radio speeches.174 Most important-
ly, the TC also specified Vojislav Šešelj as a co-member of this jce175 as did the 
TC in Karadžić just a week before the Šešelj Trial judgment.176 In the Karadžić 
case, the TC found that the accused participated in the overarching jce and 
168 Brđanin Appeal Judgment, ibid., para. 361.
169 Kearney, supra note 8, p. 247.
170 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Trial Judgment, Case No. (IT-97-24-T), 31 July 2003, para. 476.
171 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (IT-97-24-A), 22 March 2006, pa-
ras. 282-283.
172 Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Trial Judgment, Case No. (IT-00-39-T), 27 September 2006, 
para. 1121; Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (IT-00-39-A), 17 
March 2009, paras. 216-219.
173 Ibid.
174 Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Trial Judgment, Case No. (IT-95-11-T), 12 June 2007, paras. 
448-453.
175 Ibid., para. 446.
176 Karadžić, Trial Judgment, supra note 78, para. 3492.
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contributed to the commission of the crimes encompassed within through 
promoting an ideology of ethnic separation, using a rhetoric that amplified 
historical ethnic grievances and promoting propaganda to that effect, and cre-
ating a climate of impunity for criminal acts committed against non-Serbs177 in 
order to promote historical territorial claims and garner support for the cre-
ation of a largely ethnically homogeneous Bosnian Serb state in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.178 Interestingly, Karadžić submitted that the TC erred in con-
cluding that he was a member of a jce since the record allowed another infer-
ence: that he was part of a ‘joint political enterprise’ the aim of which was 
‘political autonomy, not physical separation through forced displacements’.179 
His arguments were not accepted on appeal.
The twin goals of the propaganda in all these cases were to create an atmo-
sphere of terror such that the victims would feel their only option was to leave 
their homes,180 as well as to create a climate where people were prepared to 
tolerate the commission of crimes and to commit crimes through the incite-
ment of hatred, distrust, strife and fear of subjugation.181 In Stakić, the TC 
 recognised that this atmosphere was of such a coercive nature as to satisfy the 
177 Ibid., para. 11174. The judgment describes Karadžić’s propaganda activities as inciting Bos-
nian Serb fear and hatred of Muslims and Croats which had the effect of exacerbating 
ethnic divisions and tensions and the effect of encouraging his subordinates to follow his 
example; identifying Muslims and Croats as the historic enemies of the Serbs (ibid., para. 
3485, emphasis added) and promoting the idea that the Bosnian Serbs could not live to-
gether with the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and formed the foundation for the 
ethnic separation of the three people (ibid., paras. 11089, 11096) and the creation of ethni-
cally homogeneous entities in BiH (ibid., para. 11095). The Trial Chamber further noted 
that by denying the commission of crimes, justifying them or misleading the interna-
tional community and the media, the Accused created an environment of impunity.
178 Ibid., paras. 3485-3487, 3505.
179 Karadžić Appeal Judgment, supra note 160, para. 395; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Ra-
dovan Karadžić’s Notice of Appeal, Case No. (IT-95-5/18), 22 July 2016, para. 11; Prosecutor 
v. Radovan Karadžić, Book of Authorities for Prosecution Appeal Brief, Case No. (IT-95-
5/18), 5 December 2016, paras. 461-521.
180 Stakić Appeal Judgment, supra note 171, para. 476: ‘A propaganda campaign helped to 
polarise the Prijedor population along ethnic lines and created an atmosphere of fear’. 
Brđanin, Trial Judgment, supra note 62, para.83; Martić Trial Judgment, supra note 174, 
paras. 448-453. ‘Milan Martić contributed to this displacement by fuelling the atmosphere 
of insecurity and fear through radio speeches wherein he stated he could not guarantee 
the safety of the non-Serb population’. (ibid., para. 450) ‘[Martić] promoted an atmo-
sphere of mistrust and fear between Serbs and non-Serbs, in particular Croats. In doing 
so, Milan Martić contributed significantly to the furtherance of the common purpose of 
the jce, of which he was a key member in the sao Krajina and the rsk. The TC considers 
that these factors are aggravating circumstances when determining Milan Martić’s sen-
tence’. (ibid., para. 498).
181 Brđanin, Trial Judgment, ibid, para. 80; Tadić Trial Judgment, supra note 161, para. 88.
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condition of ‘forced’ in the definition of deportation as a crime against hu-
manity.182 While all these defendants also committed other crimes and con-
tributed to the jce in other ways, their propaganda activities have been relied 
upon as evidence of their knowledge of a common plan and their substantial 
contributions to the jces both in the first and third categories.183
Dojčinović has bemoaned how the concept of propaganda has been ad-
dressed in the judgments of the two ad hoc tribunals. He asserted the reader is 
‘often left with an intuition that propaganda plays an important role, although 
it is rarely explained why. The interpretation of the concept of propaganda 
seems to be taken for granted’.184 However, at a minimum, several judgments 
translated their sustained condemnation of propaganda and the identification 
of the crucial role it plays in creating the atmosphere necessary for the com-
mission of the most serious international crimes into individual criminal 
 responsibility through the theory of jce.185 The Trial Judgment in Šešelj how-
ever, took a decisive step backward by not acknowledging the defendant’s con-
tribution or indeed the existence of a jce in itself. The AC furthermore failed 
to rectify the matter. While it was of the view that there was a discernible pat-
tern of crimes committed by cooperating Serbian forces, including ‘Šešelj’s 
men’ in furtherance of a common criminal purpose to permanently forcibly 
remove a majority of the Croatian, Bosnian Muslim, and other non-Serbian 
populations, it did not consider that the coordination among them was neces-
sarily in  pursuance of this purpose but could have merely resulted from the 
necessities of the war effort.186 In this way, the effect of Šešelj’s hate propa-
ganda as a contribution to the jce was not even considered.
3.4 Trial Chamber’s Push towards Instigation as the Main Form of 
Liability − Proving a Substantial Contribution to Subsequent Crimes 
Committed
Essentially, the Prosecution was compelled to direct its main focus on instiga-
tion. This meant that it needed to prove the necessary causal link between the 
182 Stakić Appeal Judgment, supra note 171, paras. 281-282 281. The AC therefore agrees with 
the statement made in the Krnojelac Trial Judgment that the term ‘forced’, when used in 
reference to the crime of deportation, is not to be limited to physical force but includes 
the threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, 
psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or persons or another 
person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment.
183 Kearney, supra note 8, pp. 233, 247.
184 Dojčinović, ‘Introduction’, supra note 8, pp. 1, 7.
185 Kearney, supra note 8, pp. 231, 247.
186 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, supra note 110, para. 117.
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speeches and subsequent crimes committed according to a higher standard 
than that for the jce, i.e. it had to prove a ‘substantial contribution’.
Instead of the totality of his hate and fear propaganda, the judgment anal-
ysed and qualified certain statements made by Vojislav Šešelj and their poten-
tial effect on the perpetrators of the crimes charged in the Indictment, in the 
light of their context. It specifically examined the substance and context of a) 
a speech on the Vukovar road on 7 November 1991 where he allegedly stated 
that ‘Very soon, there will not be a single Ustaša left in this area’; b) a speech in 
Vukovar between 12 and 13 November 1991 when he is said to have stated that 
‘Not a single Ustaša must leave Vukovar alive’ and ‘Ustašas, surrender! There is 
no need to lay down your lives anymore’; c) a speech in Mali Zvornik in March 
1992 in which he called on the Serbs to take revenge and ‘clear up’ Bosnia from 
the ‘pogani’ ( filth) and the ‘balijas’ (a derogatory term for Muslims), and to 
push them back towards the east, far beyond the Drina river; d) a speech in 
Hrtkovci (a village in Vojvodina, Serbia) on 6 May 1992 in which Šešelj called 
for the expulsion of the Croatian population and where he stated among other 
things, that there was no place for Croats in Hrtkovci.187
Only the speech in Hrtkovci and the two speeches in the Serbian Parliament 
were considered by the majority (Judge Antonetti dissenting) as a clear call for 
the forcible transfer of Croats from the village. For all the other speeches the 
TC bizarrely concluded that they were not necessarily a call not to spare any-
one, but were rather meant to boost the morale of the troops of his camp.188 A 
particularly unreasonable interpretation, considering the events that followed. 
Furthermore, even for the speech in Hrtkovci, the TC nevertheless found that 
instigation could not be established because the Prosecution failed to show 
that it caused the departure of the Croats or the campaign of persecution al-
leged by the Prosecution.189 Similarly, two other speeches, delivered in the Ser-
bian Parliament on 1 and 7 April 1992, were found to have constituted clear 
appeals for the expulsion and forcible transfer of Croats190 however they were 
considered to have formed part of an opposition to the official Serbian policy, 
and as such an expression of an alternative political programme that would 
never have been put into practice.191 Here too, the majority considered that 
there was no causal link or measurable impact established of the speeches on 
187 Šešelj Indictment, supra note 129, para. 10 (a).
188 Ibid., para. 44.
189 Šešelj Trial Judgment, supra note 10, para. 195.
190 Ibid., paras. 335-38.
191 Ibid., para. 338.
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the subsequent war crimes committed in Mostar, Zvornik and the Sarajevo 
area.192
This judgment reflects the fact that proving the causal link between the ut-
terances of a leader and the subsequent crimes committed by his followers is 
extremely challenging for reasons of both law and logistics. The Šešelj TC fur-
thermore raised the threshold by considering that it was necessary to prove, in 
addition, that the Accused had resorted to various forms of persuasion, such as 
threats, enticement or even promises, before concluding that he was respon-
sible for instigating crimes.193 By doing so, the TC departed from previous case 
law,194 which established that instigation means ‘urging, encouraging, or 
prompting’ another person to commit an offence195 and that the instigator 
must, in one way or another, have influenced the physical perpetrator by solic-
iting, encouraging or otherwise inducing him or her to commit the crime.196
The Šešelj Trial Judgment eventually showed that the Chamber considered 
the contribution requirement not to have been met because the speeches were 
not ‘at the root of the departure of the Croats or the persecution campaign’.197 
This was an additional raising of the threshold for causality to be established 
and looks like a ‘but for’ test contrary to previous jurisprudence and sound 
reasoning.198 For example, in Akayesu the ictr TC ruled that instigation is 
punishable when the speech is followed by subsequent criminal conduct.199 In 
the same token, the Blaškić TC found that there must be a causal connection 
between the instigation and the commission of the crime at issue.200 This does 
not inevitably signify a proof of ‘but for’ causation, as according to the Kordić 
Trial Judgment
192 Ibid., para. 343.
193 Ibid., para. 295.
194 Šešelj Trial Judgment, supra note 10, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Flavia Lattanzi, 
31 March 2016, para. 92.
195 Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Trial Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-97-20-T), 15 May 2003, 
para. 381; Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Trial Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-96-4-T), 2 Sep-
tember 1998, para. 482; Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, Trial Judgment, (IT-03-68-T), 30 June 2006, 
para. 270; Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Appeal Judgment, (IT-95-14/2-A), 17 December 
2004, para. 27, upholding Karadžić Trial Judgment, supra note 78, para. 387; Krstić Trial 
Judgment, supra note 164, para. 601. See also Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 84, 
para. 480; Prosecutor v. Emmanuel Ndindabahizi, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-
01-71-A), 16 January 2007, para. 117.
196 Šešelj Lattanzi Dissenting, supra note 194, para. 91.
197 Šešelj Trial Judgment, supra note 10, para. 333.
198 Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law, supra note 71, pp. 20, 344.
199 Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 195, para. 482.
200 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Trial Judgment, Case No. (IT-95-14-T) 3 March 2000, para. 
278.
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it is not necessary to prove that the crime would not have been perpe-
trated without the accused’s involvement’ what needs to be proved how-
ever is ‘that the contribution of the accused in fact had an effect on the 
commission of the crime.201
This contribution has been described as a ‘clear contributing factor’ in 
Kvočka202 and in Kordić as a ‘substantial contribution’ to the conduct of the 
principal perpetrator.203 In Ndindabahizi and Mpambara the ictr found that 
the contribution also needs to be direct.204
Nevertheless, as determined in the Orić Trial Judgment, the instigator need 
not be the original author of the idea or plan. Even if the principal perpetrator 
was already pondering the commission of the crime, but did not yet reach the 
final determination to do so, such a decision can still be brought about by per-
suasion or strong encouragement of the instigator.205 Only ‘if the principal 
perpetrator is an ‘omnimodo facturus’ meaning that he has definitely decided 
to commit the crime, further encouragement or moral support’ cannot consti-
tute instigation, however, it may qualify as aiding and abetting.206 Further-
more, the instigator only needs to possess a certain capability to impress  others 
and does not need to be in a position of superiority in relation to the physical 
perpetrator.207
The icc definition of inducing as provided for in Article 25(3)(b) of the icc 
Statute and as set out in the Ntaganda case confirmed the jurisprudence of the 
ad hoc tribunals:
the following objective and subjective elements must be fulfilled: (a) the 
person exerts influence over another person to either commit a crime 
which in fact occurs or is attempted or to perform an act or omission as a 
result of which a crime is carried out; (b) the inducement has a direct ef-
fect on the commission or attempted commission of the crime; and 
(c) the person is at least aware that the crimes will be committed in the 
201 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Trial Judgment, Case No. (IT-95-14/2-T), 26 February 2001, 
para. 387.
202 Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvoćka et al., Trial Judgment, Case No. (IT-98-30/1-T), 2 November 
2001, para. 252.
203 Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgment, supra note 201, para. 27.
204 Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgment, supra note 195, para. 139.
205 Orić Trial Judgment, supra note 195, para. 271.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid., para. 272; see also M.E. Badar, The Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law: 
The Case for a Unified Approach (Hart, Oxford, 2013), pp. 330-332.
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 ordinary course of events as a consequence of the realization of the act or 
omission.208
More recently at the icc, in her dissenting opinion to the 2019 Gbagbo and Blé 
Goudé decision, Judge Carbuccia referred to instigation as a concept including 
both soliciting and inducing and relied on the Orić Trial Judgment as providing 
the best definition and the most accurate standard for the ‘substantial contri-
bution’ test.209
The challenging task of proving a causal link is echoed in other interna-
tional prosecutions, such as the collapse of three cases against Callixte 
Mbarushimana, William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang at the icc. 
Mbarushimana was charged under 25(3)(d), but the Court found that there 
were no reasonable grounds to believe that he had encouraged the troops on 
the ground and thus there could be no significant contribution on his part to 
those crimes.210 William Ruto was charged with co-perpetration of cah thus 
requiring the proof of an essential contribution, and the icc Trial Chamber 
articulated the requirement for a causal nexus between his speech act and the 
criminal acts thus:
Even if it were accepted that Mr Ruto’s speeches contained a sufficiently 
clear message that he wanted others to engage in conduct that would, in 
the ordinary course of events, constitute any of the crimes charged, it still 
has to be established that this message was actually heeded by the physi-
cal perpetrators or that his speeches had a direct effect on their 
behaviour.211
On the other hand, Mr Sang was charged with solicitation or inducement and 
aiding and abetting. Judge Fremr noted that with regard to solicitation or 
 inducement there had to be evidence that any of the physical perpetrators 
were influenced by the alleged words even if it would have been established 
that he called upon listeners to engage in conduct that would, in the ordinary 
208 Situation in the drc, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber ii Decision Pursu-
ant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor 
Against Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. (ICC-01/04-02/06), 14 June 2014, para. 153.
209 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé decision, Carbuccia Dissenting Opinion, supra note 94, para. 559.
210 Situation in the drc, The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision on the confirma-
tion of charges, Case No. (ICC-01/04-01/10), 16 December 2011, para. 339.
211 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v. William Ruto and Joshua Sang, Decision 
on Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, Case No. (ICC-01/09-01/11), 5 April 
2016, para. 135.
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course of events, result in the commission of one or more of the crimes 
charged.212 It is important to note that the Chamber could not even assess 
whether the speech amounted to inflammatory or instigating speech as a re-
cord of the exact words that were used was not provided by the Prosecution 
but merely witness testimonies.213 This was particularly problematic since the 
speech was claimed to be coded and there was great risk that the witnesses 
provided ‘their own, incorrect, interpretation of the obscure wording’.214 The 
fact that the Prosecution could not obtain such evidence was further seen as a 
sign that Mr Sang was not as popular and influential as was claimed.215 The lack 
of sufficient reliable evidence prevented the possibility of establishing any 
contribution to the commission of the charged crimes and thus also liability 
under aiding and abetting.216 Sang was further charged under Article 25(3)(d), 
which requires merely a significant contribution, yet this option was excluded 
for lack of evidence that would prove the existence of the necessary group 
sharing a common plan.217
Even in the landmark case for international criminalisation of speech 
crimes, i.e. Nahimana et al., the AC acquitted Ferdinand Nahimana of instigat-
ing genocide in terms of pre-6 April broadcasts due to what they considered to 
be at the very least a tenuous link between the speeches and specific acts of 
genocide considering the time lapse between the speeches and the killings.218 
The blame for this rests also with the Prosecution as they did not bring a single 
perpetrator to testify that they had been influenced by the defendants. Most 
recently in the case of Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, the majority of the Trial Cham-
ber held that there was ‘no case to answer’ including on charges in relation to 
the contribution of the accused’s speech acts to post-election violence.
One of the biggest challenges in proving a causal link to subsequent crimes 
is bringing witnesses as evidence. Calling as witnesses the very people who had 
been influenced by the incitement and subsequently committed crimes or 
who knew others that did, would open the doors for questioning their 
212 Ibid., para. 139.
213 Ibid., para. 141.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid., para. 142.
217 Ibid., para. 131.
218 Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 84, para. 513. However, regarding broadcasts after 
6 April 1994, the AC ‘observe[d] that Appellant Nahimana does not appear to dispute that 
the broadcasts […] contributed to the commission of acts of genocide’ (para. 514) and 
concluded that ‘it has not been demonstrated that it was unreasonable for the TC to find 
that the rtlm broadcasts after 6 April 1994 substantially contributed to the killing of 
these individuals’ (para. 515).
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 credibility.219 In the Muvunyi case before the ictr,220 the credibility of a wit-
ness was doubted, based on their being an Interahamwe militiaman who may 
have been motivated to exaggerate the defendant’s role in acts of genocide in 
order to minimise his own role. More importantly, the phenomenon of recant-
ing by prosecution witnesses, although generally common in international 
criminal proceedings, is especially endemic in speech crimes cases, in part be-
cause the accused are often high-level politicians with continued government 
backing and a zealous following and witnesses are often subjected to bribery 
and intimidation.221 Another problem is that international criminal tribunals 
do not have the leverage of encouraging testimony from subordinates against 
superiors in exchange for reduced sentences, such as is the practice in the 
United States.
It is important to note that during the second icty investigation into Šešelj’s 
propaganda, which was led by the German prosecutor Hildegard Uertz Ret-
zlaff, a large number of potential fact witnesses were interviewed, including 
many different types of insiders.222 Some of the witnesses later retracted their 
statements to the otp under threats by Šešelj’s men. However, apart from 
them, there was a dozen or so paramilitary troops, mainly members of Šešelj’s 
forces who gave statements corroborating direct influence on their crimes as 
charged in the indictment.223 As Dojčinović notes, ‘[t]he proof of direct insti-
gation in these statements was truly overwhelming’.224 Unfortunately, the 
prosecution teams and their strategies drastically changed during trial and 
with a reliance on jce the view was eventually adopted that instigation or a 
causal link with crimes committed did not need to be proven.225 The state-
ments highly regrettably thus ended up not being used. They now sit in the 
otp archives and due to their confidentiality cannot be disclosed to the 
public.226
In terms of instigation the AC corrected the TC judgment in several ways. 
Firstly, it made clear that it was not necessary for the instigator to have used 
different forms of persuasion such as threats, enticement or promises to the 
219 Davies, supra note 96, p. 250.
220 Muvunyi Appeal Judgment, supra note 85, para. 129, referring to Prosecutor v. Tharcisse 
Muvunyi, Trial Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-2000-55A-T) 12 September 2006, para. 156.
221 Wilson, supra note 11, p. 119; see also R.A. Wilson and M. Gillett, The Hartford Guidelines on 
Speech Crimes in International Criminal Law, Peace and Justice Initiative, online at www 
.internationalspeechcrimes.org/hartford_guidelines.pdf, p. 70.
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physical perpetrators of the crimes.227 Secondly, it also clarified that it was not 
necessary to establish that the crimes would not have been committed without 
the instigator’s involvement but merely that his utterances were a substantial 
factor contributing to the conduct of the perpetrators.228
For Šešelj’s speech in Hrtkovci, the AC found him responsible for instigating 
deportation, persecution (forcible displacement) and other inhumane acts 
(forcible transfer) as cah. This in turn was based on the AC finding that the 
speech substantially contributed to the conduct of the perpetrators in light of 
a) Šešelj’s influence over the crowd; and b) the striking parallels between his 
inflammatory words and the acts subsequently perpetrated by, inter alia, mem-
bers of the audience.229 In a positive twist, the AC thus provided two addi-
tional criteria for trial chambers to take into consideration when determining 
the link between speech and subsequent crimes that are more than mere chro-
nology. As far as the mens rea is concerned, the AC noted that Šešelj intended 
to prompt the commission of the crimes or, at the very least was aware of the 
substantial likelihood that they would be committed in execution of his 
instigation.230
Regrettably, the AC dismissed the Prosecution’s appeal regarding all other 
speeches, that is in the towns of Mali Zvornik and Vukovar, his statements be-
fore the Serbian Parliament, and other statements encouraging the creation of 
a Greater Serbia, claiming that the evidence presented by the Prosecution was 
insufficient to discern any specific impact on the commission of crimes.231
Considering his speech at Mali Zvornik, the AC found that a substantial con-
tribution to the commission of the relevant crimes there did not exist. The AC 
acknowledged that Šešelj’s statements that ‘rivers of blood’ would follow a Bos-
nian declaration of independence, were clearly inflammatory when viewed in 
the context of the events that were unfolding at Zvornik at the time, including 
the detention, torture and murder of Muslim civilians by several factions of the 
Serbian forces.232 The AC further acknowledged that Šešelj exerted influence 
over members of his party and some combatants.233 It found that the speech 
in Mali Zvornik where Šešelj implored the Četniks to clear up Bosnia from the 
‘pagans’ and show them the road to the east where they belonged, were a call 
for ethnic cleansing, which could have prompted other persons to commit 
227 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, supra note 110, para. 122.
228 Ibid., para. 131.
229 Ibid., para. 154.
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid., paras. 133-134.
232 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, supra note 110, para. 130.
233 Ibid., para. 133.
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crimes against non-Serbian civilians.234 Despite this, however, the AC did not 
find him responsible for instigating the crimes charged in the Indictment as 
the evidence was insufficient to discern whether the impact on the commission 
of the crimes amounted to a substantial contribution.235
3.5 Aiding and Abetting
With regard to the alleged responsibility of Vojislav Šešelj on the count of aid-
ing and abetting, the Chamber, by majority, Judge Lattanzi dissenting, rejected 
it, noting that the underlying allegations of the Prosecution have the same fac-
tual basis as its allegations on his responsibility under the jce and instigation. 
The TC held that the defendant did not show sufficient criminal intent, and it 
was not proven that his speeches calling for expulsions and forcible transfers 
had had a substantial effect on the perpetration of war crimes.236
As mentioned above, on paper, aiding and abetting requires the same 
threshold for causality as instigation or ordering and planning, i.e. a ‘substan-
tial’ effect or contribution, yet the jurisprudence has shown more flexibility in 
this regard for aiding and abetting.237 For example, in Simić, the AC stated: ‘It is 
not required that a cause-effect relationship between the conduct of the aider 
and abettor and the commission of the crime be shown, or that such conduct 
served as a condition precedent to the commission of the crime’.238 Whether 
the Court will consider acts as aiding and abetting without a causal link to the 
offense in question, will depend on the nature of the contribution and the pat-
tern of facts in the case.239 Furthermore there is no specific threshold for the 
level of assistance required to establish liability for aiding and abetting other 
than that it ‘must have furthered, advanced or facilitated the commission’240 of 
the offense.241
In Charles Taylor it was also confirmed by the AC of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (scsl) that each individual act does not have to exert a ‘ substantial 
234 Ibid., para. 130.
235 Ibid., paras. 133-134.
236 Šešelj Trial Judgment, supra note 10, para. 356.
237 Wilson and Gillett, supra note 221, p. 73.
238 Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić et al., Appeal Judgment, Case No. (IT-95-9-A), 28 November 
2006, para. 85. See Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 89, para. 94; Prosecutor v. Dominique 
Ntawukulilyayo, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-05-82-A), 14 December 2011, para. 214; 
Mrkšić Appeal Judgment, supra note 85, para. 81; Prosecutor v. Emmanuel Rukundo, Ap-
peal Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-2001-70-A), 20 October 2010, para. 52; Prosecutor v. Callixte 
Kalimanzirai, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-05-88-A), 20 October 2010, para. 86.
239 Wilson and Gillett, supra note 221, p. 73.
240 Bemba Trial Judgment, supra note 89, para. 94.
241 Wilson and Gillett, supra note 221, p. 72.
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effect’ on the outcome to qualify as aiding and abetting, but rather ‘[t]he facts 
of a case may involve multiple acts or conduct which, considered cumulatively, 
can be found to substantially contribute to the crime charged’.242
Yet despite the seemingly lower threshold for causation found in the interna-
tional jurisprudence, Šešelj’s acquittal for aiding and abetting cah was  upheld 
by the AC, on the grounds that Šešelj did not show the requisite awareness that 
crimes were being committed and his speech acts did not rise to the requisite 
level of making a substantial contribution to the commission of crimes.243 The 
decisions of both chambers thus displayed a departure from previous jurispru-
dence against a just ruling and again in favour of acquittal.244
3.6 Committing Persecution through ‘Incitement to Hatred’
It is not however solely under instigation, aiding and abetting or the doctrine 
of jce that liability can be attributed to hate propagandists. In Šešelj, the Pros-
ecution alleged physical commission of persecution as a cah through the ac-
cused’s speeches in Hrtkovci, Vukovar and Mali Zvornik based on the violation 
of the right to dignity and security of the targeted groups. The Prosecution 
strategy was heavily influenced by the Nahimana et al. case where the possibil-
ity of such liability was most notably confirmed when taking place in a context 
of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population.
While this position has been criticised as ‘essentially ignoring the decision 
of icc States parties not to criminalise incitement to war crimes and cah as 
such’245 it addresses an apparent gap in icl in terms of war propaganda. 
 Furthermore, it would not be entirely accurate to equate incitement to war 
crimes or cah with incitement to hatred as persecution per se. The latter does 
not require a causal link to any subsequent crimes. However, it is nevertheless 
242 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Appeals Judgment, Case No. (SCSL-03-01-A), 26 Sep. 2013, 
para. 362, fn. 1128. See also Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Appeal Judg-
ment, Case No. (IT-02-60-A), 9 May 2007, para. 284; Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, 
Appeal Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-99-54A-A), 19 September 2005, paras. 71-72.
243 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, supra note 110, paras. 171, 173, 181.
244 It seems that a general response to the early criticisms levelled at international criminal 
judges for adopting approaches that were too pro-conviction and that overlooked rights 
of the accused has been to lurch in the other direction, with an eagerness to demonstrate 
their unparalleled care for the accused at the expense of justice. See D. Robinson, ‘The 
Other Poisoned Chalice: Unprecedented Evidentiary Standards in the Gbagbo Case?’ 
(Part 1), ejil: Talk!, online at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-other-poisoned-chalice-un 
precedented-evidentiary-standards-in-the-gbagbo-case-part-1/.
245 I. Peterson, ‘International Criminal Liability for Incitement and Hate Speech’, in M. Böse 
et al. (eds.), Justice without Borders: Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Schomburg (Brill/Ni-
jhoff, Leiden, 2018) p. 356.
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defined also in terms of impact and is thus not an inchoate crime as detailed 
below.246 As an inchoate crime, it is a wrong in itself (a ‘malum in se’) and the 
inciter is being held criminally responsible for his own actions, not those of the 
incitee.247
Notably, however in his partly dissenting opinion in the Nahimana case, 
Judge Meron clearly disagreed with the majority, insisting that mere hate 
speech could not be criminal.248 Similarly in the Trial Judgment in Šešelj the 
majority dismissed the notion that incitement to hatred constituted a crime in 
international law.249 Also against previous icty jurisprudence,250 the TC in 
Šešelj furthermore denied the existence of a widespread and systematic attack 
against the non-Serbian population that meant that the consideration of 
Šešelj’s hate speech as a cah per se was a priori impossible. Erroneously, in 
para. 192 of the judgment the TC referred to the element of ‘widespread or 
systematic’ cah as conjunctive rather than disjunctive, raising the bar further 
and contradicting the existing law.
In general, the crime of persecution consists of an act or omission that dis-
criminates in fact against protected groups in the context of a widespread or 
systematic attack on a civilian population. What is required is not merely the 
intent to discriminate but ‘the act or omission must have discriminatory con-
sequences’.251 The persecutory act or omission must deny – or infringe upon – 
a fundamental human right laid down in international (customary or treaty) 
law.252 There must be a ‘gross or blatant denial’ of a fundamental right.253  
Article 7(2) (g) of the Rome Statute states that the act of persecution must re-
sult in an ‘intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to 
246 Nahimana Trial Judgment, supra note 61, para. 1073; see also Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, 
Trial Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-97-32-I), 1 June 2000, para. 22.
247 J. Jaconelli, ‘Incitement: A Study in Language Crime’, 12 Criminal Law and Philosophy 
(2018) 245-265, p. 250.
248 Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 84, Partly dissenting Opinion of Judge Meron, 
paras. 5-8.
249 Šešelj Trial Judgment, supra note 10, para. 300.
250 Prosecutor v. Mile Mrkšić et al., Trial Judgment, Case No. (IT-95-13/1), 27 September 2007, 
paras. 470, 472.
251 Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, Trial Judgment, Case No. (IT-02-60), 17 
January 2005, para. 583; Brđanin Trial Judgment, supra note 62, para. 993.
252 Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvoćka et al, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (IT-98-30/1-A), 28 February 
2005, para. 320; Kordić and Čerkez, Appeal Judgment, supra note 195, para. 101; Prosecutor 
v. Tihomir Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, Case No. (IT-95-14-A), 29 July 2004, para. 131.
253 Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Decision on Motions for Judgment of Acquittal, 
Case No. (ICTR-98-41-T), 2 February 2005, para. 32; Kvoćka Trial Judgment, supra note 202, 
para. 184; Prosecutor v. Vlatko Kupreškić et al, Trial Judgment, Case No. (IT-95-16-T), 14 
January 2000, para. 620.
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 international law’. The aim of such a deprivation of an individual’s rights is ‘the 
removal of those persons from the society in which they live alongside the per-
petrators, or eventually even from humanity itself ’.254
An act is discriminatory when a victim is targeted because of his or her 
membership in a group defined by the perpetrator on a political, racial or reli-
gious basis.255 It is thus the perpetrator’s subjective perception of the group or 
community and who belongs to it, which is determinative and not some objec-
tifiable characteristics that connect the group.256
A number of accused have been found guilty of persecution by denigration 
through speech. In Prosecutor v. Ruggiu the ictr found that hate speech, even 
without proof of causally related violence could be the basis for charging per-
secution as cah. The Trial Judgment in that case characterised the acts of per-
secution as consisting of:
radio broadcasts all aimed at singling out and attacking the Tutsi ethnic 
group and Belgians on discriminatory grounds, by depriving them of the 
fundamental rights to life, liberty and basic humanity enjoyed by mem-
bers of wider society. The deprivation of these rights can be said to have 
as its aim the death and removal of those persons from the society in 
which they live alongside the perpetrators, or eventually even from hu-
manity itself.257
As Gordon puts it, the Chamber thus considered that the words themselves 
assaulted the victims with the consequence of denying them their fundamen-
tal rights and were not merely a means through which to inspire others to com-
mit violent acts.258 The TC in Nahimana expressly recognised that such speech 
‘is not a provocation to cause harm. It is itself the harm. Accordingly, there need 
not be a call to action in communications that constitute persecution’.259 This 
approach is reflected also in the Supreme Court of Canada in Mugesera.260
254 Kupreškić Trial Judgment, ibid., paras. 634, 750-752.
255 Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment, supra note 251, para. 583.
256 S. Meseke, Der Tatbestand der Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit nach dem Römischen 
Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes: Eine völkerstrafrechtliche Analyse (Berliner 
Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin 2004), p. 240.
257 Ruggiu Trial Judgment, supra note 246, para. 22.
258 Gordon, supra note 71, p. 173.
259 Nahimana Trial Judgment, supra note 61, paras. 405, 1073.
260 Streicher Indictment, p. 11.
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Until the Šešelj Appeal, the jurisprudence at the icty was, however, the op-
posite of the above. The first time the icty dealt with incitement to hatred as 
a crime within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal was in the Kordić 
& Čerkez case in which the indictment included ‘encouraging and promoting 
hatred on political and other grounds’ as a cah.261 However the TC did not find 
this act to constitute a cah due to the fact that such incitement was not enu-
merated as a crime in the Statute and according to the Chamber, its prohibi-
tion had not reached customary international law either.262 Furthermore it 
considered the gravity of such an act not to rise to the level of other acts enu-
merated in Article 5 of the icty Statute.263 All three justifications were dis-
missed in the Nahimana appeal judgment, which noted the consistent AC ju-
risprudence by which it does not matter whether a specific act of persecution 
was criminalised or whether its gravity amounted to other cah as the underly-
ing acts of persecution could be considered together.264
The ictr in the Nahimana appeals judgment set a two-step test to deter-
mine whether incitement to hatred amounts to persecution. Firstly, the hate 
speech has to involve the denial of a fundamental right and discriminate in 
fact and secondly, the violation of these rights needs to be of equal gravity to 
the other cah. Where the hate speech targets a population based on ethnicity, 
or any other discriminatory grounds, it violates the right to respect for the hu-
man dignity of the members of the group, whereas where the speech consti-
tuted a call for violence against a population on such grounds, it violated the 
group members’ right to security.265 Both violations constitute discrimination 
in fact.266 According to the Chamber, speech itself cannot however constitute 
a violation of the right to life, freedom or physical integrity, without a third 
 person’s interference.267 Peterson criticises the decision for thus extending the 
crime of persecution to ‘rather intangible harm’.268
261 Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgment, supra note 201, para. 209, referring to Indictment, 
Count 1 (Persecutions, para. 37(c).
262 Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgment, ibid., para. 209, fn 272.
263 Ibid., fn 271.
264 Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 84, fn 2264.
265 Ibid., para. 986; see also Prosecutor v. Simon Bikindi, Trial Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-
01-72-T), 2 December 2008, para. 392: ‘hate speech may in certain circumstances consti-
tute a violation of fundamental rights, namely a violation of the right to respect for dig-
nity, when that speech incites to hate and discrimination, or a violation of the right to 
security when it incites to violence’.
266 Bikindi Trial Judgment, ibid., para. 986.
267 Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 84, para. 986.
268 Peterson, supra note 245, p. 356.
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Where the hate speech did not incite to violence, the ictr determined that 
it is not necessary to decide whether it was in itself of a gravity equivalent to 
the other cah. This is because, as mentioned, it is only necessary for the cumu-
lative effect of all the underlying persecutory acts to be of equal gravity to the 
other cah and not for each underlying act.269 The Chamber therefore consid-
ered that hate speeches and calls for violence uttered after the beginning of a 
systematic and widespread attack against a population themselves constitute 
underlying acts of persecution, and when they substantially contribute to the 
commission of other acts of persecution they further constitute instigation to 
such crimes.270 After 6 April 1994, in Rwanda, the context was that of calls for 
genocide and a massive persecutory campaign against the Tutsis, therefore the 
gravity threshold was clearly met.271
The Šešelj Trial Judgment however dismissed hate speech as persecution per 
se entirely. In terms of the speech in Hrtkovci it stated that the mere use of in-
sulting or defamatory language was insufficient to amount to persecution.272 
On the other hand, in her dissenting opinion, Judge Lattanzi considered that at 
least the speech in Hrtkovci constituted a physical commission of the denigra-
tion of the non-Serb populations, particularly Croats, as an underlying act of 
persecution.273 The AC confirmed this opinion and considered that said speech 
denigrated the Croatians of that town on the basis of their ethnicity, in viola-
tion of their right to respect for dignity as human beings.274 Furthermore it vio-
lated the right to security of the Croatians since Šešelj’s instigation of their 
forcible expulsion incited violence that denigrated and violated this right.275 
Based on this the speech in Hrtkovci constituted commission of persecution as 
a crime against humanity. This finding of commission of persecution as cah 
was thus partly based on initially finding Šešelj responsible for instigating de-
portation, persecution (forcible displacement) and other inhumane acts 
 (forcible transfer) as cah. Other speeches that violated the right to dignity 
and  the right to security of targeted groups went unrecognised as acts of 
persecution.
One of the most contentious issues when it comes to hate speech as perse-
cution per se is the question whether it can amount to said crime without an 
269 Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 84, para. 987.
270 Ibid., para. 988.
271 Nahimana Trial Judgment, supra note 61, para. 1076; Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra 
note 84, fn 2264.
272 Šešelj Trial Judgment, supra note 10, para. 283.
273 Šešelj Lattanzi Dissenting, supra note 194, para. 48.
274 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, supra note 110, para. 163.
275 Ibid.
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actual incitement to violence. The Nahimana Trial Judgment concluded that 
calls to violence were not necessary and in Ruggiu276 the Tribunal relied on the 
Streicher judgment in its reference to ‘the poison that Streicher injected into 
the mind of thousands of Germans’.277 Hate speech as persecution per se was 
thus considered as notably wider than instigation or direct and public incite-
ment to include advocacy of ethnic hatred in other forms.278 Thus in the Nahi-
mana Trial Judgment examples such as describing Tutsis as cunning and tricky 
or the portrayal of Tutsi women as femmes fatales or seductive agents of the 
enemy were all considered to constitute persecution.279 In support of this ap-
proach Gordon states:
speech in service of widespread and systematic attacks directed 
against  civilian populations… not calling directly for action should 
 nevertheless be criminalized. It cannot wrap itself in the mantle of 
democracy- pro motion, self-governance, diversity-enhancement, com-
munity-building, or individual-empowerment in light of its link to a per-
vasive or well-organized attack on ordinary citizens in a community.280
On the contrary and mostly influenced by the American theory on the matter, 
those opposing such a wide definition have relied on the fact that Streicher 
was only convicted because of incitement to murder and they furthermore 
consider the acquittal of Fritzsche on grounds that his hate speeches did not 
seek ‘to incite the Germans to commit atrocities against the conquered 
people’.281 They furthermore understand the Ruggiu Trial Judgment as show-
ing that it is only speech whose ultimate aim is to destroy life that constitutes 
persecution282 and criticise the TC for having failed to follow the Čerkez and 
276 Ruggiu Trial Judgment, supra note 246, para. 19.
277 Ibid.
278 Nahimana Trial Judgment, supra note 61, para. 178.
279 Ibid., para. 1079.
280 Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law, supra note 71, p. 402.
281 Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 84, para. 979; Open Society Justice Initiative, Am-
icus curiae brief in Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Negeze v. 
The Prosecutor, 15 December 2006, www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/0777227e-8c7c-
4684-84ac-34175f508095/ictr-nahimana-amicus-brief-20061215.pdf; Nahimana Meron 
Dissenting, supra note 248, paras. 12-13; see also D.F. Orenticher, ‘Criminalizing Hate 
Speech in the Crucible of the Trial: Prosecutor v. Nahimana’, 21 American University Inter-
national Law Review (2006) 557-596; K.W. Goering et al., ‘Why U.S. Law Should Have Been 
Considered in the Rwanda Media Convictions’, 22 Communications Lawyer (2004) 10-18, 
pp. 10-12.
282 Gordon, supra note 71, p. 153.
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Kordić Trial Judgment, which had found that mere hate speech could not con-
stitute persecution.283
The Nahimana Appeal Judgment refrained from settling the matter in its 
entirety, while the partially dissenting opinions were split between Judge Mer-
on and Judges Shahabudeen and Pocar. Relying on Kordić and US jurispru-
dence, Meron simply dismissed the possibility of hate speech ever forming a 
basis for criminal conviction save for incitement to violence.284 On the 
 contrary, Judges Shahabudeen and Pocar were of the opinion that the Appeal 
judgment should have made it clear that speech not inciting violence can con-
stitute an underlying act of persecution.285 Pocar felt that in the case at hand 
the circumstances were a perfect example of where hate speech fulfils the con-
ditions necessary for it to be considered as an underlying act of persecution 
and that the relevant speeches taken together and in their context amounted 
to a violation of sufficient gravity.286 Furthermore Shahabuddeen claimed that 
in the case of Fritzsche his acquittal was based on the fact that he did not form 
part in originating or formulating the propaganda campaign and not on the 
fact that he did not call to violence.287 Citing furthermore the decisions in Flick 
and Einsatzgruppen he interpreted Nuremberg jurisprudence as not necessi-
tating incitement to violence for persecution as a cah but rather ‘harm to life 
and liberty’ or ‘acts committed in the course of wholesale and systematic viola-
tion of life and liberty’ that may include economic and political discrimination 
and not necessarily a physical attack. In his argument: ‘[T]he court may well 
regard the ‘cumulative effect’ of harassment, humiliation, and psychological 
abuse as impairing the quality of ‘life’, if not ‘liberty’, within the meaning of the 
tests laid down in Einsatzgruppen’.288
Shahabuddeen also criticised the Kordić judgment, which he claimed con-
tradicted the Ministries case, other cases of the icty and customary interna-
tional law by excluding the hate act from its context:
283 Open Society Justice Initiative, Amicus curiae brief, supra note 281.
284 Nahimana, Meron Dissenting, supra note 248, para. 13.
285 Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 84, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabu-
deen, paras. 7-8.
286 Nahimana Appeal Judgment, ibid, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar, para. 3. Pocar 
also stated that rtlm hate screeds caused Hutus to discriminate against Tutsis.
287 Nahimana, Shahabudeen Dissenting, supra note 285, paras. 7-8; ‘[h]is position and official 
duties were not sufficiently important… to infer that he took part in originating or formu-
lating propaganda campaigns’; Streicher Judgment, para. 161 convicting Streicher for 
Crimes against Humanity; F. Pocar, ‘Persecution as a Crime under International Criminal 
Law’, 2 Journal of National Security Law and Policy (2008) 355-365, p. 359.
288 Nahimana, Shahabudeen Dissenting, ibid, paras. 10-12.
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it is not possible fully to present a campaign as persecutory if integral 
 allegations of hate acts are excluded… The subject of indictment is the 
persecutory campaign, not the particular hate act. This was why non-
crimes were included with crimes in the Ministries case.289
Thus, despite the strong dissents, the AC in the Media case left the issue unre-
solved.290 The Šešelj Appeal did not settle the matter either, as it does not give 
a definitive answer but rather implies that a call to violence is necessary. There 
is scope to understand the mention of a violation of dignity in the Šešelj Ap-
peal Judgment as allowing for a finding of persecution without a call for vio-
lence, yet there are two issues that arise in this context. Firstly, as mentioned, 
the Appeal Judgment does not mention the violation of dignity in the actual 
disposition, and secondly, it is not clear what is meant by ‘dignity’.291 As David 
Weisstub theorises, human dignity can be violated through disrespect where-
by a person is ‘reduce[d] […] to behave in a less than dignified manner’.292 As 
Timmermann writes, it is also violated when a person is made to lose ‘self- 
respect or the feeling of self-assurance that results from social recognition that 
individuals experience when they are respected as equal members of the 
community’.293 Margalit explains that humiliation ‘shows the victims that they 
lack even the most miniscule degree of control over their fate – that they are 
helpless and subject to the good will […] of their tormentors’.294 These defini-
tions would seem to imply a policy of persecution beyond mere words to in-
clude instead a significant degree of coercion. In the context of speech, they 
thus suggest words that carry at least an implied threat of physical force or 
 violence. This would seem to loosely correspond with the Appeal Judgment 
since it did not find a violation of dignity in Šešelj’s other speeches despite 
clearly using severely derogatory terms for the out-groups.
289 Ibid., para. 16, fn omitted.
290 Gordon, supra note 71, p. 239.
291 See C. O’Mahony, ‘There is No Such Thing as a Right to Dignity’, 10 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law (2012) 551-574. Note that countries such as Germany, Denmark, The 
Netherlands and South Africa prohibit or criminalise incitement to hatred because of its 
perceived violation of human dignity. See Timmermann, supra note 6, p. 39.
292 D.N. Weisstub, ‘Honor, Dignity, and the framing of Multiculturalist Values’, in D. Kretzmer 
and E. Klein (eds.), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2002) pp. 263, 270 as quoted in Timmermann, ibid, p. 41.
293 Timmermann, ibid, p. 41, referring to C. Menke and A. Pollmann, Philosophie der Men-
schenrechte zur Einführung (Junius Verlag, Hamburg, 2007), pp. 139-143.
294 A. Margalit, The Decent Society (N. Goldblum (trs), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
1996) p. 116 as quoted in Timmermann, ibid, pp. 49-50.
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Limiting the scope of persecution to hate speech inciting to violence leaves 
essential parts of any successful hate propaganda campaign out of criminalisa-
tion. In this sense it mirrors the situation with incitement to genocide, where 
only words that directly call for genocide fall within the definition of the crime, 
whereas all other propaganda surrounding such calls can merely provide con-
text for the purpose of determining the intent of the speaker or the directness 
of his calls to genocide.295
In her dissenting opinion in Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, Judge Carbuccia re-
ferred to Féret v. Belgium to highlight that a politician’s comments constituted 
public incitement to racial hatred against outsiders, and without requiring a 
call to this or that act of violence or another delinquent act, violated the dig-
nity and security of the effected groups of people, posing a danger for social 
peace and the political stability of democratic states.296 This said, the Judge 
did not clarify what implications she wanted to infer from this for the purpose 
of interpreting the icc Statute on such incitement.
If there is no need for a direct call to violence or causality between the ut-
tered speech and any subsequent atrocities committed, proving guilt of hate 
speech as persecution per se is inherently easier. However, it nevertheless does 
not solve the issue of the potential preventative function of hate speech as a 
crime in itself. This is because hate speech as persecution per se still demands 
the contemporaneity of the speech with a widespread or systematic attack di-
rected against a civilian population, since such contemporaneity has always 
been a part of the definition of cah. The AC in Nahimana thus insisted that the 
hate speech in question be contemporaneous with the atrocities committed 
against the Tutsis after 6 April 1994. This leaves out all the propaganda leading 
up to the genocide, which was essential for the success of the actual  incitement 
to genocide. Judge Pocar drew the distinction between hate speeches prior to 
6 April 1994, that is, prior to the beginning of the systematic and widespread 
295 Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 84, para. 726; ‘It appears from the travaux 
préparatoires of Genocide Convention that only specific acts of direct and public incite-
ment to commit genocide were sought to be criminalized and not hate propaganda or 
propaganda tending to provoke genocide’. Despite this, the AC made it clear that context 
is a factor to consider in deciding whether the relevant discourse constitutes direct incite-
ment to commit genocide and that uttered speech which does not by itself amount to this 
crime can nevertheless provide such a context. As other contextually important informa-
tion, it could explain how the listeners perceived the relevant speech and the impact the 
speech may have had. See also, ibid., paras. 715, 725.
296 Féret v Belgium, App no. 15615/07 (ECtHR, 16 July 2009) para. 73, as quoted in Gbagbo and 
Blé Goudé decision, Carbuccia Dissenting Opinion, supra note 94, para. 569
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attack against the Tutsi ethnic group, and hate speeches that occurred after 
that date. In his opinion the later speeches were per se underlying acts of 
persecution,297 whereas the former ones could be considered instigation.298
4 Law Not Fit to Deal with War Propagandists
As it stands, the sort of hate and fear propaganda that was employed in the 
former Yugoslavia is not criminalised in its complex entirety. Unless it is a 
 matter of direct incitement to genocide, large chunks of speech employing 
persuasion techniques that prime a society for the commission of atrocities 
remain outside the ambit of criminalisation. The consideration of the totality 
of one’s hate propaganda and the context in which it is uttered is crucial for 
recognising the role it plays. This section will take a multi-disciplinary ap-
proach to identifying the reasons behind the failure of international criminal 
law to adequately recognise the effects of propaganda and effectively address 
it. It will furthermore highlight the necessary shifts in legal perception of this 
phenomenon that would allow more meaningful conclusions in the jurispru-
dence in line with the findings of social sciences experts.
Predrag Dojčinović noted already before the decisions in Šešelj, that there 
was a conceptual vacuum in the interaction of propaganda and international 
law.299 In his words: ‘Propaganda is used in a manner which leaves the impres-
sion of an intellectual embellishment, a prosthesis of deliberative thinking, 
rather than a concept which is first clearly understood and only then situated 
in law’.300 He further notes that after reading judgments from the icty and 
ictr ‘we are often left with an intuition that propaganda plays an important 
role in the text, although it is rarely explained why’.301 Richard Wilson goes a 
step further and claims that while international tribunals use forceful declara-
tions regarding the deleterious effects of propaganda, they are seldom sup-
ported by extensive and reliable evidence ‘and it could be argued that the 
chasm between the claims regarding propaganda’s consequences and the 
 evidence presented to support such claims is wider than in any other area of 
297 Nahimana Judge Pocar Dissenting, supra note 286, para. 3.
298 Ibid.
299 Dojčinović, Propaganda, War Crimes Trials, supra note 8, p. 7.
300 Ibid.
301 Ibid.
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international criminal law’.302 In their view, a closer insight into its mechanism 
would contribute much required precision and logical coherence to the analy-
sis in the judgments.303
Wilson warns against relying on common sense reasoning when trying to 
construct causal models of speech at international tribunals.304 In his words, 
‘our ability to understand the effects of speech through intuition and a priori 
reasoning alone is actually quite limited. Many recent findings in persuasion 
research and communication theory are counterintuitive, or at least not im-
mediately obvious, even to seasoned political and legal observers’.305 While 
regretting the lack of social research expertise during trials of hate propagan-
dists, Wilson at the same time notes that not even such research can determine 
with absolute certainty the concrete effects of a particular speech act uttered 
in the context of widespread and systematic violations, however it can identify 
which types of speech acts are most likely to elevate the risk of violence in a 
particular context.306
The above indicates that proving a causal link between a speech and an act 
from a member of the audience beyond reasonable doubt may be a near im-
possible task, particularly since, as Wilson notes, there is no guidance on how 
to understand such a causal link in icl jurisprudence or scholarly works.307 
Aksenova observes the intrinsic problem in relying on causation in the strict 
sense of the word in the context of speech acts. In the physical world, a causal 
chain is considered broken when interrupted by the free choice of an individ-
ual, even one acting under an accomplice’s influence.308 In this sense it cannot 
be said that an accomplice should be understood as a necessary prerequisite 
for harm caused by the primary perpetrator; rather he merely affects the freely 
chosen behaviour of the principal perpetrator. 309 In his Causation and Respon-
sibility, Michael Moore delves extensively into how complicity need not be 
causal with respect to the crime, claiming that all causes are by definition 
302 R.A. Wilson, ‘Propaganda and History in International Criminal Trials’, 14 Journal of Inter-
national Criminal Justice (2016) 519-541, p. 533.
303 Ibid.
304 Wilson, supra note 11, p. 223.
305 Ibid., p. 224.
306 Ibid.
307 Ibid., p. 8.
308 S.H. Kadish, ‘Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine’, 73 
California Law Review (1985) 323-410, p. 334.
309 M. Aksenova (ed.), Complicity in International Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, London, 
2016), p. 99.
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merely chance-raising.310 On the other hand, many have questioned how much 
‘free will’ there can be in a propagandistically determined context.311
Regardless of the theory, a more appropriate approach than searching for 
causation in the strict sense would be to establish that a certain speech is or 
was likely to elevate the risk of violence in a particular context including the cul-
tural, political and historical context. This way the inquiry could be done 
through an objective expert evaluation of outwardly manifestations and would 
not necessitate the testimony of principal perpetrators as to the effects the 
propaganda had on them. As Joseph Jaconelli notes generally on incitement, it 
may prove impossible to ascertain the number, location or identity of the in-
cited and how incited they were.312 In fact, in the present context, it would re-
quire bringing to the court perpetrators who: a) have a perfect recollection of 
their own thought process behind the commission of the crimes; b) have the 
willingness to honestly speak about it; and c) have an extraordinary ability of 
self-analysis to the extent that they can determine with surgical precision how 
far their thought process at the time was ‘their own’ and to what degree it was 
influenced by the subconscious effects of propaganda or the general context 
created or permitted by other individuals under its influence.
Considering the potential risk, instead of strict causation, would mirror the 
approach taken by human rights courts in assessing the legitimacy of limiting 
freedom of expression in the sense that it would consider the dangerousness of 
the speech.313 It is important to note that the cases in question at international 
criminal tribunals generally do not consider the legitimacy of a restriction of 
the freedom of speech of a minority group versus the national security consid-
erations of the government as is the situation at the human rights courts. 
 Rather it is the opposite: the speech under consideration is that of the so-called 
‘majority population’, in support of the government and as a supposed defence 
of national security.314 Thus the standards that have evolved in international 
310 M. Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals and Metaphysics (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009) 299-323.
311 P. Dojčinović, ‘Word Scene Investigations: Toward a Cognitive Linguistic Approach to the 
Criminal Analysis of Open Source Evidence in War Crimes’, in Dojčinović (ed.), supra 
note 8; A.R. Melle, Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control (Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, 1987); J.M Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, and M. Vargas, 
‘Libertarianism’, Four Views on Free Will (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2007), p. 14; D.M. 
Wegner, ‘The Mind’s Compass’, The Illusion of Conscious Will (The mit Press, Cambridge, 
MA, 2002), p. 336.
312 Jaconelli, supra note 247, 253.
313 ECtHR, Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey, Merits and Just Satisfaction, App No. 24277/94, (EC-
tHR, 8 July 1999).
314 Nahimana Trial Judgment, supra note 61, paras. 1008-1009.
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law largely to deal with the former situations required some adaptation in the 
sense of lowering protections, ‘so that ethnically specific expression would be 
more rather than less carefully scrutinized to ensure that minorities without 
equal means of defence are not endangered’.315
A broader understanding of causation in propaganda cases would thus al-
low for more effective prosecution of hate and fear propagandists, even if 
a  substantial reform of the law in terms of expanding liability remains un-
attainable.
Whether propaganda can lead to atrocities depends on the context more so 
than particular words uttered. Several studies have confirmed that ordinary 
people are capable of committing atrocities in the name of nationalist impera-
tives, religious principles and righteous ideology.316 When it comes to ethnic 
collective violence, Oberschall analyses three instances spanning three differ-
ent continents and concludes that this occurs under the following conditions:
when there are contentious issues between [the groups], when their 
 political leaders advocate hostility and aggression in ethnic conflict man-
agement, and when threat and hate messages in the mass media amplify 
danger to the group, incite hostility to adversaries, and justify collective 
violence against them as a solution to outstanding issues.317
As Gordon suggests, of all the elements to consider in incitement, context is the 
most important.318 The Hartford Guidelines advance a risk assessment frame-
work informed by the latest social science research that has identified many of 
the key ingredients of mass persuasion.319 They provide a checklist of indica-
tive factors known to elevate the risk of speech acts prompting mass crimes, 
including: (a) the political context of the speech act, (b) the emotional state of 
the audience, (c) the historical and political context of the country, (d) the 
perceived charisma, credibility and authority of the speaker, (e) their use of 
graphic and dehumanising language, (f) the degree to which they summon up 
cultural symbols and cultivate historical grievances, (g) their calls for revenge, 
315 Ibid., para. 1009.
316 E. Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989); M. Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Eth-
nic Cleansing (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), p. 9; D. Horowitz, The Dead-
ly Ethnic Riot (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985); J. Waller, Becoming Evil (Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, 2002); C. Browning, Ordinary Men. Reserve Battalion 101 and 
the Final Solution in Poland (Harper Collins, New York, 1992).
317 Oberschall, Šešelj’s Nationalist Propaganda, supra note 57, p. 44.
318 Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law, supra note 71, p. 296.
319 Wilson and Gillett, Hartford Guidelines, supra note 221, pp. 120-121.
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(h) their ability to access and control an array of means of communication, 
and (i) their identification of a clear path of violent action that their audience 
can follow.320
While the TC in Šešelj acknowledged its duty to analyse and qualify Šešelj’s 
statements and their potential impact in light of the cultural, historical and 
political context,321 it essentially considered it as a sort of mitigating circum-
stance. The Chamber construed the ‘context’ in such way that any effects and 
any responsibility that went beyond the concrete situation were dismissed. As 
Posselt describes, hate speech and hate crime necessarily have a historical and 
iterative character:
For every performative requires for its functioning that it can be reiterat-
ed, that it evokes and affirms the historical sedimented norms, structures 
and conventions that ultimately enable it. This becomes particularly ap-
parent, when we recall that the one who performs hate speech or com-
mits hate crime never acts ‘alone’, but as a representative of social struc-
tures, attitudes and dispositions that his or her (speech) acts invoke and 
actualize. Hence, hate speech and hate crime are never simply expres-
sions of an individual, but always also a reflection and reiteration of ‘in-
built tendencies and predispositions of societal structures that make 
those acts possible. 322
Posselt continues however, that this should not be an excuse for diminished 
but rather a strengthened concept of responsibility. Quoting Butler, he con-
cludes that responsibility is not linked with speech as origination, but precisely 
with its citational and repetitive character, i.e. its invocation and reiteration of 
norms, conventions, traumas, and exclusions that are sedimented in language 
with which the speaker renews the linguistic tokens of a ‘community’, reissu-
ing and reinvigorating such speech.323
320 Ibid., pp. 120-121.
321 Šešelj, Trial Judgment, supra note 10, para 300; referencing in this regard Nahimana Trial 
Judgment, supra note 61, paras 1011, 1020-1022; Nahimana Appeal Judgment, supra note 84, 
paras. 698-703; Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 195, para. 557; Bikindi Trial Judgment, 
supra note 265, para. 247; Prosecutor v. Callixte Nzabonimana, Appeal Judgment, Case No. 
(ICTR-98-44D-A), 29 September 2014, para. 134; ECtHR, Perinçek v. Switzerland, Appeal 
Judgment, App No. 27510/08, (ECtHR, 15 October 2015), paras 207, 234 and 280.
322 G. Posset, ‘Can Hatred Speak? Or the Linguistic Dimensions of Hate Crime’, 82 Linguistik 
Online (2017) 6-25, pp. 21-22, DOI: https://doi.org/10.13092/lo.82.3712,; see also J. Butler 
(ed.), Excitable Speech. A Politics of the Performative (Routledge, London, 1997), p. 39.
323 Posset, ibid., p. 22.
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4.1 A Broader Approach to Causality Considering the Context of the 
Speech
In her dissenting opinion in Šešelj, Judge Lattanzi claimed there was ample 
admitted evidence to establish instigation, which if taken into account in its 
entirety, analysed meticulously and in accordance with previous ICTY/ICTR 
jurisprudence, would lead to the only reasonable conclusion that instigation 
did take place as well as material perpetration of the crime of persecution 
through the underlying act of denigration.324 Her assessment is correct despite 
the fact that a vast amount of evidence remained unused as previously men-
tioned.325 What evidence was available was simply not factually analysed.326 
Dojčinović points out for example how the word ‘Ustaša’ referred to by Šešelj, 
had already been recognised as one of the strongest derogatory hate speech 
references to Croats in the icty jurisprudence.327 Yet the TC did not even men-
tion it, so the AC could not have taken it into account.328
Unfortunately, according to Lattanzi, in the context of instigation the 
Chamber
accorded no weight at all to the evidence showing that the Accused 
 exerted a great influence on his followers and the srs volunteers involved 
in the crimes…[and] failed to take into account important elements such 
as the means used by the Accused to influence the behaviour of the per-
petrators of crimes, the repetition of the same incriminating discourse 
over time, the general background of the disintegration of the former Yu-
goslavia and the extreme inter-ethnic tensions against which these acts 
took place, and the fact that the existing situation worsened following 
the speeches in dispute.329
Judge Lattanzi, as well as the Prosecution’s Appeal Brief, faulted the TC for not 
having taken into account more of Šešelj’s statements in order to deliberate on 
his instigation liability; however, it is important to note that while there were 
324 Šešelj Lattanzi Dissenting, supra note 194, paras. 49, 95-105.




329 Šešelj Lattanzi Dissenting, supra note 194, para. 12; Similarly, the Prosecution submitted in 
its Appeal Brief, there was a failure by the Trial Chamber to engage with its core argument 
that Šešelj’s relentless propaganda campaign instigated the commission of crimes against 
non-Serbians and that the Trial Chamber only addressed a limited number of speeches 
without assessing the evidence in its proper context, offering little, if any, reasons of anal-
ysis. Šešelj, IT-03-67-T, Notice of Filing of Public Redacted Version of Prosecution Appeal 
Brief, 29 August 2016, (Šešelj, Appeal Brief) paras. 109-117.
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at least over five hundred exhibits presented to address the mens rea, the in-
dictment only mentioned five speeches as the specific crime base.330 As  Wilson 
notes, ‘a full comprehension of the ensemble of conditions that were jointly 
sufficient [for crimes to take place] is often lost as prosecutors and defense 
counsel seize upon opposite poles of the same continuum of causation’.331 In 
the same way, the Prosecution in Šešelj sought to show how those five speeches 
were each ‘directly causal and set in motion criminal actions’.332 Yet such an 
approach misses the most important findings of recent social science research, 
i.e. that certain types of speech, while not attaining a sine qua non threshold, 
nevertheless elevate the probability conditions that a criminal harm or injury 
will ensue333 for example by lowering empathy towards an out-group,334 
heightening fear, disgust,335 anger336 and an indifference to their well-being337 
as well as morally justifying particularly brutal violence against its 
members.338
While some find it ‘problematic to suggest speeches pleaded and not plead-
ed in the indictment, ‘taken together’, satisfied the requirements of instigation’, 
this is precisely what should have been done in the Šešelj case, for a more 
 appropriate consideration of the effects of his propaganda.339 It is rather 
shocking that among all of his speeches and writings, only one, that is the 
330 Šešelj, Indictment, supra note 129, paras. 20, 22, 33.
331 Wilson, Incitement on Trial, supra note 11, p. 284.
332 Ibid.
333 Ibid., p. 285.
334 C. Guillard and L.T. Harris, ‘The Neuroscience of Dehumanization and its Implications for 
Political Violence’, in Dojčinović, supra note 2, 201 citing A. Bandura et al., ‘Disinhibition 
of Aggression through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims’, 9 
Journal of Research in Personality (1975) 253-269.
335 Ibid., citing L.T. Harris and S.T. Fiske, ‘Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low Neuroimag-
ing Responses to Extreme out-groups’, 17 Psychological Science (2006) 847-853; R.T. Aze-
vedo et al., ‘Cardiac Afferent Activity Modulates the Expression of racial Stereotypes’, 8 
Nature Communications (2017); C.M. Lillie et al., ‘This is the Hour of Revenge: The Psychol-
ogy of Propaganda and Mass Atrocities’ 2015, online at www.semanticscholar.org/paper/
This-Is-the-Hour-of-Revenge%3A-The-Psychology-of-and-Lillie-Knapp/2255450149577e8
0cb2f0d2510bba22be18da2a4.
336 Ibid., citing S. M. Utych, ‘How Dehumanization Influences Attitudes toward Immigration’, 
71 Political Research Quarterly (2018) 440-452.
337 Ibid., citing T. Rai et al., ‘Our Enemies Are Human: That’s Why We Want to Kill Them’, 
 Behaviour Scientists, 18 August 2017, https://behavioralscientist.org/enemies-human-thats 
-want-kill/.
338 Ibid., citing A. Bandura et al., ‘Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of 
Moral Agency’, 71 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (1996) 364-374; N. Kteily, 
‘The Ascent of Man: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence for Blatant Dehumanization’, 109 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (2015) 901-931.
339 Peterson, supra note 245, p. 357; see Šešelj Appeal Brief, para. 110.
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speech in Hrtkovci, was eventually found on Appeal to be criminally relevant. 
In other words, had Šešelj not given that particular speech, he would have still 
been considered innocent of any international crime. In view of the entirety of 
his propaganda portfolio, this would undoubtedly have been a grave injustice 
and would send a message that hate propaganda will go unpunished unless a 
particular speech can be linked with overwhelming evidence of causality to a 
specific crime committed as a result.
In the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé case at the icc, the Prosecutor brought a 
much larger sample of potentially relevant speech to the Court and pursued 
a holistic approach to proving causation taking into consideration the com-
bined  effects of the words and actions.340 In delivering his reasons for joining 
Judge Tarfusser in deciding to end the case against Mr Laurent Gbagbo and 
Mr  Charles Blé Goudé, Judge Henderson acknowledged that the Prosecu-
tor was ‘correct in emphasising the importance of evaluating all the evidence 
together and to take into consideration the combined effect’ of the accused’s 
actions and words.341 However, he was unconvinced by the implications 
drawn  therefrom and essentially expected evidence proving straightforward 
causation.
The Prosecution claimed, for example, that Mr Blé Goudé’s words led to vio-
lence by creating a climate of fear with threats of genocide posed by France, 
the unoci and the supporters of the opposition, who he branded as the ‘reb-
els’.342 According to the Prosecutor, this primed the youth to be ready for a ‘mot 
d’ordre’ to be issued by him in response to this threat.343 The latter referred to 
a speech in which Mr Blé Goudé instructed the audience to (a) prevent unoci 
from moving in the neighbourhoods, and (b) to coordinate with the ‘présidents 
de quartier’ in order to be aware of and verify the comings and goings in their 
neighbourhoods and to ‘denounce’ strangers entering their neighbourhoods.344 
While the said ‘mot d’ordre’ did not include calls to violence, according to the 
Prosecutor explicit language did not need to be used for the message to be 
understood after the audience was primed with fear and in the context of pre-
existing tension between the relevant neighbourhoods that made it  foreseeable 
that inflammatory words stigmatising ‘foreigners’ would lead to violence.345
Henderson rejected such a general presentation of a causal link and stated 
that while the speech contained potentially inflammatory passages, which, in 
340 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé decision, Reasons of Henderson, supra note 94, para. 1984.
341 Ibid.
342 Ibid., para. 1986.
343 Ibid.
344 Ibid., para. 1988.
345 Ibid., para. 1993.
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a volatile context, may well have caused some individuals to act in a manner 
going beyond what the words actually called for, such an effect must be estab-
lished through evidence and cannot simply be assumed.346 Again the best evi-
dence in this regard was considered to be examples of those who attended the 
speech and subsequently committed crimes and who were demonstrably in-
fluenced by the words.347 What exactly is meant by ‘demonstrably influenced’ 
is, however, unclear.
Contrary to this approach, in her dissenting opinion Judge Carbuccia con-
sidered that a reasonable Trial Chamber could find, from the evidence, that Blé 
Goudé’s speeches, ‘mots d’ordré’ and calls during the post-election violence, 
considered as a whole, and in the light of the particular social and political 
context of that post-election violence, contributed substantially to the acts of 
violence committed.348
While direct perpetrators testifying to the effects that certain speeches had 
on them may be the ideal scenario for judges, it should not a be a necessary 
requirement for the Prosecution for the reasons described above. When it 
comes to causality, it is furthermore important to acknowledge that the link 
not only runs directly from the words uttered to the perpetrators in the form of 
persuasion or other direct effects on their cognition. Rather, there exists an 
important indirect causal link through intermediaries as well as through a sig-
nalling of a new societal order and morality which individuals either feel com-
pelled to join or are willing to join voluntarily for personal reasons. In other 
words, most perpetrators do not need to be persuaded into the ideology being 
spread in order for propaganda to have an effect on them and thereby contrib-
ute substantially to the commission of the crimes.
4.2 The Context of a Severely Skewed Marketplace of Ideas
It is not merely the totality of an individual’s propaganda that should be taken 
into account, but rather the totality of all state and non-state propaganda with 
essentially the same messaging and its constant repetition that surrounded the 
speech of the accused and that makes such speech more effective. As was the 
case with Streicher, Šešelj was seen as a lone wolf. Yet the mere fact that their 
propaganda campaigns took place in the context of a complete breakdown of 
the marketplace of ideas, where all opposing views were strictly marginalised 
and to a large extent eliminated, invalidates the idea that their acts could not be 
considered as part of the broader campaigns and were mutually reinforcing.
346 Ibid., para. 1994.
347 Ibid., para. 1995.
348 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé decision, Carbuccia Dissenting Opinion, supra note 94, para. 642.
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The US model for freedom of speech, which arguably allows the fewest ex-
ceptions to it, includes the important precondition that the state remains neu-
tral and protects public discourse as a sphere that remains equally open to all 
communities.349 Šešelj’s words were not uttered in a vacuum or in the context 
of a rich marketplace of ideas. Rather they were spread in an environment in 
which the media and, in particular, national television, laid the necessary 
 emotional foundations for conducting a wartime propaganda campaign by 
building up hateful stereotypes of Croats and Muslims.350 There was generally 
no marketplace of ideas during the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s as each side 
controlled its media to give its public a distorted version of reality and cut off 
broadcasts from the other side.351
Renaud de la Brosse presented an expert report detailing the methods em-
ployed by those controlling the media during the Yugoslav wars and the use of 
media for ultra-nationalist goals.352 In 1986 Slobodan Milošević began his ef-
forts to gain control over the state media until by the summer of 1991 he held a 
monopoly over Serbian state media, albeit that there was a growing number of 
niche independent media created by liberal, progressive and independent 
journalists. Milošević and his regime waged an intense media battle of hateful 
propaganda and biased and untrue information. According to Eric Gordy,
Under the pressure of the political authorities, the media had to attempt 
to convince the citizens of Serbia that they were the victims of an inter-
national conspiracy to eliminate them and remove Serbia from the face 
of the earth. The fact that the media and, in particular, national television 
built up such hateful stereotypes incontestably laid the necessary emo-
tional foundations for conducting a wartime propaganda campaign.353
Milošević ‘personally appointed editors-in-chief of the newspapers and news 
programs, especially directors-general of the radio and television’ and was ‘in 
direct communication with all editors who ‘fed’ the public with the news, 
349 Post, supra note 29, p. 133: ‘J.S. Mills argues that nobody has a monopoly on truth, neither 
has the majority in society any right to suppress the opinions of the minority howev-
er much they dislike them. The theory demands that all discussion be kept open however 
true or false they might be. In American judicial writings, this is characterised as the 
 ‘market-place of ideas’, doctrine through which truth, it is assumed will ultimately 
surface’.
350 R. de la Brosse, Political Propaganda and the Plan to Create a ‘State for all Serbs’: Conse-
quences of Using the Media for Ultra-Nationalist Ends (University of Reins, Ardennes, 
2003), para. 31.
351 Tadić, Trial Judgment, supra note 161, para. 130.
352 Brosse, supra note 350, pp. 6-7.
353 Ibid.
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 comments and generally with information’.354 Milošević-controlled media 
reached more than 3.5 million people every day, while he used several ways of 
controlling independent media to ensure that their reach was minimal. It is 
important to note that due to significant demonstrations against regime 
 control of the state media, the largest of which were in Belgrade in March of 
1991, the regime left some room for independent media to survive albeit with 
limited means, circulation, viewers and listeners and subject to constant ha-
rassment and attacks.355 A Special Report by the Belgrade Institute of Political 
Studies found that in 1994 ‘the Milošević regime controlled 90% mass media 
penetration, i.e. 90% of information on public affairs and news reaching the 
public was through regime media’.356 By 1995, the independent media were 
largely restricted to Belgrade, thus the majority of Serbs only received regime 
propaganda.357 As one of Milošević’s closest collaborators explains: ‘He was 
deeply convinced that citizens formed their view of the political situation on 
the basis of what they were presented and not on the basis of their real mate-
rial and political position. What is not published has not happened at all – that 
was Milošević’s motto’.358
During a strike at the cultural and music service of Radio Belgrade that 
broke out in protest of political control, Šešelj himself held a press conference 
to disclose a list of radio and TV journalists he wanted eliminated because of 
their lack of patriotism and obedience to political masters.359 Most were sub-
sequently put on ‘compulsory leave’ or marginalised360 while other purges fol-
lowed, eventually getting rid of 200 journalists and thousands of staff.361
In the Serb majority territories of Bosnia, Oberschall describes the control 
of mass media as physical and coercive.362 Eight months before the start of war 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb paramilitaries supported by the Yugoslav army 
seized the Kozara mountain transmitter, followed by other such seizures in 
354 B. Jović (ed.), Last Days of the sfry, Journal of Excerpts Translated by David Stephenson for 
the icty (Politika, Belgrade, 1995), p. 15.
355 E. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives 
(Penn State University Press, Philadelphia, 1999), cited in Oberschall, supra note 57, pp. 
42-43.
356 K. Kurspahić, Prime Time Crime, Balkan Media in War and Peace (United States Institute of 
Peace, Washington, D.C., 2003), p. 53, in Oberschall, ibid., pp. 41-42.
357 Oberschall, ibid., p. 43.
358 Jović, supra note 354, p. 294.
359 Oberschall, supra note 57, p. 42.
360 Ibid.; M. Milošević, ‘The Media Wars: 1987-1997’, in J. Udovički and J. Ridgeway (eds.), Burn 
This House Down: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia (Duke University Press, Dur-
ham, 1997), in Oberschall, ibid.
361 Oberschall, ibid., pp. 42-43.
362 Ibid., p. 43.
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areas with Bosnian Serb populations in order to cut off Sarajevo TV signals and 
ensure exposure to Belgrade TV only.363
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur appointed by the UN Human 
Rights Commission described how the media of the former Yugoslavia was 
mainly spreading nationalist discourse and generalised attacks and insults 
aimed at the other peoples.364 He added that ‘it comes as no surprise that the 
phenomenon has directly led to the perpetration of horrible atrocities on the 
fields of battle and throughout the entire territory’.365
In understanding the diminished marketplace of ideas, it is also essential to 
note that in Yugoslavia, the national question overshadowed all other issues 
after the end of communism and all Serb political parties, including the op-
position, subscribed to the national crisis frame, though less strident and more 
nuanced than Milošević’s sps or Šešelj’s srs.366
Genocide and mutatis mutandis other atrocities against a targeted group, 
arise from a pattern, or gestalt, rather than from any single source.367 A mea-
sure of the effectiveness of a defendant’s use of propaganda is how their forms 
of speech shaped the language of the time. The question to ask is whether the 
accused’s vocabulary and forms of expression became part of the general pub-
lic’s universe after the propaganda campaign began.368 In the former Yugosla-
via, words like ‘Ustaša’ and ‘Balija’, derogatory terms for Croats and Muslims 
respectively, became common in the documents of Serbian armed forces and 
Serbian government bodies, as did the use of words like ‘Četnik’ to denote 
Serbs in Bosnian Muslim army and civilian records. This kind of evidence dem-
onstrates how effective propaganda becomes part of the public’s ideology and 
daily life.369
4.3 Ideological Context and Historical Anchors
Related to this is the need to consider the ideological context of particular 
words uttered as it indicates how they are meant to be understood and how 
they are in fact understood by the followers of said ideology (see discussion on 
Greater Serbia above). Furthermore, the history of the peoples involved is 
363 Kurspahić, supra note 356, p. 98.
364 UN Human Rights Commission, Report of the Special Rapporteur submitted pursuant to 
Commission resolution 1994/72, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/54 (13 December 1994), p. 35.
365 Ibid.
366 Oberschall, supra note 57, p. 41.
367 Staub, supra note 316, p. 25.
368 Catherine Merridale (ed.), Ivan’s War, the Red Army 1939 – 1945 (Faber and Faber, London, 
2005), p. 330.
369 D. Saxon, ‘Propaganda as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law: Theories and 
Strategies for Prosecutors’, in Dojčinović (ed.), supra note 8, 123-124.
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 essential context to consider. In Tadić, the TC described how the media was 
very effectively directed towards stirring up Serb nationalist feelings and con-
verting an apparently friendly atmosphere as between Muslims, Croats and 
Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina into one of fear distrust and mutual hostili-
ty.370 De la Brosse described how history and the revival of ancient Serbian 
myths were used in this sense to keep the masses mobilised. 371 Historical facts 
were imbued with mystical qualities to evoke a feeling of desire for revenge 
directed at the ‘others’, i.e. the Croats and Muslims.372 In this de la Brosse found 
parallels with Nazi propaganda:
Nazi propaganda had shown that myths bind the masses together tightly. 
Indeed, it was through myths and, therefore, the appeal to the forces of 
the unconscious, to fear and terror, the instinct of power and the lost 
community that the propaganda orchestrated by Goebbels had succeed-
ed in winning over the Germans and melding them into a compact mass. 
The Serbian regime would use a similar technique. To weld the popula-
tion together official propaganda drew on the sources of the Serbian mys-
tique, that of a people who were the mistreated victims and martyrs of 
history and that of Greater Serbia, indissolubly linked to the Orthodox 
religion.373
Political, historical and cultural propaganda each played their part.374 Ober-
schall notes in this respect the private aspect of the propaganda campaign, in 
the sense that Yugoslavs experienced ethnic relations through the frames of 
personal and family experience and through community memories of the Bal-
kan wars.375 These memories were repeated in culture and in public life in 
 collective myths and in history books and literature.376 The television and 
newspapers were filled with historical features glorifying medieval Greater 
Serbia and listing, many times in an exaggerated manner:
370 Tadić, Trial Judgment, supra note 161, para. 83.
371 Ibid., para. 46.
372 Brosse, supra note 350, para. 31.
373 Ibid., para. 46.
374 See joint research and analytical project of a group of academic researchers from Croatia 
and Serbia in: N. Skopljanac Brunner, S. Gredelj, A. Hodžić and B. Kristofić (eds.), Media 
and War (Centre for Transition and Civil Society Research, Belgrade, Zagreb, 2000); M. 
Thompson (ed.), Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (Arti-
cle xix – International Center Against Censorship, London, 1994).
375 A. Oberschall (ed.), Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic 
Violence (Routledge, London, 2007), pp. 100-101.
376 Ibid.
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the injustices and attacks suffered by the Serbs, beginning with the battle 
of Kosovo Polje in 1389 – which the Ottomans won and which put an end 
to Serbia’s autonomy – and going through to the 1943 ‘genocide’ commit-
ted against the Serbian populations by the independent Croatian state 
recognised by Hitler and Mussolini and run by Ante Pavelić, leader of the 
nationalist movement of the Ustaša responsible for the assassination of 
King Alexander in 1934.377
Only days before Milošević’s death, the otp team preparing the Final Brief were 
thinking of beginning it with a historical argument starting with the battle of 
Kosovo Polje.378 As their evidence showed, this myth played one of the most 
important roles in the commission of the crimes throughout the region.379 In 
the context of several intergroup conflicts one can observe how ‘politicians 
tapped into historical narratives and mythologies that anchored their commu-
nications in a pre-existing animus (whether real or conjured)’.380 In Rwanda 
the colonial ‘Hamitic myth’ was revived, according to which Tutsis were a dis-
tinct race of foreigners who invaded Rwanda from Ethiopia and North Africa.381 
Kenyan Vice-President William Ruto resuscitated colonial narratives in the 
2007 elections to vilify the Kikuyu ethnic group and encourage his Kalenjin fol-
lowers to commit violent attacks and drive Kikuyus and other ethnic groups out 
of the Eldoret and Nandi Hills areas.382 As Jowett and O’Donnell have noted:
[p]eople are reluctant to change; thus, to convince them to do so, the 
persuader has to relate the change to something in which the per-
suadee already believes. This is called an anchor because it is already ac-
cepted by the persuadee and will be used to tie down new attitudes or 
behaviours.383
377 Ibid.
378 Dojčinović, communication with authors, supra note 150.
379 Ibid.
380 Wilson, Incitement on Trial, supra note 11, p. 232.
381 N. Eltringham (ed.), Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda (Pluto Press, 
London, 2004); N. Eltringham, “‘Invaders Who Have Stolen the Country” The Hamitic Hy-
pothesis, Race and the Rwandan Genocide’, 12 Social Identities (2006) 425-46; C.C. Taylor, 
Sacrifice as Terror: the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 (Berg Press, Oxford, 1999).
382 icc, Case Information Sheet Situation in the Republic of Kenya The Prosecutor v. William 
Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, online at www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/
RutoKosgeySangEng.pdf.
383 Jowett and O’Donnell, supra note 2, p. 32.
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4.4 Shifting the Cognitive Frames
Paranoia propaganda was extremely effective in Yugoslavia. As the head of the 
International Committee for the Red Cross mission in Croatia in 1991-92 stated: 
‘the conflict [in Bosnia] was the first time I have seen such strong and effective 
propaganda on both sides. When you are talking to either side, they are abso-
lutely convinced they will be slaughtered by the other side’.384 Jovan Rašković, 
the Serb leader in Croatia, whose campaign for Serb autonomy highlighted 
Ustaša atrocities against Serbs in World War Two, reflected thus on the effect it 
had: ‘I feel responsible for this [Croatian] war. If I hadn’t created this emotional 
stress in the Serb people, nothing would have happened. My party was the fuse 
of Serb nationalism’.385
As Oberschall observed, Yugoslavs experienced ethnic and nationality re-
lations through two competing frames, both culturally available: a normal 
frame in peaceful times expressing cooperative relations in workplaces, neigh-
bourhoods, and in public affairs, and a rival crisis frame for times of tension 
and conflict.386 The crisis frame was grounded in the experiences and mem-
ories of the Balkan wars, the first and second world wars – and other wars 
and conflicts before those in which civilians were not distinguished from 
combatants.387
Politicians, and other elites pursuing the nationalist agenda did not invent 
the crisis; they activated and amplified it while discrediting the normal 
frame.388 This was first achieved over the plight of the Kosovo Serbs who were 
subject to intimidation and violence.389 Serb intellectuals activated the crisis 
frame with fears of extinction.390 The public was fed exaggerations of sexual 
assault and rape numbers in Kosovo and a false claim that they were a matter 
of Albanians against Serbs, instead of the reality, which was that they mostly 
occurred within, and not across nationalities, and where they were overall 
lower than in central Serbia or the rest of Yugoslavia.391
At the icc in the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé case, the Prosecutor sought to 
 establish a causal link between propaganda of an impending genocide and 
the spread of violence in Côte d’Ivoire. Yet the majority opinion dismissed the 
gravity of such a narrative. Judge Henderson recognised that some of the 
384 Oberschall, supra note 57, p. 10.
385 Ibid.; Kurspahić, supra note 356, p. 53.
386 Oberschall, ibid., p. 14.
387 Ibid., p. 15.
388 Ibid.
389 Ibid., p. 16.
390 Ibid.
391 S. Popović et al., Kosovski Čvor: Odrešiti ili Seći [Kosovo Knot: Untie It or Cut It] (Biblioteka 
Kronos, Belgrade, 1990), cited in Oberschall, ibid., p. 16.
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speeches could have constituted fear-mongering that instilled a certain level of 
fear and resentment among the listeners, however he considered it ‘possible to 
understand these utterances first and foremost as an effort to delegitimise 
 political opponents and their international backers’.392 He thus stated that:
the fact that the pro-Gbagbo population was projected as being the po-
tential victim of genocide does not imply an approval or encouragement 
to reciprocate. Even though the threat and actual instances of use of vio-
lence by the opponent’s side was repeatedly emphasised, speakers sys-
tematically reassured their audiences that the situation was under con-
trol and that their side would prevail. This reinforces the impression that 
talk about atrocities was mainly designed to foster unity among Mr Gbag-
bo’s supporters and loyalty to his regime.393
Furthermore, Judge Henderson reached the same conclusions regarding 
speeches that characterised the opposition supporters as rebels and bandits or 
those that insisted on crimes allegedly committed by the pro-opposition forc-
es.394 From this opinion one can again observe how a dangerous propaganda 
technique is downplayed by the judges as normal political talk and not prop-
erly evaluated through expert opinion. There is also an insistence on express 
encouragement of violence as the only indicator of speech that can lead to 
atrocities.
4.5 Looking Beyond Isolated Words
While historical and present facts used in hate propaganda can be true, the in-
tent of the speaker and the context in which they are conveyed to the public 
can mean the difference between such propaganda and neutral reporting. As 
Gordon observes, out of all the elements considered in evaluating hate speech 
as incitement, context is the most important.395 Some of the Kangura and rtlm 
articles and broadcasts conveyed historical information, political analysis or 
advocacy of an ethnic consciousness regarding the inequitable distribution of 
privilege in Rwanda.396 Prosecution Expert Witness Alison Des Forges stated 
her view that undue emphasis on ethnicity and presentation of all  issues in 
ethnic terms exacerbated ethnic tensions.397 However, the TC considered it 
392 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé decision, Reasons of Henderson, supra note 94, para. 1064.
393 Ibid.
394 Ibid.
395 Gordon, supra note 71, p. 296.
396 Nahimana Trial Judgment, supra note 61, para. 1019.
397 Ibid.
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critical to distinguish between the discussion of ethnic consciousness and the 
promotion of ethnic hatred. When words move listeners to take action to rem-
edy discrimination based on the reality conveyed by the words this is not incite-
ment and it falls squarely under freedom of expression.398 On the other hand 
stereotyping of ethnicity combined with its denigration constitutes the promo-
tion of ethnic hatred.399 While this does not include calls on listeners to take 
action of any kind and therefore does not constitute direct incitement, it is a 
progression from ethnic consciousness to harmful ethnic stereotyping particu-
larly when combined with a tone that conveys hostility and resentment.400
When looking at whether speech intended to educate or to provoke, the 
Chamber looked at intent and potential impact. When determining the intent 
it considered the content, the accuracy and the tone of a statement.401 For 
 example making predictions of killings in an inflammatory language and a 
threatening tone rather than in a descriptive and dispassionate tenor of jour-
nalism would be an indication of genocidal intent.402 The context of the 
speech was considered to be a further indicator of intent.403 Thus a statement 
of ethnic generalisation provoking resentment against members of that eth-
nicity in the context of a genocidal environment would be an indicator that 
incitement to violence was the intent of the statement.404 The context was also 
considered in the determination of the potential impact of the speech.405 
Turning to the ECtHR case law the focus rests on the need for less attention to 
be given to the form of the words used and more attention to the general con-
text in which they are used and their likely impact, that is whether there is a 
genuine risk that they may incite to violence.406
398 Ibid., para. 1020.
399 Ibid., para. 1021.
400 Ibid.
401 Ibid., para. 1022.
402 Ibid., para. 226.
403 Ibid. ‘In the Chamber’s view, the accuracy of the statement is only one factor to be consid-
ered in the determination of whether a statement is intended to provoke rather than to 
educate those who receive it. The tone of the statement is as relevant to this determina-
tion as is its content…The Chamber also considers the context in which the statement is 
made to be important. A statement of ethnic generalization provoking resentment 
against members of that ethnicity would have a heightened impact in the context of a 
genocidal environment. It would be more likely to lead to violence. At the same time the 




406 Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey, supra note 313, para. 184.
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The Court thus clearly drew the line between legitimate educational mes-
sages involving historical facts and political analysis on the one hand and 
statements intended to inflame ethnic resentment, calling on history as an 
aide in this effort.407 As mentioned above, unfortunately the AC took a much 
narrower approach in considering what criminally relevant hate speech was.
Another neglected aspect of hate propaganda in the search for a causal link 
is the indirect effects it has on criminality beyond direct persuasion. There is a 
significant difference between micro- and macro-criminality in the way a per-
son examines the morality of their own actions. When all one can hear in the 
media is denigrating speech and exhortations of violence from authority fig-
ures, they may conclude that the usual strictures have been lifted and that now 
assaulting members of other ethnical or religious groups will go unpun-
ished.408 Le Bon describes this as such:
The isolated individual may be submitted to the same exciting causes 
as  the man in a crowd, but as his brain shows him the inadvisability 
of yielding to them, he refrains from yielding. This truth may be physio-
logically  expressed by saying that the isolated individual possesses the 
 capacity of dominating his reflex actions, while a crowd is devoid of this 
capacity.409
Further, Le Bon notes:
The violence of the feelings of crowds is also increased, especially in 
 heterogeneous crowds, by the absence of all sense of responsibility. The 
certainty of impunity, a certainty the stronger as the crowd is more nu-
merous, and the notion of a considerable momentary force due to num-
ber, make possible in the case of crowds sentiments and acts impossible 
for the isolated individual. In crowds the foolish, ignorant, and envious 
persons are freed from the sense of their insignificance and powerless-
ness, and are possessed instead by the notion of brutal and temporary 
but immense strength.410
Propaganda helps produce public support for collective violence in inter-group 
relations that would normally be condemned, prosecuted and  limited.411 One 
407 Ibid.
408 Wilson, Incitement on Trial, supra note 11, p. 231.
409 G. Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (2nd ed., Dover Publications Inc, New 
York, 2012), p. 11.
410 Ibid., p. 22.
411 Oberschall, supra note 57, p. 9.
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could go further and claim that a new morality emerges in such circumstances 
in which such violence will not merely go unpunished but will be perceived 
as a necessary, good and moral deed for the protection of the survival of one’s 
nation and/or family. This is a completely different situation from normal 
instigation in which the law and morality of a society remain intact. In the 
latter situation the potential physical perpetrator weighs whether to commit 
the act or not against a backdrop of societal condemnation of such acts. In 
situations where the media, politicians and other respected public figures to-
gether create a new set of rules and a new morality and the society seemingly 
accepts the new norm, the decision-making process in the mind of a physical 
perpetrator becomes strikingly different. As Welzer notes, this should not be 
mistaken with an absent morality. Rather the altered normative framework 
leads to a concomitant change in the view as to what constitutes morality 
and the mass murders could not be committed without this new morality.412 
The ‘new’ morality or climate is a consequence of both propaganda and the 
systematic persecution of a specific out-group organised by the leadership of 
the State or a similar State-like organisation.413 Similarly in Le Bon’s analysis 
of the crowd, the latter is not devoid of morals. It just has a different set of 
morals:
A crowd may be guilty of murder, incendiarism, and every kind of crime, 
but it is also capable of very lofty acts of devotion, sacrifice, and disinter-
estedness, of acts much loftier indeed than those of which the isolated 
individual is capable. Appeals to sentiments of glory, honour, and patrio-
tism are particularly likely to influence the individual forming part of a 
crowd, and often to the extent of obtaining from him the sacrifice of his 
life.414
Furthermore, criminal acts carried out in accordance with the atmosphere cre-
ated by the hate propaganda, in a sense become a part of it. Germans’ partici-
pation in anti-Jewish activities and propaganda built on and reinforced one 
another.415 Explaining the complex entanglement of language and violence, 
Posselt points out that hate crime is a form of speaking in itself, stating:
412 H. Welzer (ed.), Täter: Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werdem (S. Fisch-
er Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt, 2006), citing H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on 
the Banality of Evil, 2nd ed. (Penguin Books Ltd, New York, 1986), in Timmermann, supra 
note 6.
413 Timmermann, ibid., p. 37.
414 Le Bon, supra note 409, pp. 26-27.
415 Staub, supra note 316, pp. 120.
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[I]n hate crime, a person is attacked not randomly, but precisely for being 
perceived as X. In other words, hate crime identifies, categorizes, and la-
bels persons according to real or supposed features such as sex, race, 
class, sexual orientation etc. This act of labelling a person as someone or 
something is in itself already a linguistic act of positing, an act of denomi-
nation and determination that attributes a social status to a person. This 
tendency to differentiate and to discriminate can go as far as to restrict 
the use of the term ‘human’ exclusively for the designation of one’s own 
social group.416
Thus, before considering the effects of hate propaganda on the ‘reasonable 
man’ with no previous inclinations towards violent action, we need to recog-
nise the fact that in any society there are also men (or women) eager to take on 
any cause that would allow them to act out their aggressive tendencies. 
 Although it is hard to determine exactly the percentage of psychopaths, socio-
paths and individuals with other relevant personality disorders in a society, 
what we do know is that there exists a significant number of them. One could 
say, they are the main reason criminal law and the outwardly affirmations of 
basic principles of morality exist, since these individuals lack an internal ‘gold-
en rule’. Propaganda, on the other hand, creates the perception that the law no 
longer applies or, better yet, that there is a new law and a new morality 
 established in the society thereby enabling rampant criminal behaviour. ‘Pro-
paganda defines or creates our reality and describes what is socially acceptable 
and considered to be morally right. It determines how people’s actions are 
viewed and evaluated’.417 Arguably psychopaths or sociopaths do not need 
such a ‘new law or morality’ in order to act out their evil tendencies, as they 
tend to do it regardless, however the impression of a suspension of all societal 
sanction  empowers them to act out these tendencies on an exponentially larg-
er scale. However, even people who become perpetrators as a result of their 
personality (self-selected or selected by their society for the role) evolve along 
a continuum of destruction, while others who were initially bystanders be-
come involved with the destructive system and become perpetrators.418 In 
most societies there are those who are prepared to turn against other groups, 
however it is the population as a whole that provides or denies support for 
this.419 As Staub explains:
416 Posset, supra note 322, p. 279.
417 Timmermann, supra note 6, p. 20.
418 Staub, supra note 316, p. 18.
419 Ibid., p. 20.
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The people’s support, opposition, or indifference largely shapes the 
course of events. Opposition from bystanders, whether based on moral or 
other grounds, can change the perspective of perpetrators and other by-
standers, especially if the bystanders act at an early point on the contin-
uum of destruction. They may cause the perpetrators to question the 
morality of their violent acts or become concerned about the conse-
quences for themselves.420
The illusion of a new set of rules and morals created by hate propaganda 
 directly impacts bystander behaviour by making them reluctant to interfere 
for the sake of their own personal safety. Thus, hate propaganda does not lead 
to crime merely through persuasion. In fact, the support of the propagated 
ideas by the public only needs to be outwardly. That is to say, the populace 
needs only to be seemingly convinced of such actions’ legitimacy. While large 
numbers of individuals or even the majority of the population may have strong 
doubts about the veracity of the propaganda and objections regarding the 
criminal acts that it seeks to enable, such doubts and objections are irrelevant. 
Anyone challenging the narrative is at best branded a conspiracy theorist and 
dismissed as part of only a ‘fringe group’ of people and at worst arrested and 
persecuted. The only thing that matters is the upholding of an image that soci-
ety at large is on board with the actions of the leaders. By doing so, individual 
members of the society either a) feel free to engage in criminal behaviour; b) 
feel a duty to their comrades or their group to engage in such behaviour; c) feel 
frightened or powerless to act against it while d) the targeted group directly 
perceives a threat to its safety and security. Furthermore, bystanders who pas-
sively observe as innocent people are victimised, will eventually also come to 
devalue the victims and justify their own passivity.421
In this context so-called in-group solidarity or the ‘bonds of comradeship’ 
need to be mentioned. Hate propaganda presents the violation of the new 
norms or morality as an abandonment of one’s rightful duties. In his study of 
the SS’s anti-Semitic ideological indoctrination of Reserve Police Battalion 10, 
Browning finds that the men were not exactly deprived of capacity for inde-
pendent thought, which seems to be the main narrative of literature relying on 
racism and anti-Semitism as a factor explaining why ordinary men could 
 commit murder and other atrocities against Jews.422 Rather, for a member of a 
police or military unit not to participate in mass killings was considered 
420 Ibid., p. 21.
421 Ibid., p. 18.
422 Browning, supra note 316, p. 178.
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 disloyal to his peers, a violation of group norms and an abandonment of one’s 
rightful duties.423 In Timmermann’s words:
Incitement to hatred is an integral, necessary and inevitable part of any 
persecutory campaign. It is needed to convince those carrying out the 
physical elements of the campaign of its necessity, and of the lesser value 
and perniciousness of the group to be ostracized. It serves to create a 
common bond between those carrying out the persecutory campaign in 
that it creates a barrier between those who are part of the community or 
‘in-group’ and those excluded from the community, the ‘out-group’.424
A good example of this from the Yugoslav wars can be observed in the video 
depicting the events surrounding the murder of 6 Bosnian civilians by the 
Scorpion paramilitary unit. One of the Scorpions turns to a 17-year old victim 
on the ground and asks him in a mocking and vulgar manner whether he had 
ever had sexual intercourse, proceeding to answer his own question with a 
blunt answer ‘well, you never will’.425 Interestingly, the same man who spoke so 
brutally to the petrified young man does not shoot when the time for it comes 
just minutes after.426 He keeps his barrel raised in the air, and does not fire, suf-
fering ridicule and humiliation from his comrades.427
An important study by Scott Straus into the effects of rtlm Radio on the 
genocide in Rwanda shows a far less straight forward causal link between the 
broadcasts and the crimes than generally assumed. As he points out, there 
were examples of rtlm broadcasts giving specific names and places, which 
were followed by attacks on those individuals and locations, however they were 
a tiny fraction of the total violence and the Nahimana Trial Judgment lists a 
mere 10 instances.428 A survey involving 210 sentenced and self-confessed per-
petrators, who were sampled randomly in 15 prisons nationwide in 2002 
showed rather that ‘[t]o the extent radio mattered, it had a second-order 
423 Wilson, supra note 11, p. 246.
424 Timmermann, supra note 6, p. 175.
425 Fond za humanitarno pravo (ed.), Škorpioni: od zločina do pravde (Publikum, Beograd, 
2007), p. 365.
426 I. Vukušić, ‘Nineteen Minutes of Horror: Insights from the Scorpions Execution Video’, 12 
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal (2018) 35-53, p. 44.
427 Fond za humanitarno pravo, supra note 425, p. 100.
428 S. Straus, ‘Rwanda and rtlm Radio Media Effects’, paper prepared for a workshop at the 
Committee on Conscience at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, https://
www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20100423-atrauss-rtlm-radio-hate.pdf, p. 7. The paper is based 
on a condensed version of S. Straus, ‘What Is the Relationship between Hate Radio and 
Violence? Rethinking Rwanda’s ‘Radio Machete’, 35 Politics and Society (2007) 609-637.
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impact’.429 Mostly the perpetrators said they chose to participate in the 
 genocide after face-to-face solicitation, usually from an authority, elite figure 
or a group of young violent men; only 52% of them even owned a radio and 
only 15% said the radio had lead them to take part in the attacks.430 As their 
main motivations they cited intra-ethnic coercion and intimidation, obedi-
ence, wartime fear, a desire for revenge, anger, a desire to loot or gain land, and 
interpersonal rivalries, among other factors.431 However it is important to note 
that those who said that radio incited them held more negative and racialist 
views towards Tutsis, were more likely to commit more violence and were 
more likely to be the leaders of the killing.432 On the other hand those who 
claimed that radio was not a major influence on them, said that broadcasts 
were intended for the authorities.433 Thus while radio did not present the di-
rect reason for the majority to participate in the genocide, it categorised Tutsis 
as ‘the enemy’, catalysed some key actors, served as a coordinating device for 
the elites, and signalled the power of those advocating violence thereby nar-
rowing the choices individuals believed they had and asserting the hardliners’ 
dominance.434
The effect of propaganda thus is not merely, or perhaps not at all, the per-
suasion of some individuals of the morality or desirability of their criminal 
behaviour but the atmosphere where such behaviour is enabled. In this frame-
work it would be naïve to consider the criminal responsibility of the mass-
propagandists on par with inciters, instigators or aiders or abettors in every-
day criminal situations where their words do not impact society as a whole. 
While in the latter situation the links to the physical perpetrator and the crime 
itself may be more direct and apparent and therefore a causal link is easier to 
prove, in the case of mass-propaganda the danger of creating a space where 
mass atrocities can flourish is infinitely greater, albeit all its workings and con-
nections to the crimes may forever remain elusive from exact judicial determi-
nation. Despite its perniciousness, such propaganda thus remains inadequate-
ly addressed in law, even in what appear to be clear cut cases of the use of 
all forms of propaganda techniques in order to create an atmosphere favour-
able for the commission of mass atrocities such as that of Vojislav Šešelj’s 
rhetoric.
429 Ibid., pp. 8, 11.
430 Ibid., pp. 8, 9.
431 Ibid., p. 9.
432 Ibid.
433 Ibid., p. 10.
434 Ibid., p. 11.
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4.6 Temporal Link
A narrow view on the effects of hate propaganda through the lens of instiga-
tion has furthermore placed an undue emphasis on a temporal link between 
words uttered and crimes committed. In Šešelj, the Prosecution relied heavi-
ly on chronology to prove the causal link, structuring the Indictment in the 
form of stating certain speeches by Šešelj, each followed by a crime as a direct 
consequence. Based on the interviews he conducted, Wilson furthermore 
 concludes that the view that ‘chronology proves causation’ was also present in 
the minds of the judges, and he criticises this approach as insufficient as evi-
dence of causation.435 The AC held that a reasonable trier of fact could find it 
to be too tenuous to be regarded as proof of substantial contribution in cir-
cumstances where there was a significant lapse of time between the statement 
and the offences and other factors may have influenced the conduct of the 
perpetrators.436 Similarly in Nahimana the AC found that ‘the longer the lapse 
of time between a broadcast and the killing of a person, the greater the possi-
bility that other events might be the real cause of such killing and that the 
broadcast might not have substantially contributed to it’.437
This emphasis on an immediate temporal link is problematic since the 
Chambers seem to neglect the effects of systematic propaganda over a pro-
longed period and focus on speech only as a one-time provocation or an im-
mediate trigger of violence. Although both propaganda and provocation 
achieve a certain disconnect in the mind of the physical perpetrator, they 
achieve this in different time frames. Furthermore, any particular provocation 
by Šešelj would not have been successful without the prior priming of the audi-
ence with systematic propaganda.
In Mill’s famous corn dealer illustration of the workings of mob mentality, 
the mob is already angry.438 While in Mill’s example their grievances may have 
originated in actual injustice, in the case of Šešelj’s audience, they originated 
in the extensive propaganda by Šešelj and others that portrayed Serbs as the 
perpetual victims of the ‘other’.
435 Wilson, supra note 11, p. 129 fn. 121, interview conducted by R.A. Wilson, October 2013.
436 Šešelj, Appeal Judgment, supra note 110, para. 132, referring to Nahimana Appeal Judg-
ment, supra note 84, para. 513; Ndindabahizi, Appeal Judgment, supra note 195, para. 116.
437 Nahimana, Appeal Judgment, supra note 84, para 513.
438 J.S. Mill, On Liberty (1859) (Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2001), p. 52: ‘An opinion that corn-
dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmo-
lested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when 
delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when 
handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard’. Mill thus envisions a ‘mob’ 
which is already ‘excited’ and gathering on its own outside the corn-dealer’s house for 
what can only be reasons of prior discontent.
Downloaded from Brill.com04/24/2020 09:18:59AM
via free access
 73Šešelj: Hate Propaganda | 10.1163/15718123-02002006
<UN>
international criminal law review (2020) 1-87
Provocation may have also existed in the context of Šešelj’s speeches, how-
ever it was by no means more important or effective than hate propaganda and 
indeed the success of the provocations rested on the background of extensive 
propaganda. Had the population not been already primed through systematic 
and repetitive propaganda, any individual speech would not have had the ex-
plosive effect the judges were looking for. As the expert described in Šešelj, 
propaganda techniques are used ‘to convince, persuade and influence public 
opinion’ and they ‘focus on manipulating emotions and preconceptions, at the 
expense of the faculties of reasoning and judgment’.439 In the words of Gustave 
Le Bon:
When it is wanted to stir up a crowd for a short space of time, to induce it 
to commit an act of any nature … it is necessary that the crowd should 
have been previously prepared … When, however, it is proposed to imbue 
the mind of a crowd with ideas and beliefs … the leaders have recourse to 
different expedients … affirmation, repetition, and contagion. Their ac-
tion is somewhat slow, but its effects, once produced, are very lasting.440
Judge Henderson delivering the majority opinion in the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé 
case, confirmed the focus on the temporal and special link when adjudicating 
propaganda charges. He stated that:
[a]lthough there is no fixed level of spatio-temporal proximity between 
the act(s) of inducement and the induced act(s), there must be a clear 
connection between the two. Simply arguing that everything Mr Gbagbo 
[the accused] said during a particular time-period influenced all criminal 
conduct that occurred during the same period is unacceptably vague.441
Such an approach fails to grasp the nature of how propaganda works and its 
many subtle and subconscious effects that accumulate in time.
4.7 Undue Emphasis Placed on an Identity between Words Uttered and 
Acts Committed
Furthermore, the fact that the judges were looking for the crimes committed to 
be nearly identical to what was said in the speeches shows a reluctance to con-
sider any speech whose message may not be as direct as possible instigation. 
439 Šešelj Lattanzi Dissenting, supra note 194, para. 107.
440 Le Bon, supra note 409, p. 77.
441 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé decision, Reasons of Henderson, supra note 94, para. 1982.
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This sends the message that hate propaganda is acceptable as long as it is 
 clever enough not to directly call for crimes.
In the Babić case, the defendant pleaded guilty for his participation in per-
secution against Croats and other non-Serbs as a cah in accordance with jce 
by making ‘ethnically based inflammatory speeches that added to the atmo-
sphere of fear and hatred amongst Serbs living in Croatia and convinced them 
that they could only be safe in a state of their own… [u]ltimately this kind of 
propaganda led to the unleashing of violence against the Croat population and 
other non-Serbs’.442
In Prlić et al. the TC concluded that ‘in several official and public statements, 
Jadranko Prlić did indeed engender fear, mistrust and hatred of the Muslim 
population among Bosnian Croats… and exacerbated nationalist sentiments 
among the Bosnian Croats, thus contributing to the realization of the jce’.443 
It is clear that the causal link between the accused’s messages and the effect on 
his audience was more broadly understood in these cases than the very narrow 
look at causality in Šešelj. This kind of reasoning is more similar to the case law 
of the Nuremberg Tribunal than the very narrowly construed causal link in 
Šešelj. This is in line with Wilson’s study that suggests that revenge speech has 
the most powerful effects overall, and references to past atrocities (conceptu-
ally related to revenge speech) enhance moral justifications for violence.444 
Babić claimed to have been strongly influenced and mislead himself by Serbi-
an propaganda, which repeatedly referred to an imminent threat of genocide 
by the Croatian regime against the Serbs in Croatia, thus creating an atmo-
sphere of hatred and fear of the Croats.445 The argument was unsuccessfully 
claimed as a mitigating circumstance the same as in the Banović case, where 
the defence argued that ‘with his low education and modest intellectual capa-
bilities, the Accused easily succumbed to the war propaganda that spread col-
lective hatred and rumours about the enemy’s brutality’.446 These arguments 
show how such ideas spread from one person to another and how the causal 
link with the subsequent crimes committed may not be straightforward and 
may be impossible to prove, however it nevertheless exists.
442 Prosecutor v. Milan Babić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, Case No. (IT-03-72-S), 29 June 2004, 
para 24(g).
443 Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al., Trial Judgment, Case No. (IT-04-74-T), 6 June 2014, paras. 
265, 267.
444 Wilson, Incitement on Trial, supra note 11, p. 245.
445 Babić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 442, para. 24(g).
446 Prosecutor v. Predrag Banović, Trial Sentencing Judgment, Case No. (IT-02-65/1-S), 28 Oc-
tober 2003, para. 78.
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4.8 Position of the Speaker
A further important contextual element to be considered in evaluating hate 
propaganda and its potential impact is the position of the speaker and the in-
fluence he exerts on an audience. Importantly, a number of social science stud-
ies also confirm a pervasive and deep obedience to authority figures.447 For 
example, Šešelj portrayed himself as a military leader and established a mili-
tary wing of his party, created a War Staff, promoted the Četnik movement’s 
militaristic traditions, appeared in military attire at frontlines, and took on the 
title Vojvoda (duke) for himself, as well as bestowing it on Šešeljevci, including 
those found to have committed serious crimes.448 As Gordon details, analysis 
of the context of the speech should:
embrace aspects of the speaker herself: her background and professional 
profile, her previous publications/broadcast history, and her personal 
manner of transmission (including tone of voice). It would also include 
the authority of the speaker. Are we dealing with a high-level government 
official (or even lower-ranking but with sufficient stature to have a signifi-
cant impact on public opinion) or a private person with other indicia of 
authority, such as media personality, tycoon, or political activist?449
In Gacumbitsi, the TC considered the impact of the accused driving around, 
using a megaphone, asking Hutu young men whom girls had refused to marry, 
to have sex with young Tutsi girls, and killing them in an atrocious manner, if 
they refused to do so. It concluded that:
Placed in context, and considering the attendant audience, such an utter-
ance from the Accused constituted an incitement, directed at this group 
of attackers on which the bourgmestre (mayor), had influence, to rape 
Tutsi women. That is why, immediately after the utterance, a group of at-
tackers attacked Witness taq and seven other Tutsi women and girls 
with whom she was hiding, and raped them.450
447 H.G. Kelman, ‘Violence without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of 
Victims and Victimizers’, 29 Journal of Social Issues (1973) 25-61; S. Milgram (ed.), Obedi-
ence to Authority: An Experimental View. (Harper and Row, New York, 1974); J.M. Burger, 
‘Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today?’, 64 American Psychologist (2009) 
1-11.
448 Šešelj, Appeal Brief, para. 29.
449 Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law, supra note 71, pp. 296-297.
450 Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, Trial Judgment, Case No. (ICTR-2001-64-T), 17 June 
2004, para. 215, emphasis added.
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While the paragraph does not really delve into the reasons for his influence, 
except for mentioning his position as bourgmestre, his exceedingly high status 
in the community went beyond this title. One witness described him in an in-
terview as:
a big man; a pillar of church and community. He was the man you went 
to if you had problems with education for your children, or disputes over 
farmland. Mr Gacumbitsi was the man who preserved order in the crowd-
ed hills. Who kept a signed blessing from the Pope on the walls of his 
home. His was the face of authority.451
The importance of the position of the speaker for the ability to instigate larges-
cale atrocities is already recognised in the icty and ictr jurisprudence. While 
no hierarchical relationship is required for instigation, cases related to instiga-
tion that have set precedents have either been those of military commanders 
or political leaders who wielded substantial military and political authority, 
such as Gacumbitsi, Šešelj or Kordić.
In terms of aiding and abetting, in the case of Brđanin the TC considered 
that his inflammatory and discriminatory statements amounted to encourage-
ment and moral support to the physical perpetrators of the crimes, in light of 
the positions of authority that he held.452 As Judge Lattanzi noted in her dissent-
ing opinion in Šešelj, in Féret v. Belgium the ECtHR stressed as a general rule 
that: ‘it is vitally important that in their public speeches, politicians should 
avoid making comments likely to foster intolerance’.453
5 Failing the Preventative Function of the Law
Regrettably, the drafters of the Charter of the imt did not consider that the 
significant role played by hate speech during the Holocaust ‘might necessitate 
formulation of a specific offence accounting for the unique characteristics of 
incendiary rhetoric in the atrocity context’.454 Similarly, when the drafters 
of  the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
451 F. Keane, ‘The Day I Met a Mass Killer – and He Smirked, Knowing He’d Escape Justice’, 
The Independent, 20 June 1998, https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/the-
day-i-met-a-mass-killer-and-he-smirked-knowing-hed-escape-justice-1166079.html.
452 Brđanin Trial Judgment, supra note 62, para. 368.
453 Féret v. Belgium, supra note 296, para. 75; Šešelj Lattanzi Dissenting, supra note 194, para. 
109.
454 Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law, supra note 71, p. 21.
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 Genocide considered hate speech, they did so exceptionally within the context 
of a plan to destroy in whole or in part particular groups. Such narrow focus 
 animated the drafting and the inclusion of Article iii in the Genocide Conven-
tion and ultimately the criminalisation of direct and public incitement to 
 commit genocide. To date, there is no international treaty like the Genocide 
Convention declaring direct and public incitement to cah or war crimes to be, 
in itself, a crime under international law.455 Focusing on verbal acts before they 
escalate to physical violence will directly enhance the preventive function of 
international criminal courts and tribunals. This will be discussed in subse-
quent sections. As Fletcher notes:
[w]e should generalize from the Rwandan case as the Rome Statute has 
developed a general aversion to impunity as expressed in the Preamble. 
The argument should be that ‘directly and publicly inciting’ any of the 
major four crimes should be punishable.456
5.1 The Proposed International Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of cah
The Proposed Convention on cah that was concluded in 2010 by a group of in-
ternational law experts meeting at the Washington University School of Law in 
St. Louis (Proposed Convention)457 contains extensive requirement to outlaw 
incitement of various forms and requesting States ‘to endeavour to take mea-
sures’ to ‘prevent crimes against humanity’, including, but ‘not limited to, en-
suring that any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence shall be prohibited by 
law’.458 In the same fashion as in Article iii(c) of the Genocide Convention 
455 Peterson, supra note 245, p. 338.
456 Fletcher, The Grammar, supra note 78, p. 283.
457 Crimes Against Humanity Initiative, Proposed International Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity, Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute (Wash-
ington University School of Law, St. Louis, 2010); see also L.N. Sadat, ‘A Comprehensive 
History of the Proposed International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes against Humanity’, in L.N. Sadat, Forging a Convention for Crimes against Human-
ity (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) .
458 For critical views for the inclusion of such a provision in the Proposed Convention see, T. 
Weber, ‘The Obligation to Prevent in the Proposed Convention Examined in Light of the 
Obligation to Prevent in the Genocide Convention’, in M. Bergsmo and S. Tianying (eds.), 
On the Proposed Crimes against Humanity Convention (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPub-
lisher, 2014), pp. 173, 193-197: ‘The requirement that States outlaw hate speech understand-
ably attempts to attack the root of the problem, but is likely to have difficulty gaining 
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that makes the ‘[direct] and public incitement to commit genocide’ punish-
able, Article 4(2)(e) of the Proposed Convention states that a ‘person shall be 
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime against humanity 
if that person … directly and publicly incites others to commit crimes against 
humanity’. If we compare the preventive measures included in both the Geno-
cide Convention and the Proposed Convention we find that the latter contains 
more detailed language regarding the obligation to prevent.459 As noted by 
Leila Sadat, ‘the Proposed Convention included ‘incitement’ in Article 4(2)(e), 
to enhance the treaty’s preventive dimension’.460 Sadat recalled what was not-
ed by the former US Ambassador for War Crimes Stephen Rapp in his Keynote 
address to the Crimes against Humanity Initiative, ‘incitement is often a key 
precursor to the commission of crimes against humanity’.461
5.2 The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on a Global 
Convention for cah – The Missing Inchoate Crimes
The Proposed Convention discussed above has prompted the International 
Law Commission (ilc) to include, at its 66th session in 2014, the topic of cah 
on its long-term work programme.462 Sadat has noted that during the Commis-
sion’s 2016 plenary of the Second Report submitted to the Commission by the 
Special Rapporteur Sean Murphy, some Members were of the position to in-
clude ‘incitement’ as a mode of liability in the ilc’s draft articles on cah along 
the lines of Article iii(C) of the Genocide Convention.463 It is significant in 
this regard to draw a distinction between incitement or instigation as a mode 
of participation in a criminal conduct i.e. cah and ‘direct and public incite-
ment to commit cah’. The latter stands as an inchoate offence.
Surprisingly, the Commission’s draft articles on cah which were adopted by 
the Drafting Committee in 2017 lacks any provision criminalising ‘incitement 
 support among States with more vigorous free speech laws and policies, and distracts 
the  focus of the Proposed Convention from the essence of addressing crimes against 
 humanity – prevent the murderous acts themselves’.
459 Ibid., p. 174; see also L.N. Sadat, ‘A Contextual and Historical Analysis of the International 
Law Commission’s 2017 Draft Articles for a New Global Treaty on Crimes against Human-
ity’, 16 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2018) 683-704.
460 Sadat, ibid., paras. 19-20.
461 Ibid., para. 20.
462 UN General Assembly, Report of the International Law Commission, 69th Session (1 May – 2 
June and 3 July – 4 August 2017), UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.892, (26 May 2017) (unga ilc Report, 
69th Session).
463 Sadat, A Contextual and Historical Analysis, supra note 459, para. 19.
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to commit crimes against humanity’ as an inchoate offence.464 Article 6, which 
is titled ‘criminalization under national law’ provides:
1. Each State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that crimes against 
humanity constitute offences under its criminal law.
2. Each State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the following 
acts are offences under its criminal law:
(a) committing a crime against humanity;
(b) attempting to commit such a crime; and
(c)  ordering, soliciting, inducing, aiding, abetting or otherwise assist-
ing in or contributing to the commission or attempted commission 
of such a crime. 465
There is nothing in the Commission’s work which could support an argu-
ment that the drafters had a real intention to prohibit incitement to  hatred or 
incitement to violence by spoken or written words and allow for the early in-
tervention of icl, thereby making it possible to thwart potential crimes in 
their initial stages. The official commentary by the Commission on the then 
draft Article 5(2) gives the impression that Members of the Commission un-
derstood accessorial responsibility to include ‘ordering’, ‘soliciting’, ‘inducing’, 
 ‘instigating’, ‘inciting’, ‘aiding and abetting’, ‘conspiracy to commit’, ‘being an 
accomplice to’, ‘participating in’ or ‘joint criminal enterprise’466 and particu-
larly that ‘soliciting’, ‘inducing’ and ‘aiding and abetting’ the crime ‘are gener-
ally regarded as including planning, instigating, conspiring and, importantly, 
directly inciting another person to engage in the action that constitutes the 
offence’.467 The summary records of the ilc reveal that ‘Members of the Draft-
ing Committee had considered that the concept of incitement was covered 
under the  concepts of ‘soliciting’ and ‘inducing’ in subparagraph (c) and that 
would be reflected in the commentary’.468 This statement proves to be impre-
cise as ‘the omission of ‘direct and public incitement’ and ‘conspiracy’ is not 
discussed in the general commentary on the draft articles although the provi-
sion is  mentioned indicating that it had not been entirely overlooked by the 
464 unga ilc Report, 69th Session, supra note 462, Article 6.
465 Ibid.: ‘Crimes against Humanity’. The nexus between persecution as a cah and genocide 
or war crimes was retained in Article 3(1)(h): ‘persecution against any identifiable group 
or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, religious, gender as defined in para-
graph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under interna-
tional law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or in connection with 
the crime of genocide or war crimes’.
466 UN General Assembly, Report of the International Law Commission, 68th Session (2 May-10 
June and 4 July – 12 August 2016), UN Doc. A/71/10, (12 August 2016).
467 Ibid.
468 Schabas, supra note 107, para. 21.
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 Commission.469 When the ilc invited feedback from States, Iceland (on be-
half of the Nordic countries) and Sierra Leone suggested that the forms of lia-
bility should not be interpreted narrowly and should include conspiracy and 
incitement for all core crimes.470 Yet the reaction from the Special Rapporteur 
was merely to note that the Rome Statute does not refer to incitement with 
respect to cah, ‘and hence the Commission elected also not to use such 
terms’.471 If this implies a stance that the law of 1998 should remain as it is, just 
because it is formulated this way, it would defeat entirely the mission of the 
ilc to progressively develop the law in light of the new challenges that arise 
with time.
The Commission’s position has been criticised by eminent scholars and by a 
member of the ilc who actively participated in the drafting process.472 From 
the Summary records, it is clear that the ilc’s reasoning for the non-inclusion 
of the term ‘incitement’ in the draft articles was based in part on the fact that 
the term ‘incitement’ had not been included in certain international treaties, 
such as the Rome Statute, and in part on the fact that ‘the concept did not exist 
in some national legal systems’.473 Schabas comments that this ‘is not a good 
reason to omit direct and public incitement and conspiracy to commit crimes 
against humanity from the draft articles’ and reminds that ‘there are unfortu-
nate gaps in Article 25 of the icc Statute’ which should be addressed.474 Van 
Sliedregt calls the absence of ‘incitement’ as an inchoate form of criminal re-
sponsibility noteworthy, especially in light of the Genocide Convention where 
it is punishable as such.475 From the point of view of morality the criminalisa-
tion of incitement to cah is essential. Van Sliedregt argues that ‘promoting an 
individual to commit a crime may be even more reprehensible than assisting 
someone who has already decided to commit a crime’.476
469 Ibid., referring to the unga ilc Report, 69th Session, supra note 462, para. 13.
470 Iceland (on behalf of the Nordic countries), Official Records of the General Assembly, 
 Seventy-first Session, Sixth Committee, 24th meeting (A/C.6/71/SR.24), para. 59; and cah: 
Comments and observations received from Governments, international organizations 
and others (A/CN.4/726), chapter ii.B.7, Sierra Leone.
471 UN A/CN.4/725 Fourth Report on Crimes against Humanity by Sean D. Murphy, Special 
Rapporteur, (18 February 2019), p. 57.
472 Schabas, ibid.
473 Ibid., referring to ilc, Provisional summary record of the 3312th meeting, UN Doc. A/CN.4/
SR.3312, (9 June 2016), para. 4.
474 Schabas, ibid.
475 E. van Sliedregt, ‘Criminalization of Crimes against Humanity under National Law’, 16 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2018) 729-749, 735. Sliedregt suggested the inser-
tion and explicit recognition of conspiracy and incitement as inchoate offences, ibid., 
p. 748.
476 Ibid.
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Even though the ilc’s draft articles on a global convention for cah included 
the obligations of prevention in several provisions, such prevention could be 
enhanced, as suggested by Leila Sadat, by requiring states ‘to prohibit, consis-
tent with their obligations under international human rights law, advocacy of 
national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimina-
tion, hostility, or violence’ under draft Article 4 on prevention.477
In the lead-up to the annual meeting of the States Parties to the Interna-
tional Criminal Court in December 2017 the Peace and Justice Initiative and 
the University of Connecticut Human Rights Institute propose an amendment 
to the Rome Statute to broaden the ambit of Article 25(3)(e) to criminalise not 
only the incitement of genocide, but also cah, war crimes and (potentially) 
the crime of aggression. They formulated an amendment of Article 25(3)(e) of 
the Rome Statute to read as follows: ‘Intentionally, directly, and publicly incites 
others to commit any of the crimes in the Statute, thereby substantially in-
creasing the likelihood of their occurrence. For the purpose of this provision it 
is not necessary that the incited crime(s) be committed or attempted’.478
In light of the above, one might argue that a consensus has emerged among 
scholars for the inclusion of ‘direct incitement to commit crimes against hu-
manity’ in the ilc’s draft articles and that, as rightly suggested by Gordon, 
‘there is no reason inchoate liability in reference to speech should be exclu-
sively affixed to genocide’.479
6 Conclusion
Freedom of expression is essential for personal realisation and the well-being 
of individuals as well as a precondition of any positive societal development. 
Thus, there is no doubt that limiting speech or even assigning criminality to 
any form of expression should be approached with utmost caution, even when 
the speech is unpleasant. Yet social research can methodically distinguish be-
tween speech that may be merely repugnant but is generally harmless and the 
types of speech that are known to elevate the risk of criminal acts in a statisti-
cally significant manner. Grand narratives and the spread of fear and hate pro-
paganda do not merely accompany grand-scale atrocities but also make them 
possible. The current international criminalisation and jurisprudence show a 
477 Sadat, supra note 459, paras. 19-20.
478 In the lead-up to the annual meeting of the States Parties to the International Criminal 
Court in December 2017.
479 Gordon, supra note 71, p. 22.
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deep fragmentation and inadequacy in recognising the role played by hate 
 propagandists in this respect. These shortcomings have manifested themselves 
dramatically in the Šešelj case, particularly in the TC and consequently in the 
AC as well. The mission ‘to do justice’ was not fulfilled and a worrying signal 
has been sent in terms of impunity for future such propagandists. Further-
more, in terms of deterrence, it would be far more desirable for law to be able 
to step in at an earlier stage and prevent hate and fear propaganda from spread-
ing before it achieves its ultimate goal of physical violence against a targeted 
group. Particularly in situations ‘where direct and public calls are being made 
for atrocity crimes to occur, the international community should not have to 
wait, like an ambulance at the bottom of the cliff, for the violence to manifest 
before measures can be taken against those urging the crimes’.480 Our study 
shows that the ilc has lost a golden opportunity in 2017 by excluding from its 
draft articles on cah ‘incitement to commit cah’ as an inchoate offence, 
 showing a disregard for the significance of the preventative function of icl.481 
However, in practice, it is highly unlikely that incitement to hatred per se, crim-
inalised as an inchoate crime, without the materialisation of the incited crimes, 
could ever reach the gravity threshold required.
Several proposals have been made to tackle the status quo and ensure a bet-
ter conviction rate for the likes of Šešelj at international tribunals. Gordon sug-
gests a new ‘Unified Liability Theory for Atrocity Speech Law’ that would allow 
the entire range of potential criminal speech to be charged in connection with 
each of the core international offences.482 The new model would thus include 
direct incitement to any of the core crimes without the requirement of it being 
‘public’,483 ‘ordering’ both as an inchoate and non-inchoate offense,484 and a 
completely new offence, called ‘speech abetting’ which would cover the ‘egg-
ing on’ type of rhetoric voiced contemporaneously with acts that could be 
characterised as any of the core crimes.485 This innovative mode of liabili-
ty roughly corresponds to the current hate speech as a cah (persecution)486 
480 Peace and Justice Initiative and the University of Connecticut’s Human Rights Institute, 
Incitement, Hate Speech, and the Preventive Function of the International Criminal Court, 
Beyond the Hague, 31 August 2017, online at https://beyondthehague.com/2017/08/31/
incitement-hate-speech-and-the-preventive-function-of-the-international-criminal-
court/.
481 See supra Section 5.2. 
482 Gordon, supra note 71, p. 377.
483 Ibid., p. 392.
484 Ibid., p. 251.
485 Ibid., p. 377.
486 Ibid., pp. 376-377.
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but is wider in scope (not being saddled with persecution’s specific intent 
 requirement) and would aim to deter those who watch the violence and are 
tempted to cheer from the side-lines, aggravating the situation.487
Without the possibility of substantial amendments to the existing interna-
tional criminal norms, Wilson suggests a resort to aiding and abetting as the 
most justified form of liability due to the ‘chance-rising’ effects of inciting 
speech.488 He furthermore finds that the minimally higher sentencing applied 
on average for instigation does not merit the investment into proving it.489 Wil-
son and Gillett in the Hartford Guidelines consider aiding and abetting ‘the 
most accurate way of conceptualising how non-military propagandists and 
demagogic politicians actually contribute to a collective criminal enterprise’, 
i.e. through assistance and encouragement, as supportive accomplices, rather 
than as direct instigators.490 They also suggest recourse to this form of liability 
due to the lower causation requirement in practice.491
A fundamental principal of criminal justice is the fair labelling principle, 
which aims to ensure that the label describing the criminal conduct accurately 
reflects both its wrongfulness and its severity.492 Resorting to the current op-
tion of aiding and abetting seems the most practical approach in achieving a 
higher conviction rate due to the lower threshold required for the causal link. 
However, beyond that, it would be hard to imagine those who orchestrate and 
aggressively propagate theories of fundamental and unsolvable conflict be-
tween peoples in order to achieve their political aims, merely as aiders of the 
perpetrators who physically carried out the atrocities. Particularly, if we are to 
question the existence of the free will of the physical perpetrators in such a 
propagandistically determined society, the philosophical question of who is 
really aiding whom gives a starkly different answer. Thus aiding and abetting 
does not reflect the essence and the totality of the criminal conduct which a 
proper label would.493 Instigation or inducement in this sense provides a more 
appropriate theoretical model, as the instigator is ‘the intellectual author of 
487 C. Pauli, ‘Atrocity Speech Law: Addressing Hate that Does Grave Harm’, 40 Human Rights 
Quarterly (2018) 718-729, p. 722.
488 Wilson, supra note 11, p. 299.
489 Ibid.
490 Wilson and Gillet, supra note 221, pp. 71-72.
491 Ibid.
492 D.L. Nersessian, ‘Comparative Approaches to Punishing Hate: The Intersection of Geno-
cide and Crimes Against Humanity’, 43 Stanford Journal of International Law (2007) 221-
264, p. 255.
493 Ibid.
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the crime’ and unlike the mere aider and abettor, he sets in motion a chain of 
events that eventually leads to the commission of the crime.494
In terms of fair labelling there is also the broader question of characterising 
as ‘principal perpetrators’ those who physically commit the crimes, whereas all 
others are mere ‘accomplices’, despite the fact that ‘the typical executor of 
mass crimes is just one among many participants in universal crimes and 
works in tandem with others who may not merit the label of principal 
perpetrator’.495 It has been argued that senior officials as well as hate mongers 
should be considered as accomplices who can nonetheless be more culpable 
than physical perpetrators, ‘because they are aggregators of responsibility’.496 
This is in line with the point made by the AC in Tadić that ‘the moral gravity 
of… participation is often no less – or indeed no different – from that of those 
actually carrying out the acts in question’.497 At the icc, in Katanga the TC also 
rejected a hierarchy between modes of liability, however this is in contrast to 
the majority of icc case law.498 Furthermore, from the victims’ perspective 
such an understanding of who is the principal and who the accomplice may 
prove a bit too abstract and thus appear to understate the gravity and magni-
tude of the propagandist’s actions. The principle function of label is not sen-
tencing, but rather the fact that it appropriately ‘addresses both the offender 
and the larger community, stigmatising the former for his culpable conduct 
and conveying the nature of his transgression’.499 It is thus the view of the pres-
ent authors that hate and fear propagandists, such as Šešelj, are best described 
as co-perpetrators in a common criminal enterprise. This allows for the recog-
nition of the responsibility of the physical perpetrators and the propagandists 
without diminishing the role of either. It furthermore recognises the fact that 
494 W.K. Timmerman and W.A. Schabas, ‘Incitement to, in P. Behrens and R.J. Henham (eds.), 
Elements of Genocide (Routledge, New York, 2013), p. 171.
495 T. Einarsen and J. Rikof, A Theory of Punishable Participation in Universal Crimes (Torkel 
Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2018) p. 13.
496 D. Guilfoyle, ‘Responsibility for Collective Atrocities: Fair Labelling and Approaches to 
Commission in International Criminal Law’, 64 Current Legal Problems (2001) 255-286, 
p. 255.
497 Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 85, para. 191.
498 Katanga Trial Judgment, supra note 77, para. 1387; see also Situation in the drc, Prosecu-
tor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute – Concurring 
opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, Case No. (ICC-01/04-02/12), 18 December 2012, para. 
22: ‘[t]he fat that principals are connected more directly to the bringing about of the ma-
terial elements of the crime than accessories does not imply that the role of the former 
should be regarded as inherently more blameworthy’.
499 Nersessian, supra note 488, p. 256.
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hate and fear propaganda leading to atrocities is necessarily a common 
 endeavour of a multitude of persons.
While jce does not exist under the icc Statue, the liabilities formerly 
 considered under this theory now fit under co-perpetration (Art. 25(3)(a)) and 
common purpose liability (Article 25(3)(d)), both designed for group crimes in 
which multiple persons worked together towards a joint criminal endeavour. 
The icc jurisprudence has considered that joint perpetrators are principals 
with control over the crime, who make an essential contribution to it and can 
frustrate it by withholding their assigned tasks.500
In contrast, the requirements for liability under Art. 25(3)(d) in theory set a 
relatively low threshold of criminal responsibility, which has given it the name 
‘residual’. However, in practice Art. 25(3)(d) covers a variety of conduct entail-
ing different levels of responsibility and blameworthiness, thus not necessarily 
representing a hierarchically lower form of liability.501 Which option better 
suits the hate and fear propagandist in question will depend on the particular 
circumstances. While it may be difficult to argue that such a propagandist had 
‘control over the crime’, their contribution can nevertheless be essential. The 
Rome Statute itself, does not specify anything more or less than the commis-
sion of a crime ‘jointly’ allowing room for a less strict interpretation in the 
 future, more in line with jce I. However, in cases such as the hate propaganda 
spread by the Myanmar military, the option of co-perpetration based on func-
tional control over the crime (Art. 25(3)(a)) is best suited to attribute individu-
al criminal responsibility to those senior officials in the Tatmadaw.
The practical question of course remains of how to prove the causal link. 
Whether future prosecutions and trial chambers opt for co-perpetration, 
 inducement (formerly instigation) or aiding and abetting or they make a 
 recourse to common purpose liability, the question of causation will always 
remain, regardless of how high or low its threshold is set. While it might seem 
practical to remove causation as a necessary element altogether when dealing 
with fear and hate propaganda, this would create the impression that such a 
causation does not exist, when in reality it merely works in a more complex 
manner than judges usually look for in small-scale crime or what they expect 
from typical instances of threatening or denigrating speech at national crimi-
nal courts.
500 Situation in the drc, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. 
Thomas Lubango Dyilo against his conviction, Case No. (ICC-01/04-01/06), 1 December 
2014, para. 469; Blé Goudé confirmation of charges decision, supra note 88, para. 135.
501 Cupido, supra note 77, p. 914.
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As Wilson describes, atrocity speech typically influences the mindsets of 
other people who participate in the criminal enterprise in indirect ways.502 
What is contributed to the crime by an act of instigation is often only a causal 
factor in the whole criminal enterprise and only indirectly a causal factor in 
the crime eventually perpetrated.503 Wilson strongly criticises the current the-
ories of direct causation for presenting an inaccurate account of the conse-
quences of speech and argues that international tribunals should make a clear-
er distinction between material and legal causation which would allow the 
trial chamber to consider the entire constellation of conditions jointly suffi-
cient to result in a harm or injury using a broad formulation of cause and ef-
fect.504 In this respect social science experts can answer general causation 
questions but not the specific contribution of the accused to the crime or his 
mens rea.505 In terms of legal causation, the international tribunals need to be 
explicit that the attribution of responsibility is determined by the conduct that 
the defendant should have taken reasonable steps to avoid since an offence 
was a foreseeable consequence of their act or omission, acknowledging that 
the scope of liability is a policy decision derived from the statutes and the case 
law.506
Several studies in the social sciences have identified how nationalistic, reli-
gious or other ideologies are capable of manipulating ordinary people into 
committing atrocities. As mentioned, the Hartford Guidelines advance a risk 
assessment framework informed by the latest social science research that has 
identified many of the key ingredients of what makes successful mass persua-
sion in this regard.507 In the same vein, Gordon creates a set of evaluative cri-
teria to be considered by the courts. This includes whether there was dehu-
manising language or accusations in a mirror; the channel of communication 
(i.e., whether it was broadcast, social media, or printed); the temporality and 
instrumentality (i.e., how close in time the speech was uttered with its repub-
lication and how much control the speaker had over the republication).508 
Most importantly the courts should look at the context of the speech, both 
internal and external; this includes the speaker’s background, authority and 
personal tone, the political climate, the media environment, the outbreak or 
imminent outbreak of armed conflict, instability, a dictatorial regime and the 
502 Wilson, supra note 11, p. 299.
503 Ibid.
504 Ibid.
505 Ibid., p. 300.
506 Ibid., p. 301.
507 Wilson and Gillett, supra note 221, pp. 120-121.
508 Gordon, supra note 71, pp. 300-301.
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lack of an atmosphere of diverse voices.509 To avoid further miscarriages of 
justice, icl has to incorporate into its theories of causality the broader picture 
of the role hate and fear propaganda play in enabling international crimes in 
terms of persuasion and beyond and the expertise of social scientists are 
 essential in this regard.
509 Ibid., pp. 296-297.
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